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I 
Abstract 
Just as people defend against threats to personal identity, they also defend against 
threats to social identity. In the context of intergroup transgression, the defensiveness 
against social identity threat has the effect of undermining collective guilt and its pro-
social consequences. However, there may be ways for perpetrator groups to alleviate 
threat without undermining guilt. Five studies examined whether perpetrator groups are 
more willing to acknowledge collective guilt once social identity threat has been buffered 
by ingroup-affirmation. As predicted, Study 1 revealed that men accepted greater 
collective guilt for the mistreatment of women after affirming their ingroup. Replicating 
this effect, Study 2 revealed that, following ingroup-affirmation, Canadians accepted 
greater collective guilt over the mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential 
schools. In light of the theoretical distinction between collective guilt and collective 
shame, Studies 3 and 4 examined the effect of ingroup-affirmation on each emotion. 
Results revealed that, as with collective guilt, Canadians accepted greater collective 
shame following ingroup-affirmation. More importantly, ingroup-affirmation moderated 
the relation of each emotion with compensation. Specifically, when controlling for each 
other, collective shame predicted compensation only when social identity threat was left 
unchecked, whereas collective guilt predicted compensation only when social identity 
threat had been disarmed by ingroup-affirmation. Finally, Study 5 provided direct 
evidence that the effect of ingroup-affirmation is mediated by defensiveness. Specifically, 
ingroup-affirmation lowered defensiveness, which in turn freed group members to 
acknowledge greater collective guilt and greater collective shame. The theoretical and 
applied implications of these findings are discussed. 
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Acknowledging the Skeletons in Our Closet: Collective Guilt and Ingroup-affirmation 
Historic injustices (e.g., the Holocaust, slavery of Blacks, etc.), current conflicts 
(e.g., the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Chinese occupation of Tibet, etc.), and ongoing 
inequalities (e.g., gender and racial discrimination) all illustrate humans capacity to inflict 
great atrocities upon one another. Indeed, although the nature and severity may vary, 
there are very few social groups that have not at one point devalued, exploited, or even 
persecuted another group. Such injustices can have severe psychological consequences 
for all parties involved. For instance, ingroup victimization may be experienced as a 
sense of helplessness or alternatively as a source of group solidarity and identity 
(Eyerman, 2004; Novick, 1999; Volf, 2006), produce ill effects on mental health and 
well-being that last for generations (Cairns & Lewis, 1999; Scharf, 2007; Yehuda, Bierer, 
Schmeidler, Aferiat, Breslau, & Dolan, 2000), evoke emotions such as fear for the 
ingroup or anger at the perpetrator group (Gill & Matheson, 2006; Skitka, Bauman, & 
Mullen, 2004; van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004), or motivate collective 
action or retaliation (Gallimore, 2004; Martin, Brickman, & Murray, 1984; van Zomeren, 
Postmes, & Spears, 2008). On the other hand, ingroup transgressions may cast doubt on 
the morality and justness of the ingroup (Barkan, 2000; Bar-On, 1990), evoke a sense of 
guilt for what the ingroup has done or conversely anger for being unjustly blamed 
(Barkan, 2000; Buruma, 1994; Rensmann, 2005; Steele, 1990), promote or hinder 
prejudice toward the victim group (Branscombe, Schmitt, Schiffhauer, 2007; Castano & 
Giner-Sorolla, 2006; Powell, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2005), and motivate attempts to 
either repair the harm inflicted by the ingroup (Amirkhan, Bentancourt, Graham, Lopez, 
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& Weiner, 1995; Barkan, 2000; Okimoto, 2008) or defend the ingroup's integrity 
(Dresler-Hawke, 2005; Marques, Paez, & Sera, 1997; Sahdra & Ross, 2007). 
Given the psychological impact of intergroup injustices, the current research 
builds from the premise that thinking about injustices committed by one's ingroup has the 
capacity to evoke feelings of collective guilt and pro-social intentions. Consistent with 
this premise, prior research has established that, when people belong to a perpetrator 
group, reflecting upon the harm that their ingroup has inflicted can sometimes evoke a 
sense of collective guilt (e.g., Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Branscombe, 
Slugoski, & Kappen, 2004; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Lickel, 
Schmader, Curtis, Seamier, & Ames, 2005). Moreover, when experienced, collective 
guilt may be critical for mending the fences between perpetrator and victim groups, as it 
has been linked to both reparation and positive intergroup attitudes (Harvey & Oswald, 
2000; Powell et al., 2005; Swim & Miller, 1999). 
A second premise that the current research builds from is that acknowledging 
ingroup transgressions also has the capacity to deflate the positive sense of self that 
people derive from their ingroup. Specifically, it has been speculated that reflecting on an 
ingroup transgression has negative connotations for one's social identity (Iyer, Leach, & 
Pedersen, 2004; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). As such, rather than acknowledging 
ingroup transgressions, members of perpetrator groups are often more motivated to 
defend against the identity threat posed by ingroup transgressions. To this end, they often 
engage in various strategies to deflect their ingroup's perceived culpability. 
A third premise that the current research builds from is that, through defending 
against the threat of an ingroup transgression, feelings of collective guilt may also be 
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deflected. Specifically, many of the defensive strategies employed by members of 
perpetrator groups to protect their social identity also effectively undermining the criteria 
required to elicit collective guilt and its pro-social consequences. Consistent with this 
premise, previous research has found that the pro-social outcomes linked to collective 
guilt are inhibited in members of perpetrator groups who are strongly predisposed to 
protecting their social identity (Peetz, Gunn, & Wilson, 2009). 
Given that collective guilt gives rise to reconciliatory behaviours, one way to 
improve relations between perpetrator and victim groups may be to identify ways in 
which perpetrator groups can regulate threat to social identity without undermining the 
perceived criteria that elicit collective guilt. For instance, if social identity could be 
bolstered through some other means, defensiveness against an ingroup transgression 
might become unnecessary, such that members of perpetrator groups could then be more 
likely to acknowledge collective guilt, and in turn take actions to repair the harm they 
have inflicted on the victim group. To address this possibility, the current research 
employs a well-known procedure called affirmation. Specifically, by affirming other 
valued aspects of the ingroup, members of perpetrator groups should be able to buffer 
themselves against any threats to their social identity. Consequently, ingroup-affirmation 
should allow group members to respond less defensively to their ingroup transgressions, 
and thus accept greater collective guilt. 
Social Identity Theory 
According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), people possess not 
only a private identity derived from their experiences as unique individuals, but also a 
social identity derived from the groups and social categories to which they belong (i.e., 
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gender, ethnicity, nationality, etc.). Extending social identity a step further, self-
categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) asserts that, 
when membership in a particular group is salient, that group functions as an integral part 
of the self. In support of these theories, research has shown that the cognitive 
representations that people have of important ingroups are directly linked to the cognitive 
representations they have of the self (Smith & Henry, 1996); and in turn, people expand 
their psychological sense of self to include ingroups that they identify with (Tropp & 
Wright, 2001). 
When people derive their sense of self from important ingroups, then the 
perceptions they hold of these ingroups should largely contribute to their overall sense of 
self-worth (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Therefore, in the same way as they are for their 
personal identity, people should be motivated to protect and enhance their social 
identities. Indeed, the motive to positively view one's ingroups is evident in the various 
ingroup biases that group members exhibit, for example, denigrating outgroup members 
so that ingroup members look relatively favourable (Mummendy & Schreiber, 1984; 
Turner, 1978); making dispositional attributions for an ingroup's desirable behaviour but 
making situational attributions when an outgroup engages in the same behaviour (Doosje 
& Branscombe, 2003; Hewstone, Gale, & Purkhardt, 1990; Taylor & Jaggi, 1974), 
allocating more resources to an ingroup than to an outgroup (Otten, Mummendey, & 
Blanz, 1996; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971); and organizing collective 
memories that emphasize an ingroup's glories while distorting or omitting its failings 
(Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Dresler-Hawke, 2005; Marques et al., 1997; Sahdra & 
Ross, 2007). 
Intergroup Emotions 
Drawing on social identity theory, Smith (1993; 1999) theorized that people are 
capable of experiencing social emotions on behalf of a salient ingroup. Specifically, when 
membership in a group is internalized into an individual's self-concept, appraisal of that 
ingroup's behaviour or circumstances can trigger a diversity of emotions. Such social 
emotions can be directed at outgroups (e.g., resentment or envy), or can be felt toward the 
ingroup (e.g., disappointment or pride). As a classic example, through affiliating 
themselves with their favourite teams, sports fans can take joy and pride in their team's 
victories, or feel frustrated and discouraged by their team's defeats, even though they 
personally play no direct role in their team's outcomes (Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, 
Walker, Freeman, & Sloan, 1976; Hirt, Zillmann, Erickson, & Kennedy, 1992). In this 
manner, similar to how self-conscious emotions stem from appraisals of the personal self, 
group-conscious emotions should stem from appraisals of the collective self. 
Collective Guilt 
In the context of intergroup transgressions, one emotion that has been the focus of 
considerable interest is collective guilt (e.g., Branscombe et al., 2002; Branscombe et al., 
2004; Doosje et al., 1998; Lickel et al., 2005). At the group level, people experience guilt 
when they consider the harm that members of their ingroup have inflicted upon another 
group. In this sense, collective guilt refers to the dysphoric feeling or tension experienced 
when an ingroup is perceived as responsible for some wrongdoing against others. 
According to Branscombe and colleagues (2002), the degree to which people experience 
collective guilt depends on the extent to which they: a) self-categorize as a member of a 
perpetrator group; b) perceive that ingroup as being responsible for either actions that 
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harmed another group or for not acting against existing inequality from which the 
ingroup benefits; and c) perceive the harm committed by their ingroup, or the privileged 
status they enjoy, as immoral or illegitimate. Following these criteria, people may 
experience collective guilt in response to: the harmful actions of current members of their 
ingroup against other groups (Lickel, Schmader, & Barquissau, 2004); ongoing group-
based inequality or discrimination that they may not have personally caused but that they 
do benefit from (Schmitt, Miller, Branscombe, & Brehm, 2008); or even reminders of 
historical injustices committed long ago by one's ancestors (Branscombe et al., 2004; 
Doosje et al., 1998). In this manner, people do not necessarily need to be directly 
involved in the wrongdoing in order to experience collective guilt. For instance, Doosje 
and colleagues (1998) found that, despite not being personally accountable, Dutch 
participants reported greater collective guilt when their ancestors' colonization of 
Indonesia was depicted negatively (i.e., exploitation of Indonesian land, abuse of 
Indonesian labour, and killing of many Indonesians) rather than positively (i.e., 
improving Indonesian infrastructure, providing legal system, and introducing an 
educational system). 
Strongly linked with a concern for the effect that one has on others, guilt is 
believed to engender pro-social behaviours. At the individual level, personal guilt 
motivates people to confess, apologize, and repair the damage that they have caused 
(Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 1995). 
Likewise, at the group level, collective guilt motivates people to apologize, and make 
amends, to those whom members of their in-group have harmed. Indeed, collective guilt 
resulting from specific injustices has been associated with support for monetary, 
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symbolic, or other forms of compensation (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Doosje et al., 1998; 
Manzi & Gonzalez, 2007; McGarty, Pederson, Leach, Mansell, Waller, & Bliuc, 2005; 
Reid, Gunter, & Smith, 2005). Similarly, collective guilt resulting from pervasive 
inequality has been associated with support for affirmative action programs and less 
prejudiced attitudes toward the oppressed groups (Boeckmann & Feather, 2007; 
Branscombe et al., 2004; Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby, 2003; 
Klandermans, Werner, & van Doom, 2008; Powell et al., 2005; Swim & Miller, 1999). 
Hence, the pro-social consequences of collective guilt seem apparent, as the experience 
of collective guilt appears to play a vital role in facilitating social justice and intergroup-
reconciliation. 
Rarity of Collective Guilt 
Although collective guilt is linked to apologies and reparation, such pro-social 
behaviors are not always forthcoming from perpetrator groups. This is likely due to the 
fact that, despite the prevalence of both historic and contemporary intergroup 
transgressions, collective guilt is a relatively rare phenomenon (Iyer et al., 2004; Wohl et 
al., 2006). By "rare", it is not meant to say that most perpetrator groups simply do not 
acknowledge collective guilt for their wrongdoings. At the group level, perpetrator 
groups have been found to report modest levels of collective guilt, typically around or 
below the midpoint of a response scale (e.g., Gunn & Wilson, 2008; Harvey & Oswald, 
2000; Hewstone, Cairns, Voci, McLernon, Neins, & Noor, 2004; Peetz et al., 2009; Swim 
& Miller, 1999). Instead, by "rare", it is meant that within perpetrator groups, although 
some members may acknowledge ingroup culpability and report collective guilt, many 
others do not. To illustrate the rarity of collective guilt, Wohl and colleagues (2006) point 
8 
out several international examples where collective guilt may have been expected to 
occur, but in reality was quite minimal. For instance, following WWII, and despite the 
atrocities that took place within the death camps having been recently disclosed to the 
public, almost all Germans interviewed about the Holocaust denied any sense of moral 
responsibility or guilt. Similarly, even decades after the fact, the modern Turkish 
government continues to deny any moral responsibility for the murder of over one 
million Armenians between 1915 and 1917. 
Social Identity Threat 
Acknowledgment of an ingroup's wrongdoings has been speculated to have 
negative evaluative implications for one's social identity (e.g., Iyer et al., 2004; Roccas, 
Klar, & Liviathan, 2004; Wohl et al., 2006). Specifically, an ingroup transgression 
reflects negatively on social identity - implying that the ingroup is immoral or evil. 
However, according to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), people are 
motivated to protect and enhance their social identities in order to maintain a positive 
overall sense of self. Therefore, rather than acknowledge the ingroup's transgression, 
people are motivated to avoid any sense of ingroup culpability in order to protect their 
social identity. Specifically, group members should be motivated to engage in a variety of 
group-protective strategies aimed at alleviating the aversive threat that such behaviour 
poses for their social identity. Indeed, there is ample evidence that when confronted with 
their ingroup's transgressions, rather than acknowledge ingroup culpability, perpetrator 
groups resort to a variety of defensive strategies with which they dissociate from, 
minimize, diffuse responsibility for, or legitimize the perceived harm inflicted by their 
9 
ingroup (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Sahdra & Ross, 
2007). 
Social identity threat, and the defensiveness it evokes, appears to play a key role 
in the experience of collective guilt. Specifically, many of the defensive strategies 
employed by members of perpetrator groups to protect their social identities also serve to 
undermine the criteria required to elicit collective guilt. For instance, the first criteria of 
collective guilt put forth by Branscombe and colleagues (2002) - that one must self-
categorize as a member of the perpetrator group - may be undermined through 
dissociating oneself from the perpetrator group. The second criteria - that one must 
perceive their ingroup as responsible for harming another group - may be undermined 
through minimizing the perceived harm inflicted by the ingroup or by diffusing the 
ingroup's responsibility for that harm. Finally, the third criteria - that one must perceive 
the harm inflicted by the ingroup as immoral or illegitimate - may be undermined 
through justifying the ingroup's actions. When such defensive strategies succeed then, 
members of perpetrator groups should be less inclined to experience collective guilt. For 
instance, within the context of ongoing inequality, members of the advantaged groups 
report less collective guilt when they endorse beliefs that either minimize the extent to 
which their ingroup benefits from its advantaged status (Iyer et al., 2003), or legitimize 
the lower status of the outgroup (Miron, Branscombe, & Schmitt, 2006; Powell et al., 
2005). Alternatively, within ongoing conflicts in which each side may be considered as 
both the perpetrator and victim, group members report less collective guilt over their 
ingroup's transgressions when they blame the other group for instigating the conflict or 
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for harming the ingroup (Hewstone et al., 2004; Roccas et al., 2004; Wohl & 
Branscombe, 2008). 
Our own research has also demonstrated the rarity of collective guilt, and how it 
may arise from defensiveness (Gunn & Wilson, 2008; Peetz et al., 2009). In a number of 
studies, participants read about an ingroup transgression against another group. For 
instance, men read about the inequality that women experienced circa 1900 (e.g., women 
being unable to vote, to run for office, to own property, to work after marriage, or to 
divorce their husbands on the grounds of domestic abuse or infidelity), and Germans read 
about atrocities perpetrated by their group during the Holocaust. In each study, the 
criteria required for experiencing collective guilt (Branscombe et al., 2002) were met -
there was a strong consensus that their ingroup was accountable, that the victim group 
was severely negatively impacted, and that the treatment of the victim group was 
extremely unjust. However, we also altered the description of these events to increase or 
decrease the likelihood that participants would experience them as a threat to social 
identity. Participants were randomly assigned to an "injustice" condition were asked to 
read a passage including details only about the severity of the transgressions. The 
remaining participants were assigned to a "mitigation" condition in which, after reading 
about the injustices, they were reminded of subsequent acts of reparation made by the 
ingroup. We had reasoned that a past ingroup transgression should pose a threat to social 
identity, but that subsequent acts of reparation should mitigate this threat by providing a 
sense of absolution for past crimes. Now, one might expect group members to be more 
empathic with the victim group after reflecting on the severity of an ingroup 
transgression rather than on how their ingroup has already atoned for their wrongdoing. 
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However, across studies, participants only reported modest levels of collective guilt 
across conditions (i.e., ratings hovering at or just slightly above the mid-point of a 7-point 
scale). Moreover, they did not report any more collective guilt in the injustice condition 
than in the mitigation condition. The reason for the observed null effects seems to be that 
participants acted more defensively in the threat condition than in the mitigation 
condition. Specifically, before indicating collective guilt, participants had been given an 
opportunity to defend against threat by relegating the injustice to the psychologically 
distant past. Across studies, ingroup transgressions were more likely to be perceived as 
"ancient history" in the injustice condition than in the mitigation condition. Moreover, 
defensive distancing was associated with collective guilt, as those who perceived the 
transgression as "ancient history" tended to report less collective guilt. Therefore, greater 
defensive distancing in the injustice condition appears to have undermined collective 
guilt in that condition, lowering it even to the levels reported in the mitigation condition 
where participants already felt absolved for their ancestors' crimes. 
In a different approach to examining the role of defensiveness, we also attempted 
to intensify rather than mitigate the threat posed by an ingroup transgression (Peetz et al., 
2009). Specifically, instead of providing Germans with an opportunity to defensively 
distance the Holocaust, we used a procedure designed to make the Holocaust feel 
subjectively recent. We also measured individual differences in Germans' defensiveness 
about their nation's role in the Holocaust. Now, research has demonstrated that past 
events have greater implications for current identity when they feel recent rather than 
distant (Ross & Wilson, 2002). As such, one might expect that inducing a sense of 
closeness to a past ingroup transgression may force group members to acknowledge that 
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transgression and thus accept greater collective guilt. However, by itself, inducing an 
ingroup transgression to feel close should do nothing to attenuate the identity threat that it 
poses for current group members. In fact, we reasoned that a historic ingroup 
transgression should pose an even greater social identity threat when induced to feel 
recent. Therefore, forcing closeness may actually result in less willingness to 
acknowledge collective guilt. Moreover, this defensive backlash should be especially 
evident in Germans who are predisposed to protecting their social identities. Consistent 
with this reasoning, we found that Germans who were high in defensiveness reported 
even lower levels of collective guilt when the Holocaust was induced to feel recent (i.e., 
when social identity threat should have been highest for these individuals). In contrast, 
non-defensive Germans reported greater collective guilt when the Holocaust was induced 
to seem near than when it was portrayed as temporally remote. Therefore, conforming to 
what one might expect if not for the role of social identity threat, collective guilt was 
acknowledged by non-defensive individuals who are somehow able to resolve any 
feelings of identity threat on their own. In contrast, it is only those individuals who are 
most prone to defensiveness that seem to inhibit their collective guilt in situations in 
which it would be expected to occur. 
Taken together, these studies provide some evidence that defensive reactions to 
social identity threat may underlie the rarity of collective guilt. Specifically, feelings of 
collective guilt are likely alleviated when social identity threat is successfully defended 
against. However, given the pro-social benefits of collective guilt, its rarity raises the 
question of whether there is another way for members of perpetrator groups to disarm the 
social identity threat posed by their ingroups' transgressions without inhibiting the 
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experience of collective guilt. One possibility is that, although belonging to a perpetrator 
group can pose a threat for one's social identity, other aspects of that group's identity 
may serve as a psychological resource with which one can draw upon to confront the 
threat posed by the transgression. Specifically, drawing upon self-affirmation theory 
(Steele, 1988), affirming other aspects of an ingroup may reduce the identity threat posed 
by the ingroup's misdeeds, thus alleviating the need to engage in defensive processes that 
have the side effect of undermining collective guilt. 
Self-Affirmation Theory 
According to self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988), people are motivated to 
maintain their self-integrity. Self-integrity refers to a sense of oneself as an overall 
worthy (e.g., good, competent, moral, coherent, etc.) person. People base their self-
integrity on different domains (e.g., being intelligent, being a good friend, having good 
judgement, or being considerate of others, etc.). When the positive views that people 
typically hold of themselves are threatened in any of these domains, people are motivated 
to repair their sense of self-integrity. To this end, people normally engage in a variety of 
defensive strategies, such as invalidating the negative feedback, derogating the source, or 
making excuses for failures. Although such defensive strategies may prove effective at 
protecting a sense of self-integrity, they can also prove costly by preventing people from 
learning about potentially important information about the self or from taking measures 
to address their faults (Sherman & Cohen, 2002). 
As an alternative to defensive strategies, self-affirmation theory (Steele, 1988) 
suggests a potentially less costly way in which people can respond to threats to the self. 
When threatened in one domain, people can restore their sense of integrity by affirming 
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the self in another domain. Specifically, rather than addressing the provoking threat, self-
integrity is restored by reflecting on other positively valued aspects of the self that are 
unrelated to the threat (e.g., focusing on high performance in other domains, thinking 
about an important but unrelated value and how it is reflected in one's life, or engaging in 
an activity that makes other important aspects salient). The benefit of re-establishing 
integrity through self-affirmation is that people will be less defensive and more open-
minded to negative self-information. Indeed, people who have had an opportunity to self-
affirm are less likely to: dismiss evidence that disconfirms their own opinions (Cohen, 
Aronson, & Steele, 2000; Correll, Spencer, & Zanna, 2004); rationalize their consumer 
choices (Steele & Liu, 1983); or derogate others (Fein & Spencer, 1997). 
Group-Affirmation 
As mentioned earlier, people possess not only a personal sense of self, but also a 
collective sense of self. As such, some identity threats can be more collective in nature, 
such as an ingroup's failure or defeat (Crisp, Heuston, Fair, & Turner, 2007), negative 
stereotypes about the ingroup (Shapiro & Neuberg, 2007), being the victim of 
discrimination (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998), or acknowledging how an ingroup has 
harmed another group or benefited from inequality (Iyer et al., 2004; Roccas et al., 2004; 
Wohl et al., 2006). In a manner consistent with self-affirmation theory, can such 
collective threats be disarmed by affirming other aspect of one's social identity? More 
specifically, in the context of intergroup transgressions, can the evaluative threat posed 
by an ingroup transgression be buffered by affirming some unrelated but valued aspect of 
the ingroup? If so, this would make it possible for members of perpetrator groups to 
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circumvent their defensiveness when confronted with an ingroup transgression, thus 
freeing them to accept collective guilt. 
There is some evidence that ingroup-affirmations can serve as resources that 
individuals use to buffer social identity threats. For instance, this possibility seems to be 
rooted in the notion of social creativity proposed in social identity theory (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1986). Social creativity refers to the process by which, when social identity is 
devalued within a particular domain, individuals restore the positive distinctiveness of 
their ingroup by emphasizing the importance of alternative domains. For example, when 
making potentially threatening intergroup comparisons, members of lower status groups 
tend to spontaneously emphasize the importance of traits other than those on which 
higher status groups tend to be superior (e.g., Lalonde, 1992; Spears & Manstead, 1989). 
Such findings suggest that group members sometimes spontaneously engage in 
affirmation-like strategies when confronted with a threat to their social identity, although 
by themselves, these findings do not confirm that these group-affirming strategies 
effectively buffer against the provoking threat. 
More recently, Derks, van Laar, and Ellemers (2006; 2007) examined whether the 
negative consequences of stereotype threat on devalued group members' motivation and 
performance in status-defining domains are mitigated when group members are offered 
ways to affirm their social identity. For members of stigmatized groups, stereotype threat 
is elicited in situations that emphasize the importance of status-defining domains on 
which the stigmatized group tends to be negative stereotyped (e.g., as underperforming in 
those domains relative to high-status groups). When experienced, stereotype threat 
impedes the performance of minority group members within status-defining domains in 
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two ways: a) by increasing anxiety and cognitive load that interferes with their 
performance on domain-relevant tasks; and b) by members of the stigmatized group 
devaluing the domain in which the ingroup tends to underperform (Crocker & Major, 
1989; Schmader & Major, 1999). Devaluing the domains in which one's ingroup is 
negatively stereotyped may serve to protect social identity, but doing so also serves to 
undermine their motivation and investment in these domains, consequently perpetuating 
their ingroup's low social status. 
Derks and colleagues (2006) argued that, instead of devaluing the domains in 
which the ingroup is negatively stereotyped, a less damaging strategy to counter 
stereotype threat would be for stigmatized groups to emphasize other domains in which 
they excel. To examine this, female students were told that they would be taking two tests 
that are commonly used at job recruitment centres. They were also told that women tend 
to perform "below average" on one test (threat domain) but "above average" on the other 
test (affirmed domain). Then, to manipulate the conditions necessary for stereotype 
threat, they were told they would be taking the tests in front of three men (outgroup 
context) or three other women (ingroup context). To manipulate ingroup-affirmation, 
participants then read that, to get a job, it is important to perform well in: the domain in 
which they were previously told that women tend to perform "below" average (non-
affirmation); the domain in which participants they were previously told that women tend 
to perform "above" average (ingroup-affirmation); or both domains (ingroup-
affirmation). Results revealed that women reported lower self-esteem when they took the 
test with three men as opposed to three other women. Therefore, they did seem to 
experience stereotype threat in the outgroup context, but were relatively free of threat in 
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the ingroup context. More importantly though, within the outgroup context, women 
reported greater self-esteem when the importance of performing well in the ingroup 
domain was acknowledged, either on its own or in conjunction with the outgroup domain, 
than when only the importance of performing well in the outgroup domain was 
acknowledged. Thus, affirming the importance of some other domain in which their 
ingroup excels appears to have buffered against some of the negative evaluative 
implications posed by the stereotype threat. In subsequent studies, Derks and colleagues 
(2007) also demonstrated that, in domains in which women are negatively stereotyped, 
their motivation to perform well is greater when they are able to affirm their gender 
identity in other domains. Derks and colleagues concluded that, by focusing on their 
ingroup's positive performance in other domains, members of stigmatized groups are able 
to affirm their social identity and inhibit coping strategies which devalue those domains 
in which their ingroup is outperformed by high-status groups. As a result, they are able to 
remain invested, and perform better, in domains that can help them achieve higher 
societal status. 
As further evidence that ingroup-affirmations buffer against social identity threat, 
thus allowing group members to respond to the source of the threat in a non-defensive 
manner, Sherman, Kinias, Major, Kim, and Prenovost (2007) examined the effectiveness 
of a ingroup-affirmation in inhibiting group-serving judgments of favourable and 
unfavourable group outcomes. In an initial study, intramural athletes whose team had 
either won or lost were assigned to an ingroup-affirmation or control condition. Similarly, 
in a second study, fans seated in stadiums who had just watched their college team win or 
lose an intercollegiate basketball game were randomly assigned to an ingroup-affirmation 
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or non-affirmation condition. Participants in the ingroup-affirmation conditions ranked 
the importance of 10 values (e.g., sense of humour, relationships with friends, religion) 
according to their team, and then wrote about why the top-rated value was important to 
their team and what their team has done to demonstrate that value. In contrast, 
participants in the non-affirmation conditions ranked the importance of the 10 values to 
themselves personally, but then wrote about why the ninth-ranked value might be 
important to a typical college student and something that a college student might do to 
demonstrate that value. As predicted, in the non-affirmation conditions, fans or members 
of losing teams were less likely to attribute the outcome to their team's performance than 
were fans or members of winning teams. However, in both studies, this group-serving 
attribution was eliminated in the ingroup-affirmation condition, with losers now 
attributing the outcome to their team performance as much as did winners. Thus, 
affirming values important to one's group reduced group-serving judgments - allowing 
group members to assign less credit to their team for victories and more credit for losses. 
Taken together, the work by Derks and colleagues (2006; 2007) and Sherman and 
colleagues (2007) demonstrate that, when the group is included as an important part of 
one's sense of self, people are able to use the group as a resource to confront threats to 
their social identity in the same manner as people are able to use the self as a resource to 
confront threats to their personal identity. Specifically, engaging in ingroup-affirmation 
(by emphasizing valued but unrelated aspects of the ingroup) allows groups to feel less 
threatened by, and thus more open-minded toward, information that has negative 
evaluative implications for their social identity. Therefore, it stands to reason that, in the 
context of intergroup transgressions, perpetrator groups may respond less defensively to 
19 
their transgressions when they are able to affirm their ingroup identity along another 
dimension. To the extent that this is indeed the case, then members of the perpetrator 
group should be more accepting of collective guilt, and thus more supportive of 
reparative actions toward the victim, when they have had a chance to affirm their 
ingroup. 
Overview of Present Research 
Members of perpetrator groups do not necessarily experience collective guilt, 
even in contexts that might be expected to produce it (Wohl et al., 2006). This rarity of 
collective guilt seems to be a by-product of the defensive strategies people use to 
alleviate social identity threat. Specifically, the defensive strategies employed by 
members of perpetrator groups to protect their social identities have the side effect of 
reducing collective guilt and its pro-social consequences (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998; Gunn 
& Wilson, 2008; Hewstone et al., 2004; Iyer et al., 2003; Miron et al., 2006; Peetz et al., 
2009; Powell et al., 2005; Roccas et al., 2004; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). As such, 
members of perpetrator groups might be more willing to acknowledge collective guilt if 
they were able to somehow regulate social identity threat without engaging in such 
defensive strategies. 
In the following set of studies, I focus on one particular strategy, or intervention, 
that may enable members of perpetrator groups to rise above the self-centered, or group-
centered in this case, concerns associated with identity threat. Specifically, I attempt to 
demonstrate that, by circumventing the defensiveness associated with ingroup 
transgressions, group members should be free to acknowledge the pro-social concerns 
associated with collective guilt. In Study 1,1 attempt to buffer the threat posed by an 
ingroup transgression for some participants by providing an ingroup-affirmation task. 
This affirmation should alleviate the need to defend social identity by restoring the 
integrity of social identity through an alternate means. As a result, participants may be 
more willing to acknowledge collective guilt if their defensive reactions are attenuated. In 
Study 2,1 again attempt to demonstrate the effectiveness of ingroup-affirmation in 
facilitating acknowledgement of collective guilt, but using a different intergroup context. 
In Studies 1 and 2,1 only examined the effect of ingroup-affirmation on collective guilt. 
However, examination of collective guilt on its own may not tell the whole story. Several 
recent attempts have been made to distinguish collective guilt and the pro-social 
behaviours it evokes from collective shame and the more defensive identity-maintenance 
strategies that it is associated with (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown, Gonzalez, Zagefka, 
Manzi, & Cehajic, 2008). In light of this distinction, in Studies 3 and 4,1 attempt to 
disentangle collective guilt from collective shame and examine the moderating effect of 
ingroup-affirmation on both emotions. Finally, in Study 5,1 more directly tested the role 
that defensiveness plays in undermining collective guilt and collective shame, and how 
such defensiveness can be attenuated by ingroup-affirmation. 
Study 1 
In our past research (Gunn & Wilson, 2008; Peetz et al., 2009), we have found 
that members of perpetrator groups do not report any more collective guilt when their 
social identities were threatened (i.e., reading about an ingroup transgression) than when 
the identity threat had been mitigated (i.e., reading about the ingroup's subsequent acts of 
reparation). We attributed these null effects to the greater defensiveness exhibited under 
the conditions of threat, which served to decrease feelings of collective guilt. However, 
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an alternative explanation for the null effects is that something about the mitigation 
condition elevated feelings of collective guilt, raising them to the levels reported in the 
injustice conditions. For instance, perhaps collective guilt was primed in this condition 
through its associative links with reparation (Zemack-Rugar, Bettman, & Fitzsimons, 
2007), or perhaps it was felt more intensely because compensation seemed more feasible 
(Schmitt et al., 2008). To more directly test the role of defensiveness in undermining 
collective guilt, the current research was designed to rule out these potential confounds in 
our past research. In Study 1,1 provided men with a detailed account of injustices 
perpetrated by men against women circa 1900. However, some men were first given an 
opportunity to bolster their social identity through an affirmation task. Specifically, 
before reminding them of their ingroup's historic mistreatment of women, I randomly 
assigned participants to either write about a value that is generally important to men (i.e., 
ingroup-affirmation condition) or to write about a value that is unimportant to men (i.e., 
non-affirmation condition). Therefore, by being given an opportunity to affirm some 
other unrelated aspect of the ingroup, the threat to social identity posed by the ingroup 
transgression should have been buffered for those men in the ingroup-affirmation 
condition. 
Past research on self-affirmation has found that people respond less defensively to 
negative self-evaluative information when they are able to re-establish a global sense of 
self-worth through some other means, such as by thinking and writing about some valued 
but unrelated aspect of the self (Steele, 1988). Recently, ingroup-affirmations have been 
shown to affirm social rather than personal identities (Derks et al., 2006; Sherman et al., 
2007). If the rarity of self-reported collective guilt is a by-product of the defensiveness 
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intended to protect social identity, then I expect that men might report greater collective 
guilt in the ingroup-affirmation condition (where such defensiveness has been disarmed) 
than in the non-affirmation condition. 
Method 
Participants 
This study was administered online for course credit. To avoid any self-selection 
bias, this study was advertised as investigating people's views on various historical 
events and social issues rather than as investigating people's attitudes toward a specific 
ingroup transgression. In total, 59 male undergraduates at WLU signed up to participate 
for course credit. However, five were excluded from analyses for failing to follow 
instructions on the affirmation task, and one more was excluded for omitting responses to 
key variables. The final sample consisted of 53 men (Mage = 18.38, range = 18-22 
years), with 85% of European descent.1 
Materials & Procedure 
At the beginning of the study, participants first provided their age, gender, 
nationality, and ethnicity on a background survey (see Appendix A). 
Affirmation manipulation. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two 
affirmation conditions. All participants were given a list of 18 values (i.e., self-discipline, 
family, politics, loyalty, creativity, originality, appearance/fashion, honesty, concern for 
others, patience, religion/spirituality, social issues, self-respect, friendships, 
independence, athletics, business/money, and social skills). In the ingroup-affirmation 
condition, participants circled the value that is most important to men generally, and then 
wrote a paragraph describing the reasons why this value generally tends to be important 
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to men (see Appendix B). In contrast, in the non-affirmation condition, participants 
circled the value that is least important to men generally, and then wrote a paragraph 
describing the reasons why this value might be important to other social groups (see 
Appendix C). As a manipulation check, participants also indicated how important that 
value was for men (1 = not at all important to 10 = very important). 
Injustice. After the affirmation manipulation, all participants read a paragraph 
depicting the unjust treatment that women endured at the turn of the century: 
Gender inequality, with men having more power, resources, and status than 
women, has been the most prevalent form of group-based inequality through 
history. Women have often been at a disadvantage; being underrepresented in the 
labour force, and being the primary victims of domestic abuse and sexual assault. 
For instance, at the turn of the 20th century, women in Canada had few rights. In 
1900, women were not considered "people" under the law. They were not allowed 
to vote, to run for office, or to own property. Furthermore, job discrimination on 
the basis of marital status forced women to be financially dependent on their 
husbands, as they were not allowed to work after marriage. Moreover, male 
violence against women was not only common, but was socially and legally 
accepted. For example, spousal rape was not considered a crime and domestic 
battery was not a chargeable offence, so men could sexually or physically assault 
their wives without fear of consequence. Women had so few rights that they were 
not permitted to divorce their husbands on the grounds of domestic abuse nor 
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infidelity. Even if abandoned by an unfaithful husband, she was not entitled a 
share in the property or even financial support for herself and their children. 
Collective guilt. Participants then completed four items (a = .83; see Appendix D) 
adapted from Branscombe et al.'s (2004) Collective Guilt Scale (e.g., "I can easily feel 
guilty about the bad outcomes received by women in the past;" 1 = strongly disagree to 7 
= strongly agree). Because I operationalize the affective component of guilt as distinct 
from its behavioural component, I omitted one of the original items tapping a desire to 
make reparations. 
Compensation. I also measured both general support for, and personal willingness 
to, compensate women (see Appendix E). To measure support for compensation, 
participants completed a single item (i.e., "Should women be compensated because of the 
past injustices committed by men against women"; 1 = should not be compensated to 7 = 
should be compensated). However, I was concerned that, based on this item alone, the 
interpretation of compensation may have varied widely across participants. Therefore, to 
ensure that participants shared an understanding of compensation behaviours, they were 
also asked to indicate from a checklist which forms of compensation they would like to 
see offered to women in response to the treatment of women in 1900 (i.e., nothing, 
formal apology, community support, education about gender issues, greater protection 
for victims of domestic abuse, stricter laws against gender discrimination, stronger 
support for affirmative action policies, and monetary compensation). I tallied the number 
of forms of compensations that each participant would like to see offered to women to 
create a single aggregate score. Note that as the "nothing" item was a non-response, it 
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was not summed into the aggregate scores. The single-item measure was strongly 
correlated with the aggregate-score from the checklist, r(49) = .54, p < .01, so I 
standardized both and averaged them together to create a composite score for general 
support for compensation. 
To measure personal willingness to compensate, participants completed a single 
item (i.e., "To what degree are you personally willing to take action to ensure that women 
are compensated for the past injustices committed by men against women"; 1 = not 
willing to compensate at all to 7 = willing to compensate). They also indicated which 
activities they would personally be willing to engage in to promote gender equality (i.e., 
nothing, stay informed on gender issues, discuss with others, sign a petition, write a 
letter, take part in a protest/march, volunteer for groups aimed at reducing gender 
inequality, and donate money to a group aimed at reducing gender inequality). I 
computed a single aggregate score for each participant by tallying the number of 
activities they indicated that they would personally be willing to engage in. Again, as the 
"nothing" item was a non-response, it was not summed into the aggregate scores. 
Moreover, the single-item measure was strongly correlated with the aggregate-score from 
the checklist, r(51) = .73, p < .01, so I standardized both and averaged them together to 
create a composite score for personal willingness to compensate. 
Injustice Appraisals. Finally, participants completed a series of single-item 
measures assessing their appraisals of the past treatment of women and the harm it caused 
(see Appendix F). Among the injustice appraisal items, I focus only on: "Were men 
initially accountable for the past treatment of women?" (1 = not at all to 7 = fully); and, 
"How unjust was the treatment of women in 1900?" (1 = not at all to 7 = extremely). I 
extended my analyses only to these two appraisals as they were the only ones that seemed 
to reflect the criteria provided by Branscombe and colleagues (2002) as necessary 
antecedents of collective guilt. However, the means and standard deviations of the other 
non-criterion injustice appraisals, as well as their correlations with collective guilt, are 
presented in Appendix G. 
Results and Discussion 
For each variable, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine mean 
differences across conditions. In addition, the relations between collective guilt and 
compensation were examined. The means and standard deviations are presented by 
condition in Table 1. The intercorrelations across conditions are presented in Table 2. 
Manipulation Check 
By reflecting on an important value, men in the ingroup-affirmation condition 
should be able to affirm their social identities. In contrast, reflecting on an unimportant 
value in the non-affirmation condition should have little consequence for social identity. 
With this in mind, participants appeared to have followed the affirmation task's 
instructions, as participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M- 8.60, SD = 1.07) 
considered the value that they circled and wrote about to be significantly more important 
to men in general than participants in the non-affirmation condition (M= 3.52, SD = 
1.78), F(l, 49) = 161.73,/? < .01, n2partiai = -77. 
Injustice Appraisals 
Recall that, in order to feel collective guilt, aside from categorizing oneself as a 
member of the perpetrator group, people must also perceive their ingroup as having 
harmed another group, and perceive this harm as being illegitimate or immoral 
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(Branscombe et al., 2002). In the current sample, there was consensus that the ingroup 
was at least in part responsible for harming another group, as across conditions, 
participants tended to perceive men as fairly accountable for the past treatment of women 
(M= 4.92, SD = 1.56). There was also a very strong consensus that the harm inflicted 
against the other group was illegitimate and immoral, as participants tended to perceive 
the past treatment of women as being extremely unjust (M= 5.75, SD = 1.08). Indeed, 
both appraisals of ingroup accountability, t(5\) = 4.27, p < .01, Cohen's d= .59, and 
appraisals of unjust harm, ^(51) = 11.66,;? < .01, Cohen's d = 1.62, fell significantly 
above the midpoint of their 7-point scales. Moreover, the injustice appraisals did not 
differ across conditions, Fs < .52, ps > .47, indicating that the criteria for eliciting 
collective guilt were equally met across conditions. 
Collective Guilt 
Overall, participants reported modest levels of collective guilt (M= 4.31, SD = 
1.39), which was non-significantly above the midpoint of the 7-point scale, /(51) = 1.63, 
p = .12, Cohen's d= .22. If collective the rarity of collective guilt is a by-product of the 
defensiveness associated with social identity threat, then men should report greater 
collective guilt when the threat has been disarmed than when left unchecked. Consistent 
with this prediction, men reported greater collective guilt in the ingroup-affirmation 
condition (M= 4.70, SD = 1.35) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= 3.76, SD = 
1.29), F(l, 51) = 6.49,p = .01, r|2partiai = .11. Therefore, men in the non-affirmation 
condition reported only modest levels of collective guilt when confronted with an ingroup 
transgression, which is consistent with previous evidence for collective guilt being a rare 
phenomenon. However, affirming other important aspects of one's ingroup appears to 
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have successfully buffered the threat posed by an ingroup transgression. With their guard 
lowered against the negative evaluative implications of the ingroup transgression, men in 
the ingroup-affirmation condition were no longer defensive about their ingroup's 
culpability, which consequently freed them to acknowledge greater collective guilt. 
Compensation. Presumably, if men are more accepting of collective guilt in the 
ingroup-affirmation condition, they might be expected to also have more favourable 
attitudes toward compensation. However, participants in the ingroup-affirmation 
condition (M= -.02, SD = .91) were not more supportive of women receiving 
compensation than those in the non-affirmation condition (M= .04, SD = .87), F(l, 51) = 
.06, p = .81, r\ partiai < .01. Similarly, participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M 
= .05, SD = 1.01) were not more willing to personally engage in activities to promote 
gender equality than those in the non-affirmation condition (M= -.09, SD = .82), F(\, 51) 
= .27,/? = .61, ^partial <.01. 
These null effects on the compensation measures stand in contrast to the pattern 
of results obtained from Harvey and Oswald (2000), who found that, after watching a 
video of a civil-rights protest, White students were more in favour of funding for on-
campus Black programs after they had been given a chance to affirm themselves in some 
other domain than when given no such chance. Harvey and Oswald concluded that those 
who were given an opportunity to self-affirm exhibited enhanced pro-social support, 
whereas those who were not able to self-affirm actually exhibited suppressed pro-social 
support, relative to White students who did not watch the civil-rights protest at all. In 
contrast, the null effects obtained in the current study make it hard to conclude whether 
participants across conditions are exhibiting enhanced or suppressed pro-social support. 
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Now, there are two distinctions between this study and the one conducted by Harvey and 
Oswald which may contribute to the contrasting findings: a) participants affirmed their 
ingroup in this study, but their personal self in Harvey and Oswald's study; b) 
participants affirmed themselves before watching the ingroup transgression in this study, 
but after watching the ingroup transgression in Harvey and Oswald's study, and; c) 
participants only reported collective guilt in this study, but reported guilt, shame, sadness, 
distress, and empathy in Harvey and Oswald's study. I will make some attempt in the 
following studies to disentangle which, if any, of these different methodologies 
contributed to the discrepant results. 
Collective Guilt's Relation with Compensation 
If members of perpetrator groups are only free to acknowledge their collective 
guilt when the social identity threat posed by ingroup transgressions has been alleviated, 
then an argument could be made that collective guilt should only motivate reparative 
behaviors when people are free to acknowledge collective guilt (such that some other, as 
of yet unmeasured, variable may be motivating reparative behaviors when collective guilt 
is inhibited). This possibility may even help to explain the null effects on reparatory 
attitudes. Specifically, if some other motivator of compensation were to arise in the non-
affirmation condition where collective guilt is inhibited, then reparatory attitudes may not 
necessarily show the same drop in that condition as collective guilt does. However, 
arguing against this reasoning is the fact that, in the current study, collective guilt predicts 
both types of compensation in each condition. Specifically, to examine whether collective 
guilt differently motivated compensation across the two conditions, I separately regressed 
men's support for compensation and personal willingness to engage in reparative action 
onto the affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, and the corresponding affirmation X 
collective guilt interaction.2 Results revealed that collective guilt was a significant 
predictor of both support for compensation, /? = .54, t(50) = 4.18, p < .01; and personal 
willingness, /? = .39, /(50) = 2.83, p < .01. The affirmation X collective guilt interactions 
for neither type of compensation approached significance, /?s < .09, ps > .68. Therefore, 
collective guilt appears to predict reparatory attitudes regardless of whether the social 
identity threat posed by ingroup transgressions has been attenuated or not. 
Study 2 
Study 1 demonstrated that men tend to accept greater collective guilt due to the 
past mistreatment of women after having been provided an opportunity to affirm their 
ingroup (i.e., writing about a value that they perceived to be generally important to men) 
than when not provided with any such opportunity. This finding suggests that collective 
guilt becomes more prevalent when social identity threat is buffered. In Study 2,1 sought 
to replicate these findings within a different intergroup context: the mistreatment of 
Aboriginal children in Canadian residential schools. In Study 1, participants were given 
an opportunity to affirm their ingroup before reading about the ingroup transgression. 
Thus, it is unclear whether ingroup-affirmation buffers against social identity threat, thus 
effectively undermining any defensive processes before they even begin, only if it were 
to occur before the source of the threat. To rule out this possibility, participants in Study 
2 were randomly assigned to the affirmation manipulation after they read about the 
ingroup injustice (but before they reported their collective guilt). Finally, self-affirmation 
theory asserts that people should be able to restore their self-integrity by affirming 
themselves in other, unrelated, domains. However, in Study 1, some of the values that 
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participants were presented with (i.e., concern for others, social issues, politics) may 
conceivably have been directly related to the source of their social identity threat (i.e., 
perceiving the ingroup as immoral or unjust toward other groups). Therefore, in Study 2, 
to assure that participants were not affirming themselves in the domain under threat, I 
removed any potentially justice-related values from the affirmation task. Similar to Study 
1,1 expect that Canadians might report greater collective guilt in the ingroup-affirmation 
condition (where the threat has been disarmed) than in the non-affirmation condition 
(where the threat is left unchecked). 
Method 
Participants 
This study was administered online and advertised as a study to investigate 
attitudes toward various historical events and social issues. In total, 55 undergraduates at 
WLU signed up to participate for course credit. However, four were excluded from 
analyses as non-Canadians, and four more were excluded for failing to follow 
instructions on the affirmation task. The final sample consisted of 28 women and 19 men 
(Mage = 18.59, range = 18-22 years), with 79% of European descent. 
Materials & Procedure 
At the beginning of the study, participants first indicated their age, gender, 
nationality, and ethnicity on a background survey (see Appendix H). 
Injustice. All participants read a paragraph depicting Canada's treatment of 
Aboriginal children in residential schools, in which Aboriginal children were taken from 
their homes and forced into residential schools where they were subjected to various 
abuses (see Appendix I). 
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Affirmation manipulation. At this point, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two affirmation conditions. All participants were given a list of 9 values (i.e., 
family, business/money, independence, integrity, hard working, knowledge, art & 
creativity, friendships, and self-respect). In the ingroup-affirmation condition, 
participants circled the value that is most important to Canadians generally, and then 
wrote about why this value tends to be important to Canadians and what Canadians have 
done to demonstrate this value (see Appendix J). In contrast, in the non-affirmation 
condition, participants circled the value that is least important to Canadians generally, 
and then wrote about why this value might be important to some other nationality and 
what this other nationality has done to demonstrate this value (see Appendix K). As a 
manipulation check, participants also indicated how important that value was for 
Canadians (1 = not at all important to 10 = very important). 
Collective guilt. Participants then completed four items (a = .86) modified to 
assess the collective guilt that Canadians experience over the mistreatment of Aboriginal 
children in residential schools (see Appendix L). 
Compensation. At the end of the study, I measured both general support for, and 
personal willingness to, compensate Aboriginals (see Appendix M). To measure support 
for compensation, participants completed a single item (i.e., "Should Aboriginals be 
compensated by Canada for the harms they endured in residential schools"; 1 = should 
not be compensated to 7 = should be compensated). In addition, they indicated from a 
checklist which forms of compensation they would like to see Canada offer Aboriginals 
(i.e., nothing, formal apology, community support, memorial, education about the 
residential schools, and monetary compensation). As the single-item measure and the 
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aggregate-score from the checklist were strongly correlated, r(47) = .61,/? < .01, they 
were standardized and averaged together. 
To measure personal willingness to compensate, participants completed a single 
item (i.e., "How willing are you personally to take action to ensure that the harms 
committed against Aboriginals in residential schools are redressed"; 1 = not willing to 
compensate to 7 = willing to compensate). Then, participants indicated which activities 
they would personally be willing to partake in to ensure that the harms committed against 
Aboriginals in residential schools are redressed (i.e., nothing, discuss with others, sign a 
petition, write a letter, take part in a protest/march, volunteer for groups aimed at 
improving conditions for Aboriginals, and donate money). Again, as the single-item 
measure and the aggregate-score from the checklist were strongly correlated, r(47) = .70, 
p < .01, they were standardized and averaged together. 
Injustice Appraisals. Finally, participants completed a series of single-item 
measures reflecting appraisals of the past mistreatment of Aboriginal (see Appendix N). 
Among these items were included the following questions: "Can Canada be held 
accountable for the past treatment of Aboriginal children in these residential schools?" (1 
= not at all to 7 = fully); and, "How unjust was the treatment of Aboriginal children at 
these residential schools?" (1 = not at all to 7 = extremely). The means and standard 
deviations of the non-criterion injustice appraisals, as well as their correlations with 
collective guilt, are presented in Appendix O. 
Results and Discussion 
For each variable, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine mean 
differences across conditions. In addition, the relations of each variable to collective guilt 
34 
were examined. The means and standard deviations are presented by condition in Table 
3. The intercorrelations across conditions are presented in Table 4. 
Manipulation Check 
The affirmation instructions appeared successful, as participants in the ingroup-
affirmation condition (M= 8.35, SD = .98) considered the value that they circled to be 
significantly more important to Canadians in general than did participants in the non-
affirmation condition (M= 4.83, SD = 1.63), F(l, 45) = 79.08,p < .01, r|2partial = .64. 
Injustice Appraisals 
As in Study 1, there was relatively strong consensus that the ingroup was 
responsible for harming another group, as across conditions, participants tended to 
perceive Canada as being fairly accountable for the mistreatment of Aboriginal children 
in residential schools (M= 4.49, SD = 1.49). There was also very strong consensus that 
the harm inflicted against the other group was illegitimate and immoral, as participants 
tended to perceive the treatment of Aboriginal children as being extremely unjust (M= 
6.30, SD = 1.23). Appraisals of both ingroup accountability, ^(46) = 2.26, p = .03, 
Cohen's d= .33, and of unjust harm, ^(46) = 12.79,;? < .01, Cohen's d = 1.87, fell 
significantly above the midpoint of their 7-point scales. Moreover, neither of these 
injustice appraisals differed across conditions, Fs < 1.78,/?s > .18. Therefore, the criteria 
for eliciting collective guilt were met in both conditions. 
Collective Guilt 
Relative to Study 1, participants in general were quite willing to acknowledge 
collective guilt (M= 5.31, SD = 1.39), being significantly above the midpoint of the 7-
point scale, t(46) - 7.09,p < .01, Cohen's d= .94. However, replicating the results of 
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Study 1, participants reported greater collective guilt in the ingroup-affirmation condition 
(M= 5.72, SD = 1.02) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= 4.91, SD = 1.37), F(\, 
45) = 5.22, p = .03, rfpartiai = .10. Therefore, affirming the ingroup allowed Canadians to 
accept greater collective guilt for Canada's mistreatment of Aboriginal children in 
residential schools. This effect persisted even though the opportunity to reflect on an 
ingroup value was not given until after participants were confronted with Canada's 
mistreatment of Aboriginal children. Coupled with Study 1, this finding suggests that 
ingroup-affirmation can both circumvent defensiveness before it arises (as in Study 1 
when the ingroup-affirmation occurred before the threat was introduced) or disarm 
defensiveness after it has been activated (as in Study 2 when the ingroup-affirmation took 
place after the threat was introduced). 
Compensation 
As in Study 1, although the affirmation manipulation was effective at increasing 
collective guilt amongst the perpetrator group, it was not effective at facilitating 
reparative attitudes. Specifically, participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= 
.10, SD = .88) were not more supportive of Canada compensating Aboriginals than those 
in the non-affirmation condition (M= -.10, SD = .92), F(l, 45) = .60,p = .44, 
t| partial = .01. Similarly, participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M- .05, SD = 
.98) were not more willing to personally engage in activities to repair the harm inflicted 
upon Aboriginals than those in the non-affirmation condition (M= -.05, SD = .88), F(l, 
45) = .13,/? = .73, r^ partjai < .01. Again, these null effects stand in contrast to the results 
obtained from Harvey and Oswald (2000), who found that Whites were more supportive 
of Black programs after having an opportunity to self-affirm than when given no such 
opportunity. However, like in the Harvey and Oswald study, the opportunity to affirm in 
the current study was provided after the ingroup transgression was introduced. Therefore, 
it seems unlikely that the discrepancy between findings is simply due to whether 
affirmation occurred before or after the social identity threat. 
Collective Guilt's Relation with Compensation 
If Canadians were only free to acknowledge collective guilt in the ingroup-
affirmation condition, then collective guilt may have motivated reparative behaviour only 
in this condition. To address this possibility, participants' support for compensation and 
personal willingness to engage in reparative action was regressed onto the affirmation 
manipulation, collective guilt, and the corresponding affirmation X collective guilt 
interaction. Results revealed that collective guilt was a significant predictor for both 
general compensation support, /? = .66, t(44) = 5.41,/? < .01; and personal willingness, ft 
- .57, ^(44) = 4.25,/? < .01. However, the affirmation X collective guilt interactions for 
neither type of reparative attitude approached significance,/?s < .\2,ps > .45. Therefore, 
as in Study 1, collective guilt remained a significant predictor of pro-social reparative 
attitudes in both conditions. 
Study 3 
So far, Studies 1 and 2 have demonstrated that members of perpetrator groups 
accept greater collective guilt after having been provided an opportunity to affirm their 
ingroup. In other words, when people are able to buffer the social identity threat posed by 
an ingroup transgression, they seem to react less defensively by accepting greater 
collective guilt. On the other hand, when social identity threat is present and not buffered, 
it appears to inhibit collective guilt relative to the affirmation conditions. Such findings 
are in line with the rarity of collective guilt that has often been observed amongst 
perpetrator groups. Specifically, in explaining the rarity of collective guilt, researchers 
have suggested that collective guilt stems from negative evaluative implications for one's 
identity, and as such is experienced as an aversive emotion that people are motivated to 
defend against (Iyer et al., 2004; Wohl et al., 2006). However, such speculation may 
seem at odds with how guilt has traditionally been conceptualized at the interpersonal 
level. Guilt has been conceptualized quite differently at the individual versus the group 
level. At the individual level, personal guilt is described as a pro-social concern for the 
harmful impact of one's own behaviours on others (Baumeister et al., 1994; Lewis, 1971; 
Niederthal, Tangney, & Gavanoski, 1994; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney, Miller, 
Flicker, & Barlow, 1996). In contrast, a concern with the implications of one's immoral 
behaviour for one's self concept is generally linked to personal shame (Lewis, 1971; 
Niederthal et al., 1994; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney et al., 1996). Therefore, the 
negative self-evaluative implications that have been associated with collective guilt seem 
to correspond more with shame than guilt at the individual level. Due to the inconsistent 
conceptualization of guilt as having negative evaluative implication, I seek to disentangle 
collective guilt from collective shame in Study 3. Moreover, I will examine the 
moderating effect of ingroup-affirmation on both emotions. 
Guilt versus Shame 
The potential confounding of guilt with shame at the collective level is not very 
surprising in light of the fact that even at the individual level, guilt and shame are often 
used interchangeably (Tangney et al., 1996). Indeed, both are unpleasant, self-conscious 
emotions that arise when the self is implicated as having done something immoral or bad 
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(Lewis, 1971). However, despite their commonalities, guilt and shame are 
distinguishable. At the individual level, people experience personal guilt when they focus 
on their harmful behavior and its consequences for others (Baumeister et al., 1994; 
Lewis, 1971; Niederthal et al., 1994; Tangney et al., 1996; Teroni & Deonna, 2008). 
Although the self is responsible for how one behaves, the harmful behavior is not 
necessarily perceived as reflective of the self or how one will behave in the future. In this 
manner, instead of the self being negatively evaluated, only the harmful behavior is the 
target of such evaluation (e.g., "What I did was bad and immoral"). Condemning the 
wrongdoing, and not the self, allows people to focus outwardly on the consequences of 
the wrongdoing for others. As such, guilt invokes an empathic concern with undoing the 
harm inflicted by that behavior. In this manner, the guilt that people feel over what they 
have done often motivates reparative actions such as confessions, apologies, or 
compensation (Baumeister et al., 1994; Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney, 1995). 
In contrast, personal shame is experienced when people focus on the implications 
of their unjust behavior for their self-concept (Baumeister et al., 1994; Lewis, 1971; 
Niederthal et al., 1994; Smith, Webster, Parrott, & Eyre, 2002; Tangney et al., 1996; 
Teroni & Deonna, 2008). There is some debate as to whether shame is linked to a 
personal sense of moral inferiority (e.g., "I am a bad or immoral person"), or instead to 
damage to one's reputation (e.g., "I am perceived as bad or immoral person in their 
eyes"). In both cases though, an unjust behavior is seen as reflective of one's personal 
shortcomings, such that the self is the target of negative evaluation, either to the self or in 
the eyes of others. As shame arises out of the condemnation of one's enduring, stable 
self, attempts of reparation may only provide temporal relief. As such, people are often 
more motivated to escape their shame through defensive strategies that often involve 
concealing or denying what they have done (Lewis, 1971; Morrison, 1999; Tangney et 
al., 1996; Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, & Gramzow, 1992a). 
Collective Guilt versus Collective Shame 
At the group level, most measures (including the ones I have been using up to this 
point) have only been directed at collective guilt, without any real consideration of how it 
might be distinguished from collective shame (e.g., Branscombe et al., 2004; Doosje et 
al., 1998; Pederson, Beven, Walker, & Griffiths, 2004; Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006; 
Swim & Miller, 1999). More recently though, and in acknowledgement of their 
distinction, various attempts have been made to explicate guilt and shame at the 
collective level (e.g., Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Harvey & Oswald, 
2000; Iyer, Schmader, and Lickel, 2007; Lickel et al., 2005; Schmader & Lickel, 2006). 
For instance, Harvey and Oswald (2000) demonstrated that White participants reported 
significantly higher guilt and shame after watching a 10-min video depicting Black 
children being attacked by dogs and police during a civil-rights protest than after 
watching a video of either a White person suffering from Alzheimer's or a documentary 
on how to make a movie. Thus, both collective emotions of guilt and shame were elicited 
by an ingroup transgressing against another group. However, it is not clear how well 
collective guilt and collective shame were distinguished from each other in this study. 
Harvey and Oswald hypothesized that as guilt elicits an altruistic motive for pro-social 
behaviors, it should be linked with an empathic concern for the victim. In contrast, as 
shame elicits an egoistic motive to reduce one's own aversive state, it should be linked to 
personal sense of distress. Results revealed that, within the civil-rights video condition, 
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collective shame and collective guilt were highly correlated with each other. 
Unfortunately though, both emotions positively correlated with personal distress, and 
neither correlated with empathy. Therefore, consistent with the operationalization of 
shame but in stark contrast to the operationalization of guilt, both emotions in this study 
seemed more reflective of a preoccupation with the self than with a concern for others. 
Lickel and colleagues also attempted to explicate guilt and shame at a collective 
level (Iyer et al., 2007; Lickel, et al., 2005; Schmader & Lickel, 2006). For instance, 
Lickel and colleagues (2005) proposed that collective guilt, or what they termed vicarious 
guilt, occurs when people focus on the control that they have over others' wrongdoing. 
As such, in response to an ingroup transgression, vicarious guilt should be elicited in 
groups where there is a high level of social interaction and interpersonal interdependence 
(e.g., families, close friends, sports teams, etc.), as this would have afforded one more 
influence over, and thus more opportunities to try to prevent, their fellow group 
members' misdeeds. In contrast, vicarious shame should occur when people focus on the 
implications of other's wrongdoing for one's global sense of self. As such, vicarious 
shame should be elicited in groups in which members possess a strong sense of shared 
identity (e.g., ethnicities, nationalities, religions, etc.), as someone else's misdeed would 
then pose a threat to the social identity that one has in common with that wrongdoer. To 
demonstrate this, they asked participants to recall past events in which they felt guilty or 
ashamed for the actions of someone else. As predicted, vicarious guilt was associated 
with a belief that one should have been able to control or prevent the other's wrongdoing. 
In contrast, vicarious shame was associated with a belief that the other's wrongdoing 
reflected negatively on oneself. Thus, vicarious guilt and shame were each elicited by 
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distinct appraisals of an ingroup's wrongdoing. The results also revealed that each 
vicarious emotion evoked a unique behavioral response. Specifically, vicarious guilt was 
associated solely with a desire to undo the other's wrongdoing, whereas vicarious shame 
was much more strongly associated with a desire to dissociate oneself from the 
wrongdoer. Altogether, these results provide support for guilt and shame as being distinct 
emotional reactions to an ingroup's transgressions. However, one potential issue is the 
importance placed on personal controllability of the ingroup's actions for the experience 
of guilt. Many intergroup transgressions occurred in the past, in many cases even before 
most current members of the perpetrator group were born. Having not been born or being 
very young at the time, people today obviously had no control over their ancestors' 
actions, and thus may feel very little need to acknowledge collective guilt. However, 
despite its rarity, collective guilt has been demonstrated in at least some members of 
historic, rather than current, perpetrator groups - Germans for the Holocaust, Dutch for 
the colonization of Indonesia; Canadians for the interment of Japanese Canadians during 
WWII (e.g., Doosje et al., 1998; Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 2006; Gunn 
& Wilson, 2008; Peetz et al., 2009). That people today can feel guilt over their ancestors' 
behaviours which they personally had no control over, coupled with the argument that 
people can feel shame over behaviours or circumstances that they do have control over, 
strengthens recent speculation that controllability is not an effective criterion which 
distinguishes between feelings of guilt and shame (Teroni & Deonna, 2008). 
Citing the inconclusive and even contrasting findings obtained from previous 
studies, Brown and colleagues (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008) called for 
the need to use more theoretically grounded items to validly and reliably distinguish 
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between collective guilt and collective shame. To this end, Brown and colleagues' 
offered their own conceptualizations of collective guilt and collective shame. 
Accordingly, collective guilt is experienced when the ingroup is perceived as having 
unjustly harmed another group, and thus reflects an empathic concern for the adverse 
impact of the ingroup's action on the welfare of the victim group. Thus, to reduce 
collective guilt, people are motivated by a pro-social desire to repair the harm inflicted by 
one's ingroup. In contrast, collective shame is evoked when an ingroup's misdeeds 
reveal, either to oneself or to others, a flawed aspect of one's social identity. Specifically, 
focusing within the context of intergroup transgression, collective shame on the part of 
the perpetrator group is evoked when one feels that an ingroup transgression exposes the 
ingroup as immoral or unjust. Thus, to reduce collective shame, people are motivated by 
a more defensive self-serving desire to restore the ingroup's integrity or social standing. 
In accord with the distinction made by Brown and colleagues (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; 
Brown et al., 2008) then, collective guilt seems to stem more from appraising the ingroup 
injustice in terms of both the harm it has caused others and the ingroup's responsibility 
for undoing that harm. In contrast, instead of collective guilt as has been previously 
speculated (Iyer et al., 2004; Roccas et al., 2004; Wohl et al., 2006), it seems to be 
collective shame that stems from an appraisal of the ingroup's transgression as having 
negative evaluative implications for the ingroup's identity or reputation. This is not to 
suggest that collective guilt and collective shame are entirely independent emotions, as 
there is evidence that they tend to co-occur within the same individuals (Brown & 
Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008; Harvey & Oswald, 2000; Lickel et al., 2005). 
Similarly, this is not to suggest that they are elicited by entirely different appraisals. As 
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with collective guilt, collective shame likely requires people to self-categorize as 
members of the perpetrator group, perceive that ingroup as responsible for harming 
another group, and perceive that harm to be immoral or illegitimate. However, the key 
distinction between collective guilt and collective shame seems to be whether people 
additionally appraise the unjust harm committed by their ingroup as damaging to that 
ingroup's identity or reputation. When they do not appraise the transgression as reflecting 
a threat to social identity, they should be free to focus primarily on the harm endured by 
the victim group and their responsibility for fixing that harm, which will produce feelings 
of collective guilt. However, when they do appraise the ingroup transgression in terms of 
social identity threat, group members will primarily experience collective shame and a 
desire to restore their social identity. 
Defensiveness as an Inhibitor of Collective Guilt and Collective Shame 
Although Brown and colleagues (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008) 
propose that it is collective shame rather than collective guilt that produces a 
preoccupation with protecting the self, this does not mean that the defensive strategies 
that people employ to alleviate collective shame have no effect on collective guilt. Some 
of the defensive strategies employed by members of perpetrator groups to alleviate 
collective shame, thus restore their social identity, function by circumventing the 
appraisals required to elicit collective shame (e.g., minimizing the perceived harm 
inflicted by the ingroup, diffusing the ingroup's responsibility for that harm, justifying 
the ingroup's actions, etc.). However, as mentioned above, these same appraisals are also 
necessary to elicit collective guilt. Thus, many of the defensive strategies employed by 
members of perpetrator groups to alleviate collective shame should also serve to 
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undermine collective guilt. Indeed, Brown et al. (2008) speculated that, although they are 
distinct emotions, collective shame evokes a preoccupation with protecting the self which 
often undermines the experience of empathic collective guilt. 
Collective Guilt and Collective Shame as Facilitators of Compensation 
Although shame may evoke a preoccupation with protecting the self, Brown and 
colleagues (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008) also propose that it does not 
necessarily preclude the perpetrator from engaging in reparative actions. In other words, 
although the primary antecedent of reparation may be collective guilt, collective shame 
can have similar positive associations with reparatory behaviors. Indeed, at the individual 
level, there is evidence that personal shame does sometimes motivate reparative or 
reconciliatory behavior (Fessler, 2004). Similarly, at the group level, even when 
controlling for collective guilt, collective shame has been found to predict reparation 
attitudes (Brown et al., 2008). 
To account for the association between collective shame and reparation, Brown 
and colleagues (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008) pointed out the 
"reputational" aspect of shame. Specifically, when perceived as an immediate means of 
restoring the ingroup's image in the eyes of other, endorsing restitutive policies may be 
an efficient means to alleviate shame. In this manner, although both collective guilt and 
collective shame can lead to reparation, their true aims are not necessarily the same. For 
instance, Brown and Cehajic (2008) found both collective guilt and collective shame to 
be predictive of reparatory attitudes. However, whereas the relation between collective 
guilt and reparation was mediated only by an empathic concern for how the victims felt, 
the relation between collective shame and reparation was mediated by both empathy and 
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a more inward-directed concern for the burden placed upon the ingroup for their past 
crimes. In this manner, attempts at reparation may function to alleviate collective shame 
when perceived as an opportunity to improve the ingroup's tarnished reputation. 
In the short-term, collective shame may lead to acts of reparation, or at least 
public endorsement of reparation in front of others. However, given that collective shame 
stems from more aversive concerns over threats to the ingroup's reputation than does 
collective guilt, Brown et al. (2008) reasoned that its association with reparation is 
unlikely persist over the long run. For instance, as time progresses, group members will 
likely encounter other opportunities to alleviate their feelings by reappraising the 
transgression in ways that undoes its negative evaluative implications for the ingroup's 
identity. Consistent with their reasoning, Brown et al. (2008) found in a longitudinal 
design that, whereas guilt predicted both concurrent and future reparatory attitudes, 
shame only predicted concurrent and not future reparatory attitudes. Therefore, although 
collective shame may initially prompt reparation as a means of restoring the ingroup's 
image, members of perpetrator groups may eventually seek out other, more group-
defensive and less costly, strategies to reduce their shame. In other words, shame-induced 
reparation appears to be undermined when members of perpetrator groups are able to 
defend against identity threats in some other way. 
Affirmation on Collective Guilt versus Collective Shame 
I have already established in Studies 1 and 2 that group members accept greater 
collective guilt after having a chance to re-affirm their ingroup, but how will ingroup-
affirmation affect collective shame? To begin to address this question, let's first consider 
the non-affirmation condition, which would represent the normal circumstances in which 
people are confronted with an ingroup transgression. Previous theorizing and research, at 
both individual and group levels, indicates that guilt and shame may co-occur (Brown et 
al., 2008; Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1991; Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992b). 
Therefore, in the non-affirmation condition, participants may experience both collective 
guilt and collective shame in response to an ingroup transgression. However, they may be 
hesitant to acknowledge either of these emotions, instead focusing their energies on 
defending against the social identity threat present in this condition. Specifically, 
participants may busily set about defending against threat as a means to alleviate their 
collective shame, and as a consequence collective guilt is also undermined. 
Now, let's consider the ingroup-affirmation condition. On one hand, considering 
the theoretical distinction between collective guilt and collective shame, it may seem 
reasonable for ingroup-affirmation to have very divergent effects on the two emotions. 
Specifically, since collective shame stems from threats to the ingroup's identity or 
reputation, then if ingroup-affirmation were to effectively eliminate the identity threat 
posed by an ingroup transgression, it might also be expected to attenuate feelings of 
collective shame. In addition, by precluding the need to engage in defensive strategies, 
which have the side-effect of undermining collective guilt, ingroup-affirmation could 
simultaneously free members of the perpetrator group to experience a greater sense of 
guilt and empathy for those who their ingroup has harmed. According to this logic then, 
group members might be expected to experience less collective shame in the ingroup-
affirmation condition than in the non-affirmation condition, but greater collective guilt in 
the ingroup-affirmation condition than in the non-affirmation condition. 
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On the other hand, as seems more likely to be the case, if ingroup-affirmation 
does not actually eliminate or reduce threat, instead just buffering the impact of that 
threat on identity, it may also seem reasonable for ingroup-affirmation to have very 
similar effects on the two emotions. Specifically, by allowing group members to feel 
secure about their ingroup's integrity or worth, ingroup-affirmation may circumvent the 
defensiveness toward an ingroup transgression, such that group members should then be 
more open-minded towards acknowledging both the harm their ingroup has inflicted on 
others and the implications of that harm for their reputation or status. Thus, as I have 
already shown with collective guilt, members of perpetrator groups may also be more 
willing to openly acknowledge collective shame after affirming the ingroup, although this 
shame is unlikely to have the same aversive quality to it as when social identity threat has 
not been buffered. According to this logic then, group members might be expected to 
experience both greater collective guilt and greater collective shame in the ingroup-
affirmation condition than in the non-affirmation condition. 
Putting aside how ingroup-affirmation may differentially affect collective guilt 
and collective shame at a mean level, I was more interested in how ingroup-affirmation 
may moderate the role of each emotion as a facilitator of pro-social behaviour. In accord 
with previous theorizing (Harvey & Oswald, 2000), I expect that the affirmation 
manipulation might differentially moderate the roles that collective guilt and collective 
shame play as motivators of compensatory attitudes. In the non-affirmation condition, the 
negative affect that group members experience in response to an ingroup transgression 
may be driven more by the identity threat posed by their ingroup's immoral behaviour 
than by any empathic concern for those harmed by the ingroup. In other words, the 
empathic concerns associated with collective guilt should be overridden by the image 
concerns associated with collective shame, leaving collective shame as the primary 
motivator of compensatory attitudes. In contrast, recall Brown et al. (2008)'s proposition 
that shame-induced reparation can be undermined when members of perpetrator groups 
are able to defend against identity threats in some other way. If this is true, then when 
social identity threat is disarmed by ingroup-affirmation, collective shame should no 
longer motivate compensatory attitudes. Instead, once threat is disarmed by ingroup-
affirmation, the negative affect experienced in response to an ingroup transgression may 
then be driven by a genuine empathic concern for those harmed by the ingroup, such that 
collective guilt becomes the primary motivator of compensatory attitudes. In summary 
then, I expect that, when controlling for each other, collective shame might be the 
stronger predictor of compensation in the non-affirmation condition, whereas collective 
guilt might be the stronger predictor of compensation in the ingroup-affirmation 
condition. 
Method 
Participants 
This study was administered online and advertised as investigating attitudes 
toward various historical events and social issues. In total, 70 undergraduates at WLU 
signed up to participate for course credit. However, three were excluded from analyses as 
non-Canadians, two were excluded for being of Aboriginal descent, and six more were 
excluded for failing to follow instructions on the affirmation task. The final sample 
consisted of 41 women and 18 men (Mage = 18.31, range = 17-21 years), with 88% of 
European descent.4 
Materials & Procedure 
At the beginning of the study, participants first indicated their age, gender, 
nationality, and ethnicity on the same background survey as used in Study 2. 
Affirmation manipulation. At this point, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two affirmation conditions. All participants were given a list of 12 values (i.e., 
family, hard-working, politics, integrity, originality, concern for others, honesty, 
independence, art & fashion, knowledge, self-respect, and religion/spirituality). In the 
ingroup-affirmation condition, participants circled the value that is most important to 
Canadians generally, and then wrote about why this value generally tends to be important 
to Canadians and what Canadians have done to demonstrate this value (see Appendix P). 
In contrast, in the non-affirmation condition, participants circled the value that is least 
important to Canadians generally, and then wrote about why this value might be 
important to some other nationality and what this other nationality has done to 
demonstrate this value (see Appendix Q). As a manipulation check, participants indicated 
how important that value was for Canadians (1 = not at all important to 10 = very 
important). 
Injustice. After the affirmation manipulation, participants all read the same 
paragraph depicting Canada's mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools 
as was used in Study 2, in which Aboriginal children were taken from their homes and 
forced into residential schools where they were subjected to various abuses. 
Collective guilt and Collective Shame. Participants then completed three items (a 
= .87) to assess collective guilt, and another three items (a = .90) to assess collective 
shame (see Appendix R). Consistent with Brown and colleagues operationalizations 
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(Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008), the guilt items focused on the harm that 
their ingroup has caused others (e.g., "I feel guilty for the negative things that Canada has 
done to Aboriginals in residential schools;" 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree); 
whereas the shame items focused on the negative implications of an ingroup's 
wrongdoings for their reputation (e.g., "I feel ashamed of how others might look at or 
think about Canada because of the harm inflicted against Aboriginals in residential 
schools;" 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). An exploratory principle-axis 
(PA) factor analysis was conducted to determine the underlying structure of the 6 items. 
Two factors were requested as the items were designed to reflect two underlying 
constructs: collective guilt and collective shame. Moreover, a direct oblimin rotation was 
specified to allow the factors to be correlated. In support of a two factor solution, the 
scree plot leveled off after the second factor and the eigenvalues of the remaining factors 
were all well under 1. After rotation, the first factor accounted for 62.41% of the 
variance, and the second factor accounted for 13.45%. The correlation between the two 
factors was .57. In support of collective guilt and collective shame as distinct constructs, 
the structure coefficients revealed that the three collective shame items loaded higher 
onto the first factor (ranging from .813 to .951) than the second factor (ranging from .457 
to .644), whereas the three collective guilt items loaded higher onto the second factor 
(ranging from .741 to .978) than the first factor (ranging from .387 to .638). 
Compensation. Participants completed the same single-item measures and 
checklists used in Study 2 to assess support for, and personal willingness to, compensate 
Aboriginals. Regarding support for compensation, the single-item measure and the 
aggregate-score from the checklist were strongly correlated, r(58) = .59, p < .01, so I 
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standardized both and averaged them together to create a composite score for general 
support for compensation. Similarly, regarding personal willingness to composite, the 
single-item measure and the aggregate-score from the checklist were strongly correlated, 
r(58) = .72, p < .01, so I standardized both and averaged together to create a composite 
score for personal willingness to compensate. 
Injustice Appraisals. Finally, participants completed a series of single-items 
assessing their appraisals of the past mistreatment of Aboriginal (see Appendix S). 
Among these items were included the following statements: "Aboriginals at the time 
experienced negative consequences as a result of their treatment in residential schools"; 
"Canada can be held accountable for the past treatment of Aboriginal children in 
residential schools"; and "The treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools was 
unjust and unfair". Participants indicated their agreement with each item on a 7-point 
scale (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). The means and standard deviations of 
the non-criterion injustice appraisals, as well as their correlations with collective guilt and 
collective shame, are presented in Appendix T. 
Results and Discussion 
For each variable, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine mean 
differences across conditions. In addition, the relations of collective guilt and collective 
shame to compensation were examined. The means and standard deviations are presented 
in Table 5. The intercorrelations across conditions are presented in Table 6. 
Manipulation Check 
The affirmation instructions appeared successful, as participants in the ingroup-
affirmation condition (M~ 8.32, SD = 1.38) considered the value that they circled to be 
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significantly more important to Canadians in general than participants in the non-
affirmation condition (M= 3.50, SD = 1.82), F(l, 57) = 133.79,/? < .01, r|2partiai = -70. 
Injustice Appraisals 
There was relatively strong consensus that the ingroup was responsible for 
harming another group, as across conditions, participants highly agreed that Aboriginal 
children experienced negative consequences as a result of their treatment in residential 
schools (M= 5.98, SD = 1.27), and moderately agreed that Canada was accountable for 
the treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools (M= 4.50, SD = 1.84). There 
was also very strong consensus that the harm inflicted against the other group was 
illegitimate and immoral, as participants tended to perceive the treatment of Aboriginal 
children as being extremely unjust (M= 6.36, SD = 1.17). Indeed, appraisals of negative 
impact on the victim group, ^(58) = 12.03,p < .01, Cohen's d- 1.56, appraisals of 
ingroup accountability, /(57) = 2.07, p = .04, Cohen's d = 21, appraisals of unjust harm, 
/(58) = 15.45,/? < .01, Cohen's d = 2.02, all fell significantly above the midpoint of their 
7-point scales. Moreover, none of these injustice appraisals differed across conditions, Fs 
< .74, ps > .39. Therefore, the criteria required to elicit collective guilt were met in both 
conditions. 
Collective Guilt and Collective Shame 
Overall, participants were quite willing to acknowledge both collective guilt (M= 
5.36, SD = 1.42) and collective shame (M= 5.28, SD = 1.58), which were both above the 
midpoint of their 7-point scales, /s > 6.23, ps < .01, Cohen's ds > .81. Supporting the 
argument that both emotions can occur simultaneously in response to an ingroup 
transgression, collective guilt and collective shame were strongly correlated, r(59) = .60, 
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p < .01. More importantly though, replicating Studies 1 and 2, participants reported 
greater collective guilt in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= 5.82, SD - 1.21) than in 
the non-affirmation condition (M= 4.86, SD = 1.50), F(l, 57) = 7.47,p < .01, 
f] partial = -12. Participants similarly reported greater collective shame in the ingroup-
affirmation condition (M= 5.66, SD = 1.33) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= 
4.86, SD = 1.74), F(l, 57) = 4.03,p = .05, n2partiai = .07. Therefore, instead of 
undermining collective shame and facilitating collective guilt, ingroup-affirmation had a 
similar effect on the two emotions. Specifically, affirming the ingroup appears to have 
allowed Canadians to accept greater collective guilt and to acknowledge greater 
collective shame over Canada's mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential 
schools. Dependent samples Mests within each condition revealed that participants' 
collective guilt did not differ from their collective shame in the non-affirmation 
condition, t(27) = .00,p = 1.00, Cohen's d< .01, suggesting that both emotions can be 
experienced not only simultaneously, but also equally in response to an ingroup 
transgression. Similarly though, collective guilt was not acknowledged to a significantly 
greater extent than collective shame in the ingroup-affirmation condition, /(30) = .87, p = 
.39, Cohen's d- .16, which further discredits the hypothesis that ingroup-affirmation 
would preclude collective shame while facilitating collective guilt. 
Compensation 
In contrast to Studies 1 and 2, the affirmation manipulation in the current study 
appears to have been effective at facilitating reparative attitudes. Specifically, participants 
in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= .22, SD = 1.03) were more supportive of 
Canada compensating Aboriginals for the mistreatment that occurred in residential 
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schools than those in the non-affirmation condition (M= -.23, SD - .70), F(l, 57) = 3.91, 
p - .05, n partial = .06. Similarly, participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= 
.20, SD = .99) were more willing, albeit non-significantly, to personally engage in 
activities to repair the harm inflicted upon Aboriginals than those in the non-affirmation 
condition (M= -.20, SD = .85), F(l, 57) = 2.81,/? = .10, n2partia, = .05. 
Collective Guilt's and Collective Shame's Relations with Compensation 
To examine whether collective guilt may have differently motivated 
compensation across the two conditions, I separately regressed participants' support for 
compensation and personal willingness to engage in reparative action onto the 
affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, and the corresponding affirmation X collective 
guilt interaction. Results revealed that collective guilt was a significant predictor for both 
general compensation support, /?= .42, t(56) = 3.38,/? < .01; and personal willingness, /? 
= .57, /(56) = 4.89,/? < .01. The affirmation X collective guilt interactions for neither type 
of reparative attitude approached significance, |/?|s < .16,/?s > .35. Therefore, collective 
guilt was a significant predictor of reparative attitudes in both conditions. 
Now, to examine whether collective shame may have differently predicted 
compensation across the two conditions, I separately regressed participants' support for 
compensation and personal willingness to compensate onto the affirmation manipulation, 
collective shame, and the corresponding affirmation X collective shame interaction. 
Results revealed that collective shame was a significant predictor for both general 
compensation support,/?= .45, /(56) = 3.73,/? < .01; and personal willingness,/? = .42, 
t(56) = 3.41,/? < .01. The affirmation X collective shame interactions for neither type of 
reparative attitude approached significance, |/?|s < .10,/?s > .52. Therefore, collective 
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shame also remained a significant predictor of pro-social reparative attitudes in both 
conditions. 
Shame-Free Collective Guilt and Guilt-Free Collective Shame 
The above regression analyses revealed both collective guilt and collective shame 
to be significant predictors of compensation in each condition. Such results offer little 
hope for the prediction that ingroup-affirmation may differently moderate the role of each 
emotion as a facilitator of pro-social behaviour. Specifically, compensation may be 
driven primarily by collective shame when social identity is under threat (i.e., non-
affirmation condition), but driven primarily by collective guilt when such threat had been 
buffered (i.e., ingroup-affirmation condition). Given the shared variance between 
collective guilt and collective shame though, the above regression analyses may not have 
been appropriate for testing such hypotheses. To extricate the relations of guilt and 
shame, Tangney and colleagues (1992a) introduced the concepts of shame-free guilt 
(guilt controlling for shame) and guilt-free shame (shame controlling for guilt). The use 
of such partial-correlations has helped to distinguish the consequences of each emotion, 
as shame-free guilt has been positively linked to empathy and reparative intentions 
whereas guilt-free shame tends to be more strongly linked with self-centered concerns 
and protective, although potentially maladaptive, behaviours (e.g., Fontaine, Luyten, De 
Boeck, & Corveleyn, 2001; Orth, Berking, & Burkhardt, 2006; Tangney et al., 1992a). 
In accord with the recommendations of Tangney and colleagues (1992a), I next 
consider the relations of collective guilt and collective shame with compensation within 
each condition while controlling for each other. Specifically, I separately regressed 
participants' general support for compensation and personal willingness to compensate 
56 
onto the affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, collective shame, the corresponding 
two-way interaction terms, as well as the three-way interaction.6 Regarding support for 
compensation, neither the three-way interaction, nor the collective guilt X collective 
shame interaction, was significant, |/?|s < A0,ps > .54. However, both the affirmation X 
collective guilt, >S = .38, ^(53) = 1.78,p = .08, and affirmation X collective shame, ft = -
.32, ^(53) = 1.67,/? = .10, interactions approached significance. As shown in Figure 1, 
simple slopes revealed that, when controlling for collective shame, there was a significant 
positive relation between collective guilt and support for compensation in the ingroup-
affirmation condition, /? = .65, /(28) = 3.20, p < .01; but not in the non-affirmation 
condition, /? = .07, p = .73. In contrast, as shown in Figure 2, when controlling for 
collective guilt, there was a significant positive relation between collective shame and 
support for compensation in the non-affirmation condition, /? = .45, ^ (25) = 1.95,/? = .03; 
but not at all in the ingroup-affirmation condition, /? = -.06,/? = .76. Therefore, consistent 
with predictions, guilt-free collective shame appears to have been the driving force 
behind compensation support when the ingroup transgression posed a social identity 
threat, but shame-free collective guilt appears to have been the driving force when the 
social identity threat was buffered by an opportunity to affirm the ingroup in some other 
domains. 
Regarding personal willingness to compensate, none of the interaction terms 
approached significance, |/?|s < .12,/?s > .54. Simple slopes revealed that, when 
controlling for collective shame, collective guilt predicted personal willingness in the 
ingroup-affirmation condition, /? = .46, ^(28) = 2.03,/? = .05; and in the non-affirmation 
condition, /? = .49, t{25) = 2.72, p = .01. In contrast, when controlling for collective guilt, 
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collective shame did not predict personal willingness in either condition, /3s < .23, ps > 
.21. Therefore, contrary to expectations, collective guilt appears to have been the driving 
force behind personal willingness to compensate regardless of whether an opportunity to 
affirm the ingroup was presented or not. 
Study 4 
In Study 4, my main goal was to strengthen or clarify the findings obtained in 
Study 3 by attempting to replicate them in a different sample. Study 3 revealed that 
affirming the ingroup enabled Canadians to acknowledge both greater collective guilt and 
greater collective shame due to the mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential 
schools. Such findings may come as a bit of a surprise as, given the theoretical distinction 
between collective guilt and collective shame, it may have seemed reasonable to expect 
that ingroup-affirmation would have very different effects on the two emotions -
alleviating collective shame while simultaneously facilitating collective guilt. Indeed, in 
prior research, Harvey and Oswald (2000) found that White participants acted more pro-
socially after given a chance to affirm themselves than when given no such chance. 
Unfortunately, the affirmation manipulation they used in their study was introduced after 
participants were exposed to the ingroup transgressions and completed the emotion 
measures. As such, the authors did not directly examine the effect of affirmation on 
collective guilt or collective shame. However, they did speculate that the self-affirmation 
task may have actually decreased collective shame and the antipathy it evokes toward the 
victim group, which in turn allowed participants to act more pro-socially. Contrary to this 
reasoning, the results of Study 3 instead revealed that ingroup-affirmation facilitated the 
acknowledgement of collective shame. Such results suggest that ingroup-affirmation may 
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have enabled participants to less defensively accept their ingroup's shortcomings, such 
that they were more willing to acknowledge a threat-free sense of collective shame. 
Regardless, it is important to ascertain whether the effect of ingroup-affirmation on 
collective shame is reliable before speculating further one way or the other. 
In Study 3, the affirmation manipulation facilitated compensation such that 
participants were more supportive of compensation, and more personally willing to 
compensate, after given an opportunity to affirm their ingroup than when given no such 
opportunity. These results are consistent with past findings that Whites indicate greater 
support for Black programs after self-affirmation (Harvey & Oswald; 2000), but they are 
inconsistent with the null effects found in Studies 1 and 2. Such discrepancies raise the 
question of when exactly does affirmation affect compensation? One possibility is that 
there is something in common about the procedures employed in Study 3 and the past 
research, something that was not present in Studies 1 and 2, which acted to inhibit 
compensation in the non-affirmation conditions. For instance, in both Study 3 and the 
study by Harvey and Oswald, participants were asked to reflect on both collective guilt 
and collective shame. So could reporting one's collective shame act to suppress 
compensation in the non-affirmation condition? This would seem unlikely given the 
argument that collective shame is the driving force behind compensation in that 
condition. Regardless, before speculating even further, it is important to examine whether 
the effect of ingroup-affirmation on compensation when both collective guilt and 
collective shame are measured is reliable. 
I had also expected that the affirmation manipulation would differentially 
moderate the roles that collective guilt and collective shame each play as motivators of 
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compensatory attitudes. However, results from Study 3 did not provide consistent support 
for this hypothesis. As predicted, compensation support was fuelled primarily with 
collective shame in the non-affirmation condition, but primarily by collective guilt in the 
ingroup-affirmation condition. However, contrary to expectations, personally willingness 
to compensate was fuelled solely by collective guilt in both conditions. These results 
become even more difficult to interpret in light of previous attempts to delineate whether 
the relations of collective guilt and collective shame to reparatory attitudes are differently 
moderated by affirmation. For instance, Harvey and Oswald (2000) predicted that 
alleviating collective shame would not require the actual harm inflicted by the ingroup to 
be repaired as long as people were able to restore their sense of self-integrity in some 
other means. Therefore, people who are able to restore their self-integrity through 
affirmation (of the self in this case) should no longer feel inclined due to their shame to 
support reparation. However, they predicted that the association between collective guilt 
and reparation support should remain intact. Their results revealed the expected pattern 
for collective shame - White participants' collective shame predicted their support for 
Black programs in a control condition, but not in a self-affirmation task. However, 
perhaps due to their measures failing to effectively distinguish between collective guilt 
and collective shame, the same pattern of relations was obtained for collective guilt -
collective guilt predicted support for Black programs in the control condition but not in 
the self-affirmation task. Given the inconsistent and unexpected findings obtained across 
these two studies, Study 4 attempted to clarify the effect of affirmation on the 
associations of collective guilt and collective shame with compensation. 
Finally, I have speculated that ingroup-affirmation facilitates collective guilt by 
buffering the social identity threat posed by an ingroup transgression, such that group 
members no longer feel any need to engage in defensive processes which have the side 
effect of undermining collective guilt. Thus, Study 4 will also examine group members' 
propensity to engage in one particular defensive strategy. Specifically, I will examine the 
effect of ingroup-affirmation on infrahumanization of the victim group. Past research 
indicates that group members may protect against the immoral implications of an ingroup 
transgression by denying the victims full human-status (Bandura, 1990; Zebel, 
Zimmermann, Viki, & Doosje, 2008). For instance, Bandura (1990) argues that 
perceiving another person as human precludes one from mistreating that person. 
However, by perceiving a person as less than human, moral standards no longer apply to 
that person, such that one can mistreat that person without any sense of moral distress. 
According to Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006), a subtle form of dehumanization is 
infrahumanization, which involves the denial to a group of some of the characteristics 
that make us humans, such as the ability to feel secondary emotions. Primary emotions 
are considered as characteristic of both humans and animals (e.g., attraction, fear, 
pleasure), whereas secondary emotions are considered uniquely human (e.g., love, 
sympathy, pride). Therefore, infrahumanization occurs when people ascribe to the victim 
group less secondary than primary emotions. In the current research, if group members 
infrahumanize the victim group to defend against the moral implications of an ingroup 
transgression, then the need to engage in this strategy should be eliminated when group 
members are able to affirm their ingroup identity in some other way. Therefore, I expect 
that participants might engage in infrahumanization (i.e., ascribe Aboriginals less 
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secondary than primary emotions) less in the ingroup-affirmation condition relative to the 
non-affirmation condition. 
Method 
Participants 
This study was administered online and advertised as investigating attitudes 
toward various historical events and social issues. In total, 65 Canadians participated (55 
undergraduates at WLU and 10 individuals from online classified ads) in exchange for 
either course credit or a chance to win a $50 gift certificate. However, one was excluded 
for being of Aboriginal descent, two were excluded for failing to follow instructions on 
the affirmation task, and three more were excluded as multivariate outliers. The final 
sample consisted of 26 women and 33 men (Mage = 20.17, range = 18-59 years), with 
97% of European descent.7 
Materials & Procedure 
At the beginning of the study, participants first indicated their age, gender, 
nationality, and ethnicity on the same background survey as used in Study 2. 
Affirmation manipulation. At this point, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two affirmation conditions using the same procedure outline in Study 3. 
Specifically, participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition circled a value that was 
important to Canadians, and then wrote about why this value generally tends to be 
important to Canadians and what Canadians have done to demonstrate this value. In 
contrast, participants in the non-affirmation condition circled the value that was 
unimportant to Canadians, and then wrote about why this value might be important to 
some other nationality and what this other nationality has done to demonstrate this value. 
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As a manipulation check, participants indicated how important that value was for 
Canadians (1 = not at all important to 10 = very important). 
Injustice. After the affirmation manipulation, participants all read the same 
paragraph depicting Canada's unjust treatment of Aboriginal children in residential 
schools as used in Study 2. 
Collective Guilt and Collective Shame. Participants then completed three items (a 
= .96) to assess collective guilt, and another three items (a = .86) to assess collective 
shame (see Appendix U). The guilt items focused on the harm that their ingroup has 
caused others (e.g., "I feel guilty because of the harmful actions of Canada toward 
Aboriginals in residential schools;" 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree); whereas 
the shame items focused on the negative implications that an ingroup's wrongdoings has 
for their identity (e.g., "I feel ashamed because of how others might look at or think about 
Canada in response to the mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential schools;" 1 = 
strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). An exploratory PA factor analysis with a direct 
oblimin rotation was conducted with two factors requested to determine the underlying 
structure of the 6 items. In support of a two factor solution, the scree plot leveled off after 
the second factor and the eigenvalues of the remaining factors were all well under 1. 
After rotation, the first factor accounted for 62.92% of the variance, and the second factor 
accounted for 16.24%. The correlation between the two factors was .54. The structure 
coefficients confirmed that the three collective guilt items loaded higher onto the first 
factor (ranging from .930 to .968) than the second factor (ranging from .447 to .591), 
whereas the three collective shame items loaded higher onto the second factor (ranging 
Q 
from .745 to .876) than the first factor (ranging from .376 to .545). 
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Compensation. Participants completed the same single-item measures and 
checklists used in Study 2 to assess support for, and personal willingness to, compensate 
Aboriginals. Regarding support for compensation, the single-item measure and the 
aggregated score from the checklist were strongly correlated, r(59) = .48, p < .01, so I 
standardized both and averaged them together. Similarly, regarding personal willingness 
to composite, the single-item measure and the aggregated score from the checklist were 
strongly correlated, r(59) = .54, p < .01, so I standardized both and averaged them 
together. 
Infrahumanization. At this point, participants were provided an opportunity to 
infrahumanize the victim group (see Appendix V). Specifically, participants were 
presented with a list of emotions, and asked to indicate the extent to which they thought 
Aboriginals in general are likely to feel each emotion (1 = not at all to 7 = very much). 
The list of emotions consisted of 10 primary emotions (i.e., anger, attraction, excitement, 
fear, irritation, pain, panic, pleasure, sadness, and surprise) and 10 secondary emotions 
(i.e., admiration, embarrassment, guilt, hope, love, pride, remorse, resentment, shame, 
and sympathy). 
Injustice Appraisals. Finally, participants indicated their agreement (1 = strongly 
disagree to 7 = strongly agree) with the same series of single-items as used in Study 2. 
Included amongst these items were: "Aboriginals at the time experienced negative 
consequences as a result of their treatment in residential schools"; "Canada can be held 
accountable for the past treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools"; and 
"The treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools was unjust and unfair". The 
means and standard deviations of the other non-criterion injustice appraisals, as well as 
their correlations with collective guilt and collective shame, are presented in Appendix 
W. 
Results and Discussion 
For each variable, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine mean 
differences across conditions. In addition, the relations of collective guilt and collective 
shame with compensation were examined. The means and standard deviations are 
presented in Table 7. The intercorrelations across conditions are presented in Table 8. 
Manipulation Check 
The affirmation instructions appeared successful, as participants in the ingroup-
affirmation condition (M= 8.12, SD = 1.19) considered the value that they circled to be 
significantly more important to Canadians in general than participants in the non-
affirmation condition (M= 4.38, SD = 1.72), F(l, 57) = 96.71,/? < .01, ^partial = .63. 
Injustice Appraisals 
As in Study 3, there was relatively strong consensus that the ingroup was 
responsible for harming another group, as across conditions, participants very strongly 
agreed that Aboriginal children experienced negative consequences as a result of their 
treatment in residential schools (M= 6.07, SD = 1.26), and moderately agreed that 
Canada was accountable for the treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools 
(M= 4.38, SD = 1.64). Moreover, participants tended to perceive the treatment of 
Aboriginal children as being extremely unjust (M= 6.58, SD = .65). Appraisals of 
negative impact on the victim group, t(5S) = 14.28,/? < .01, Cohen's d= 1.64, ingroup 
accountability, /(57) = 1.76,/? = .08, Cohen's d = .23, and unjust harm, /(58) = 30.5\,p < 
.01, Cohen's d= 3.97, all fell above the midpoint of their 7-point scales. Moreover, none 
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of these injustice appraisals differed across conditions, Fs < 1.88,/?s > .17. Therefore, the 
criteria required to elicit collective guilt were met in both conditions. 
Collective Guilt and Collective Shame 
Participants were quite willing to acknowledge both collective guilt (M= 4.87, 
SD = 1.33) and collective shame (M= 5.20, SD = 1.17), which were both above the 
midpoint of their 7-point scales, ts > 5.00, ps < .01, Cohen's ds > .65. Moreover, 
collective guilt and collective shame were strongly correlated, r(59) = .56, p < .01. More 
importantly though, participants reported greater collective guilt in the ingroup-
affirmation condition (M= 5.17, SD = 1.15) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= 
4.49, SD = 1.47), F(l, 57) = 4.02,/? = .05, r|2partiai = .07. Similarly, participants reported 
greater collective shame in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= 5.49, SD = 1.04) than 
in the non-affirmation condition (M= 4.82, SD = 1.24), F(l, 57) = 5.14,/? = .03, 
il partial = -08. Further discrediting the notion that ingroup-affirmation would have 
divergent effects on the two emotions, dependent samples Mests revealed that 
participants' acknowledgement of collective guilt did not significantly differ from their 
acknowledgement of collective shame in both the non-affirmation condition, /(25) = -
1.65,/? = .11, Cohen's d= .32; and in the ingroup-affirmation condition, ^(32) = -1.41,/? 
= .17, Cohen's d= .24. Therefore, in replication of Study 3, affirming the ingroup 
allowed Canadians to accept both greater collective guilt and greater collective shame 
over Canada's mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools. 
Compensation 
In contrast to Study 3, but consistent with Studies 1 and 2, ingroup-affirmation 
was not effective at facilitating reparative attitudes. Specifically, participants in the 
ingroup-affirmation condition (M= .08, SD = .81) were not more supportive of Canada 
compensating Aboriginals than those in the non-affirmation condition (M= -.10, SD = 
.93), F(l, 57) = .55,p - .45, Tj2partiai = -01. Similarly, participants in the ingroup-
affirmation condition (M= .10, SD = .83) were not more willing to personally engage in 
activities to repair the harm inflicted upon Aboriginals than those in the non-affirmation 
condition (M= -.12, SD = .93), F(l, 57) = .89,/? = .35, impartial = .02. How though can the 
null effects found in Study 4 be reconciled with the main effects of affirmation on 
compensation found in Study 3? One possibility may be there was just something about 
the sample in Study 3 which sets them apart from the samples in Studies 1 and 2. For 
instance, although reparation can sometimes be driven by collective shame, such shame-
induced reparation should be undermined when group members are able to restoring their 
ingroup's integrity in some other way (Brown et al., 2008). People have been shown to be 
able to take many different routes to defensively minimize or legitimize the harm 
inflicted by their ingroup (Baumeister & Hastings, 1997; Sahdra & Ross, 2007; Wohl et 
al., 2006). Hence, even when a specific strategy is not provided for them within the 
context of a lab setting, they may sometimes still be able to defend against social identity 
threat by falling back on a range of idiosyncratic routes. Therefore, for what ever 
unknown reason, maybe the sample in Study 3 was just more prone to resorting to their 
various idiosyncratic defensive strategies, such that fewer participants in the non-
affirmation felt any need to endorse reparative when given a chance to do so. This is all 
speculation at this point, so it is still unclear why the main effects of affirmation on either 
compensation variable found in Study 3 were not replicated here. At the very least 
though, the null effects found here act to rule out the possibility that simply measuring 
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collective shame is enough to reliably inhibit compensation in the non-affirmation 
condition. 
Collective Guilt's and Collective Shame's Relations with Compensation 
To examine whether collective guilt may have played different roles in facilitating 
compensation across the two conditions, I separately regressed participants' support for 
compensation and personal willingness to engage in reparative action onto the 
affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, and the corresponding affirmation X collective 
guilt interaction. Results revealed that collective guilt was a significant predictor for both 
general compensation support, /? = .31, ^(56) = 2.39,p = .02; and personal willingness to 
compensate, /? = .51, /(56) = 4.28, p < .01. The affirmation X collective guilt interactions 
for neither type of reparative attitude approached significance, |/?|s < .19, ps > .24. 
Therefore, collective guilt remained a significant predictor of pro-social reparative 
attitudes in both conditions. 
Similarly, to examine whether collective shame may have played different roles in 
facilitating compensation across the two conditions, I separately regressed participants' 
support for compensation and personal willingness to engage in reparative action onto the 
affirmation manipulation, collective shame, and the corresponding affirmation X 
collective shame interaction. Results revealed that collective shame was a significant 
predictor for both general compensation support, fi = .38, t(56) = 2.95, p < .01; and 
personal willingness, /? = .50, ^(56) = 4A4,p < .01. The affirmation X collective shame 
interactions for neither type of reparative attitude approached significance, |/?|s < .24, ps 
> .15. Therefore, collective shame also remained a significant predictor of pro-social 
reparative attitudes in both conditions. 
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Shame-Free Collective Guilt and Guilt-Free Collective Shame 
Now, to examine whether collective guilt or collective shame may have played 
different roles in facilitating compensation across the two conditions while controlling for 
each other, I separately regressed participants' support for compensation and personal 
willingness to engage in reparative action onto the affirmation manipulation, collective 
guilt, collective shame, the corresponding two-way interaction terms, as well as the three-
way interaction. Regarding support for compensation, neither the three-way interaction, 
nor the collective guilt X collective shame interaction, was significant, \ft\s < .28, ps > 
.68. However, the affirmation X collective guilt interaction, ft = .43, 7(53) = 2.1 \,p = .04 
was significant; and the affirmation X collective shame interaction, ft = -.35, 7(53) = 1.67, 
p = .10, approached significance. As shown in Figure 3, when controlling for collective 
shame, there was a significant positive relation between collective guilt and support for 
compensation in the ingroup-affirmation condition, ft - .36,7(30) = 2.10,/) = .05; but not 
in the non-affirmation condition, ft = -.27, p = .31. In contrast, as shown in Figure 4, 
when controlling for collective guilt, there was a significant positive relation between 
collective shame and support for compensation in the non-affirmation condition, ft = .68, 
7(23) = 2.60, p = .02; but not at all in the ingroup-affirmation condition, ft = .15, p = .40. 
Regarding personal willingness to compensate, neither the three-way interaction, 
nor the collective guilt X collective shame interaction, was significant, \ft\s < .20, ps > 
.57. However, both the affirmation X collective guilt, ft = .51, 7(53) = 2.95, p < .01, and 
the affirmation X collective shame, ft = -.43, 7(53) = -2.36, p = .02, interactions were 
significant. As shown in Figure 5, when controlling for collective shame, there was a 
significant positive relation between collective guilt and personal willingness in the 
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ingroup-affirmation condition, ft = .57, r(30) = 3.82,/? < .01; but not in the non-
affirmation condition,p = -.\l,p = .45. In contrast, as shown in Figure 6, when 
controlling for collective guilt, there was a significant positive relation between collective 
shame and personal willingness in the non-affirmation condition, ft = .79, f(23) = 3.52,p 
< .01; but not at all in the ingroup-affirmation condition, /? = .14, /? = .36. 
Altogether then, guilt-free collective shame appears to have been the driving force 
behind compensatory attitudes, expressed as either general support for or personal 
willingness to engage in, when the ingroup transgression posed a social identity threat, 
but shame-free collective guilt appears to have been the driving force when the social 
identity threat was buffered by an opportunity to affirm the ingroup in some other 
domains. The different roles that each emotion appears to have played in facilitating 
reparation across the two conditions may help to account for the null effects of ingroup-
affirmation on compensation that were found in this study as well as in Studies 1 and 2. If 
collective guilt were the only motivator of compensation across both conditions, then one 
might expect reparatory attitudes to drop as collective guilt does in the non-affirmation 
condition. However, if collective shame arises as a motivator of compensation when 
collective guilt is inhibited, then reparatory attitudes may not necessary drop with 
collective guilt in the non-affirmation condition. 
Infrahumanization 
Infrahumanization occurs when people ascribe to the victim group less secondary 
than primary emotions. Therefore, to test whether ingroup-affirmation effectively 
alleviated the need to defensively infrahumanize the victim group, I conducted a 2 
(affirmation: ingroup versus none) X 2 (emotion: primary versus secondary) mixed 
70 
ANOVA design. Results did reveal a main effect of emotion, such that participants 
ascribed Aboriginals fewer secondary (M= 3.40, SD = .76) than primary emotions (M= 
3.74, SD = .66), F(l, 57) = 46.74, p < .01. However, neither the effect of affirmation, nor 
the affirmation X emotion interaction, were significant, Fs < .30, ps > .58. Therefore, 
contrary to predictions, participants were not any less likely to infrahumanize Aboriginals 
after having an opportunity to re-affirm their ingroup than when not given any such 
opportunity. 
As infrahumanization has been purported as a defensive strategy to protect against 
the immoral implications of an ingroup transgression, it may have been motivated in 
response to a sense of collective shame. To examine this possibility, I first attempted to 
rule out that infrahumanization was motivated by collective guilt. Specifically, I 
regressed participants' ascription of secondary emotions onto the affirmation 
manipulation, collective guilt, the corresponding affirmation X collective guilt interaction 
term, as well as the ascription of primary emotions as a covariate. Results revealed that 
collective guilt was not a significant predictor of the ascription of secondary emotions, /? 
= -.00, p = 1.00. Moreover, the affirmation X collective guilt interaction was not 
significant, fi = -.\Q,p = .30. 
Next, to examine whether collective shame may have played a role in 
infrahumanization, I regressed participants' infrahumanization onto the affirmation 
manipulation, collective shame, the corresponding affirmation X collective shame 
interaction term, as well as the ascription of primary emotions as a covariate. However, 
results revealed that collective shame was not a predictor of the ascription of secondary 
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emotions, /? = -.05, p = .46. Moreover, the affirmation X collective shame interaction was 
not significant, /? = -.12,/? = .19. 
As a further test, I separately regressed participants' infrahumanization onto the 
affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, collective shame, the corresponding two-way 
interaction terms, the three-way interaction, and again the ascription of primary emotions 
as a covariate. Consistent with the above analysis, results revealed that neither collective 
guilt, /? = . 11, /? = . 18, nor collective shame, /? = -.ll,/? = .19, were predictors of the 
ascription of secondary emotions; and none of the interaction terms approached 
significance, |/?|s < .88,ps > .38. Taken together, these results suggest that neither 
collective guilt nor collective shame were significant predictors of infrahumanization. 
Study 5 
I have argued that the rarity of collective guilt is a by-product of social identity 
threat. Specifically, many of the defensive strategies employed by members of 
perpetrator groups to protect their social identity have a side effect of undermining 
collective guilt. In support of this argument, Studies 1 through 4 have illustrated how 
members of perpetrator groups are more willing to acknowledge collective guilt when 
social identity threat, and presumably the defensiveness associated with it, have been 
counteracted by ingroup-affirmation. However, up to this point, I have not directly 
demonstrated how defensiveness in response to social identity threat, or more specifically 
its alleviation, contributes to increased collective guilt after ingroup-affirmation. I 
attempted to do so in Study 4 by having participants complete a defensive measure of 
infrahumanization. However, the results failed to show that participants were less likely 
to infrahumanize the victim group in the ingroup-affirmation condition than in the non-
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affirmation condition, or that greater infrahumanization was even associated with reduced 
collective guilt. 
One possible reason for the null findings in Study 4 is that the measure of 
infrahumanization was included near the end of the study, such that the psychological 
impact of the ingroup transgression may have worn itself out. In addition, by this time, 
participants had completed a number of compensatory measures which might have 
already met their need to restore the ingroup's integrity. To address these methodological 
concerns, participants in Study 5 were given an opportunity to engage in defensive 
strategies immediately after the ingroup affirmation and reading about the ingroup 
injustice (i.e., before completing the collective guilt, collective shame, and reparation 
measures). Another possible reason for the null findings obtained in Study 4 is that 
participants were provided with just one strategy (i.e., infrahumanization) to undermine 
the immoral implications of the ingroup transgression. This particular strategy may have 
seemed quite blatant and apparent, such that participants may have been guarded with 
their responses. In an attempt to provide participants an opportunity to protect social 
identity through their own idiosyncratic routes, participants in Study 5 were given more 
options by responding to a measure that captured various defensive appraisals of the 
ingroup transgression. 
If ingroup-affirmation buffers against social identity, then I expect that 
participants will ascribe to fewer defensive appraisals of the ingroup transgression in the 
ingroup-affirmation condition than in the non-affirmation condition. Moreover, if 
members of perpetrator groups are only free to acknowledge collective guilt when the 
defensiveness associated with social identity threat has been attenuated, then I expect that 
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defensiveness will mediate the effect of ingroup-affirmation on collective guilt. 
Specifically, affirming the ingroup should preclude one from ascribing to defensive 
appraisals, which in turn should lead to greater acknowledgement of collective. Like 
collective guilt, participants have seemed unwilling to acknowledge collective shame in 
the non-affirmation conditions than in the ingroup-affirmation conditions. In other words, 
group members only seem to acknowledge their collective shame when the social identity 
threat posed by the ingroup transgression has been buffered. Presumably, this is because 
participants normally engage in defensive strategies that allow them to inhibit their 
collective shame. However, when the social identity threat posed by the ingroup 
transgression has been buffered, these defensive strategies are no longer engaged in as 
participants are now more open-minded to accepting their ingroup's faults and 
acknowledging their collective shame. Therefore, I expect defensiveness to similarly 
mediate the effect of ingroup-affirmation on collective shame. 
Endorsing defensive appraisals of an ingroup injustice should have implications 
for collective shame as a facilitator of reparation. Brown et al. (2008) cautioned that, 
although collective shame can prompt reparation as a means of restoring the ingroup's 
image, the link between collective shame and reparation will be undermined if members 
of perpetrator groups are able to engage in other strategies to restore their ingroup's 
integrity. If true, then at a mean-level, greater endorsing of the defensive appraisals in the 
non-affirmation condition should preclude the need for participants in that condition to 
endorse reparatory attitudes as a means of restoring their ingroup's integrity. Therefore, 
in contrast to the null-effect of ingroup-affirmation on compensation generally found in 
the previous studies (except Study 3), I expect that participants in Study 5 will be less 
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supportive of compensation and less personally willing to compensate in the non-
affirmation condition than in the ingroup-affirmation. Moreover, at a relational level, if 
the link between collective shame and reparation is undermined when other more 
defensive strategies are employed, then collective shame should no longer predict 
reparation in the non-affirmation condition. Specifically, when controlling for each other, 
collective guilt should still be the stronger predictor of compensation in the ingroup-
affirmation condition, but I no longer expect collective shame to be a stronger predictor 
of compensation in the non-affirmation condition. 
Method 
Participants 
This study was administered online and advertised as investigating attitudes 
toward various historical events and social issues. In total, 45 undergraduates at WLU 
participated for course credit. However, one was excluded from analyses as a non-
Canadian, and three more were excluded for failing to follow instructions on the 
affirmation task. The final sample consisted of 35 women and 6 men (Mage = 21.73, 
range = 18-48 years), with 82.9% of European descent.9 
Materials & Procedure 
At the beginning of the study, participants first indicated their age, gender, 
nationality, and ethnicity on the same background survey as used in Study 2. 
Affirmation manipulation. At this point, participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two affirmation conditions using the same procedure outline in Study 3. 
Specifically, participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition circled a value that was 
important to Canadians, and then wrote about why this value generally tends to be 
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important to Canadians and what Canadians have done to demonstrate this value. In 
contrast, participants in the non-affirmation condition circled the value that was 
unimportant to Canadians, and then wrote about why this value might be important to 
some other nationality and what this other nationality has done to demonstrate this value. 
As a manipulation check, participants indicated how important that value was for 
Canadians (1 = not at all important to 10 = very important). 
Injustice. After the affirmation manipulation, participants all read the same 
paragraph depicting Canada's unjust treatment of Aboriginal children in residential 
schools as used in Study 2. 
Defensive Appraisals. Participants were then presented with a list of 12 statements 
(a = .88) which were phrased as commonly held opinions about the treatment of 
Aboriginal children in residential schools (see Appendix X). These statements (e.g., "The 
treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools reflected the norms of the time and 
should not be judged by today's standards of fairness") were generated from what I 
perceived as various defensive responses (or non-defensive responses for the reversed 
scored items) provided by participants in past studies on open-ended items (e.g., "When 
you read about the past mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools, what 
kind of thoughts or feelings did you experience?"). Participants were instructed to rate 
how valid or invalid they perceive each opinion to be (-3 = very invalid to +3 = very 
valid).10 
Collective Guilt and Collective Shame. Participants then completed three items (a 
= .86) to assess collective guilt (see Appendix Y), and another three items (a = .90) to 
assess collective shame (see Appendix Z).11 The guilt items focused on the harm that 
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their ingroup has caused others (e.g., "I do not feel any guilt over Canada's mistreatment 
of Aboriginals in residential schools;" 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree); 
whereas the shame items focused on the negative implications that an ingroup's 
wrongdoings has for their identity (e.g., "I do not feel any shame over how negatively 
Canadians may be viewed by the rest of the world in light of the way we treated 
Aboriginals in residential schools;" 1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). An 
exploratory principle-axis factor analysis with a direct oblimin rotation was conducted 
with two factors requested to determine the underlying structure of the 6 items. In support 
of a single factor model rather than a two factor model, the scree plot leveled off after the 
first factor and the eigenvalues of the remaining factors were all well under 1. Regardless, 
after rotation, the first factor accounted for 67.26% of the variance, and the second 
specified factor accounted for 7.09%. The correlation between the two factors was .74. 
The structure coefficients confirmed that the three collective shame items loaded higher 
onto the first factor (ranging from .816 to .930) than the second factor (ranging from .637 
to .730), whereas the three collective guilt items loaded higher onto the second factor 
(ranging from .720 to .950) than the first factor (ranging from .660 to .791). 
Compensation. Participants completed the same single-item measures and 
checklists depicted in Study 2 to assess support for, and personal willingness to, 
compensate Aboriginals. Regarding support for compensation, the single-item measure 
and the aggregated score from the checklist were strongly correlated, r(41) = .57, p < .01, 
so I standardized both and averaged them together. Similarly, regarding personal 
willingness to composite, the single-item measure and the aggregated score from the 
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checklist were strongly correlated, r(41) = .70, p < .01, so I standardized both and 
averaged them together. 
Results and Discussion 
For each variable, one-way ANOVAs were conducted to examine mean 
differences across conditions. In addition, defensive appraisals were examined as a 
mediator. Finally, the relations of collective guilt and collective shame with 
compensation were examined. The means and standard deviations are presented in Table 
9. The intercorrelations across conditions are presented in Table 10. 
Manipulation Check 
The affirmation instructions appeared successful, as participants in the ingroup-
affirmation condition (M= 7.70, SD = 1.08) considered the value that they circled to be 
significantly more important to Canadians in general than participants in the non-
affirmation condition (M= 3.14, SD = 2.20), F(\, 39) = 69.86,/? < .01, -n2partiai = -64. 
Defensive Appraisals 
Overall, participants were not very endorsing of the defensive statements (M= -
.34, SD = 1.15), with the mean perceived validity of these statements falling below the 
midpoint, albeit only marginally, /(40) = 1.87,/? = .07, Cohen's d = .30. More importantly 
though, participants rated the defensive statements as being less valid in the ingroup-
affirmation condition (M= -.72, SD = 1.24) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= 
.02, SD = .96), F(l, 39) = 4.60,p = .04, n2partiai = .11. Therefore, as predicted, participants 
appeared to view the mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools less 
defensively after they were given an opportunity to affirm other important aspects of their 
ingroup. 
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Collective Guilt and Collective Shame 
Overall, participants were quite willing to acknowledge collective shame (M= 
4.96, SD = 1.25), which was above the midpoint of the 7-point scale, /(40) = 4.88,/? < 
.01, Cohen's d = .77. But they were not so willing to acknowledge collective guilt (M= 
3.89, SD = 1.60), Cohen's d = .07, which was non-significantly below the midpoint, /(40) 
= -.46, p- .65. Further analysis confirmed that participants acknowledged significantly 
more collective shame than collective guilt, /(40) = 6.66, p < .01, Cohen's d - 1.04. 
Regardless, collective guilt and collective shame were strongly correlated, r(41) = .77, p 
<.01. 
Most importantly, participants reported significantly greater collective guilt in the 
ingroup-affirmation condition (M= 4.42, SD = 1.60) than in the non-affirmation 
condition (M= 3.38, SD = 1.47), F(l, 39) - 4.69,p = .03, r|2partiai = .11. Participants also 
reported greater collective shame in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= 5.32, SD = 
1.02) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= 4.61, SD = 1.38), albeit only marginally, 
F(l, 39) = 3.44, p - .07, r|2partiai - -08. Therefore, in replication of Studies 3 and 4, 
affirming the ingroup allowed Canadians to accept greater collective guilt, and to a lesser 
extent greater collective shame. Dependent samples /-tests revealed that participants' 
accepted significantly greater collective shame than collective guilt in both the non-
affirmation condition, /(20) = 6.09,p < .01, Cohen's d = 1.33; and the ingroup-
affirmation condition, /(19) = -3.58,p < .01, Cohen's d- .80. Therefore, further 
discrediting the notion that ingroup-affirmation would have diverging effects on 
collective guilt and collective shame, although participants reported one emotion as being 
stronger than the other, the pattern remained the same across conditions. 
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Compensation 
In contrast to the previous studies (with the exception of Study 3), the affirmation 
manipulation in the current study did have an effect on reparatory attitudes. Specifically, 
participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= .30, SD = .87) were more 
supportive of Canada compensating Aboriginals than those in the non-affirmation 
condition (M= -.27, SD = .84), F(l, 39) = 4.50, p = .04, nVniai = -10. Similarly, 
participants in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= .34, SD = .99) were more willing 
to personally engage in activities to repair the harm inflicted upon Aboriginals than those 
in the non-affirmation condition (M= -.31, SD = .77), F(l, 39) = 5.66,p = .02, 
T| partial = .13. How can I reconcile the effect of ingroup-affirmation on compensation 
obtained in this study with the null effects found in the previous studies? In the previous 
studies, compensation was more likely to be perceived as the only route with which 
participants could combat the moral implications of an ingroup transgression for their 
social identity, as they were not explicitly given an opportunity to engage in other more 
defensive strategies. As such, the previous samples in the non-affirmation condition may 
have indicated themselves to be just as supportive of compensation, and just as personally 
willing to compensate, as those in the ingroup-affirmation condition in an attempt to 
restore their ingroup's integrity. In contrast, in Study 5, participants were given an 
opportunity to engage in various strategies to defend their ingroup's integrity (e.g., by 
either legitimizing the perceived harm inflicted on the victim group or by minimizing 
their ingroup's culpability). Therefore, the current sample in the non-affirmation 
condition may no longer have indicated themselves to be just as supportive of 
compensation, or just as personally willing to compensate, as those in the mgroup-
affirmation condition because doing so was not needed to restore the ingroup's integrity. 
Defensiveness as a Mediator 
So far, I have speculated that the rarity of collective guilt is a by-product of social 
identity threat, such that ingroup-affirmation allows for increased collective guilt by 
undermining the defensive strategies aimed at protecting social identity. For the current 
study, I have also speculated that in the absence of ingroup-affirmation, engaging in 
defensive strategies will inhibit reparation as a means for protecting social identity. To 
test defensiveness as a potential mediator for the relation between ingroup-affirmation 
and these various outcomes, I conducted a series of mediation analyses according to the 
procedures outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986). As I have previously established, 
ingroup-affirmation had an effect on each of the outcome variables: collective guilt, /? = 
.33, <39) = 2.17,/? = .04; collective shame, /3 = .29, t(39) = 1.85,/? = .07; support for 
compensation, /? = .32, t(39) ~2A2,p = .04, and; personal willingness to compensate, /? = 
.36, t(39) = 2.38, p - .02.1 have also already established the effect of ingroup-affirmation 
on the proposed mediator - defensiveness, P = -.33, (^39) = 2.15,/? = .04. 
Next, to examine whether defensiveness mediated the effect of ingroup-
affirmation on the outcome variables, I separately regressed each outcome variable onto 
affirmation and defensiveness simultaneously. As shown in Figures 7 to 10, 
defensiveness proved to be a significant predictor in each of these analyses whereas the 
effect of the ingroup affirmation was eliminated. Specifically, across these regression 
analyses, people who were high in defensiveness tended to: acknowledged less collective 
guilt,/? = -.61, J(38) = -4.74,/? < .01; acknowledged less collective shame, p = -.43, r(38) 
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= -2.88, p < .01; be less supportive of compensation, /? = -.74, J(38) = -6.69, p < .01; and 
be less personally willing to compensate, /? = -.63, ^(38) = -5.15,/? < .01. In contrast, the 
effect of ingroup-affirmation on each outcome variable was eliminated when controlling 
for defensiveness. Specifically, the effects on collective guilt, collective shame, support 
for compensation, and personal willingness were all reduced to non-significance, |/?|s < 
A5,ps> .22. A series of Sobel tests confirmed that the effect of ingroup-affirmation on 
collective guilt was significantly mediated by defensiveness, z = 1.96,/? = .05; the effect 
on collective shame was marginally mediated by defensiveness, z = 1 .72, p = .08; the 
effect on support for compensation was significantly mediated by defensiveness, z = 2.04, 
p - .04; and finally that the effect on personal willingness to compensate was 
significantly mediated by defensiveness, z = 1.98,/? = .05. Taken together, these results 
support evidence for the role of defensiveness in undermining affective responses to 
ingroup transgression along with their pro-social benefits. Specifically, affirming the 
ingroup led to less defensiveness, which in turn led to greater acknowledgement of both 
collective guilt and collective shame, and greater endorsement of reparative attitudes.13 
Collective Guilt's and Collective Shame's Relations with Compensation 
To examine whether collective guilt may have played different roles in facilitating 
compensation across the two conditions, I separately regressed participants' support for 
compensation and personal willingness to engage in reparative action onto the 
affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, and the corresponding affirmation X collective 
guilt interaction. Results revealed that collective guilt was a significant predictor for both 
general compensation support, /? = .53, /(38) = 3.85,p < .01; and personal willingness, /? 
= .65, t(3S) = 5.42,/? < .01. The affirmation X collective guilt interactions for neither type 
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of reparative attitude approached significance, |/?|s < .11, ps > .56. Therefore, collective 
guilt remained a significant predictor of pro-social reparative attitudes in both conditions. 
Similarly, to examine whether collective shame may have played different roles in 
facilitating compensation across the two conditions, I separately regressed participants' 
support for compensation and personal willingness to engage in reparative action onto the 
affirmation manipulation, collective shame, and the corresponding affirmation X 
collective shame interaction. Results revealed that collective shame was a significant 
predictor for both general compensation support, /? = .42, /(37) = 2.85,/? < .01; and 
personal willingness, /? = .47, ^(37) = 3.41,p < .01. The affirmation X collective shame 
interactions for neither type of reparative attitude approached significance, |/?|s < .10,/?s 
> .61. Therefore, collective shame also remained a significant predictor of pro-social 
reparative attitudes in both conditions. 
Shame-Free Collective Guilt and Guilt-Free Collective Shame 
Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that when controlling for each other, collective guilt 
predicted compensation in the ingroup-affirmation condition whereas collective shame 
predicted compensation in the non-affirmation condition. In the current study though, I 
have already demonstrated that participants are more likely to engaging in defensive 
strategies in the non-affirmation condition than in the ingroup-affirmation condition. 
Engaging in these defensive strategies should preclude the need to endorse reparation as a 
means to restore the ingroup's integrity. Therefore, I expected that, when controlling for 
the other emotion, the link between collective guilt and compensation in the ingroup-
affirmation condition should remain intact, but the link between collective shame and 
compensation in the non-affirmation might be undermined. 
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To examine the roles that collective guilt and collective shame play in facilitating 
compensation while controlling for each other, I separately regressed participants' 
support for compensation and personal willingness to engage in reparative action onto the 
affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, collective shame, the corresponding two-way 
interaction terms, as well as the three-way interaction. Regarding support for 
compensation, neither the three-way nor any of the two-way interactions were significant, 
|/?|s < .18,/?s > .59. Moreover, whereas collective guilt remained a significant predictor, /? 
= .49, r(37) = 2.35,/? = .02; collective shame did not, /? = .06,p = .79. That neither the 
interactions of collective guilt or collective shame with the affirmation manipulation were 
significant suggests that role of each emotion in facilitating compensation support did not 
differ across the two conditions. However, by themselves, these non-interactions do not 
speak to which emotion was the stronger predictor of compensation support in each 
condition. Therefore, to test my hypothesis concerning when each emotion would predict 
reparation, I still examined the partial correlations within each condition. Within the 
ingroup-affirmation condition, only collective guilt, J3 = .59, t(\l) = 2.13,/? = .05, and not 
collective shame, /? = .01,/? = .97, predicted support for compensation when controlling 
for each other. On the other hand, within the non-affirmation condition, neither collective 
guilt, /? = .35, p = .34, nor collective shame, /? = .16,/? = .65, persisted as significant 
predictors of support for compensation. 
The same pattern of relations was found for personal willingness to compensate. 
Again, neither the three-way nor any of the two-way interactions were significant, |/?|s < 
.37,/?s > .18. Moreover, collective guilt remained a significant predictor, /? = .67, t(37) = 
3.65,p < .01; whereas collective shame did not, /? = -.02,p = .93. Looking specifically 
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within the ingroup-affirmation condition now, only collective guilt, /? = .84, /(17) = 3.38, 
p < .01, and not collective shame, /? = -.22, p = .39, predicted personal willingness when 
controlling for each other. On the other hand, within the non-affirmation condition, 
neither collective guilt, /? = .41, p = . 17, nor collective shame, /? = .29, p = .33, persisted 
as significantly predictors of personal willingness to compensate. 
Consistent with Studies 3 and 4 then, shame-free collective guilt persisted as the 
sole driving force behind reparation, either in the form of general support or personal 
willingness, when the threat posed by the ingroup transgression had been buffered 
through affirming other important aspects of the ingroup. However, in contrast to studies 
3 and 4, reparation was not predicted by guilt-free collective shame in the non-
affirmation condition (where the ingroup transgression still posed a threat to social 
identity). The reason that collective shame was not associated with reparation in the 
current study seems to be that participants had already been given an opportunity to 
endorse various statements aimed at minimizing either the unjust harm inflicted against 
Aboriginals or their ingroup's accountability for such harms. By successfully defending 
the integrity of their ingroup through endorsing these statements, compensation may no 
longer have been necessary as a means to alleviate the identity concerns associated with 
collective shame. 
General Discussion 
Through a series of studies, I have attempted to highlight the role that 
defensiveness plays in contributing to the rarity of collective guilt. Specifically, I have 
demonstrated that members of perpetrator groups become more willing to acknowledge 
collective guilt after the threat posed by ingroup transgressions has been buffered by 
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affirming other important aspects of the ingroup. Moreover, Study 5 confirmed that 
ingroup-affirmation lowers defensiveness (i.e., decreased endorsement of various 
appraisals aimed at minimizing or legitimizing the ingroup transgression), which in turn 
mediates the effect of ingroup-affirmation on collective guilt. Taken together, these 
results indicate that ingroup-affirmation allows members of perpetrator groups to accept 
greater collective guilt by lowering their guard against social identity threat. 
Attempting to contribute to the growing literature aimed at disentangling 
collective guilt and collective shame (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; Brown et al., 2008), I 
measured collective shame in addition to collective guilt in Studies 3 through 5. Results 
revealed that, like collective guilt, affirming the ingroup appears to have enabled 
Canadians to acknowledge greater collective shame. Thus, like collective guilt, members 
of perpetrator groups seemed more willing to openly acknowledge collective shame after 
they have lowered their guard against the negative evaluative implications of the ingroup 
transgression. Moreover, the effect of ingroup-affirmation on collective shame was 
mediated by defensiveness. Taken together then, by disarming the social identity threat 
posed by an ingroup transgression, ingroup-affirmation circumvented the need to engage 
in defensive strategies to deal with the shameful event. As a result, group members 
appear to have been more willing to admit collective shame. 
Results also revealed that the affirmation manipulation differentially moderated 
the relations of collective guilt and collective shame with compensation. Specifically, 
when controlling for the other emotion, compensatory attitudes were predicted primarily 
by collective shame in the non-affirmation condition, but by collective guilt in the 
ingroup-affirmation condition (with the exception of personal willingness to compensate 
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each of the outcome variables is still at the very least marginally mediated by 
defensiveness, z > 1.88, p < .06. 
As in Studies 3 and 4, CFA using maximum-likelihood estimation were 
performed via AMOS 7 to test how well the two factor model fit the data. All indicators 
loaded strongly and significantly on their respective factors. Specifically, the 
standardized loadings ranged from .75 to .89 for the collective guilt items; ranged from 
.81 to .91 for the collective shame items; and all/?s < .01. This model did provide a 
reasonable fit to the data, £ (8) = 13.567,/? = .09, CFI = .966, RMSEA = .132. For 
comparison, a single factor model with the collective guilt and collective shame items all 
loading onto one factor was also tested. All indicators loaded significantly onto the single 
factor. Specifically, the standardized loadings ranged from .73 to .79 for the collective 
guilt items; ranged from .82 to .88 for the collective shame items; and all/?s < .001. 
However, this model did not provide good fit to the data, *£ (9) = 25.584,/? < .01, CFI = 
.898, RMSEA = .215. Moreover, the comparison between the two factor model and the 
one factor model was significant, % difference (1) = 12.017, p < .01, again indicating that 
the two-factor model is preferred over the one-factor model. 
I conducted a second series of mediation analyses in an attempt to rule out the 
reverse causality models - that the effect of affirmation on defensiveness is mediated by 
any of collective guilt, collective shame, compensation support, or personal willingness. 
As already established, ingroup-affirmation had an effect on defensiveness (fi = -.33, 
/(39) — 2.15,/? = .04); and on each of the other variables: collective guilt, /? = .33, t{2>9) = 
2.17,/? = .04; collective shame,/? = .29, /(39) = 1.85,/? = .07; support for compensation,/? 
= .32, ^(39) = 2.12,/? = .04, and; personal willingness to compensate, P = .36, ^(39) = 
2.38, p = .02. Next, I separately regressed defensiveness onto affirmation and each of the 
other variables. Specifically, across these regression analyses, people who acknowledged 
less collective guilt, /? = -.61, ^(38) = -4.14, p < .01; acknowledged less collective shame, 
P = -.42, /(38) = -2.88, p < .01; were less supportive of compensation, /? = -.74, /(38) = -
6.69,p < .01; and were less personally willing to compensate, /? = -.65, t(3&) =-5A5,p< 
.01, were all high in defensiveness. In contrast, the effect of ingroup-affirmation on 
defensiveness was eliminated in each case. Specifically, when controlling for either 
collective guilt, collective shame, support for compensation, or personal willingness, the 
effects of affirmation on defensiveness were all reduced to non-significance, |/?|s < .2\,ps 
> . 16. A series of Sobel tests confirmed that the effect of ingroup-affirmation on 
collective guilt was significantly mediated by defensiveness, z = 1.97, p = .05; the effect 
on support for compensation was significantly mediated by defensiveness, z = 2.02, p = 
.04; and the effect on personal willingness to compensate was significantly mediated by 
defensiveness, z = 2.16, p = .03. The only mediation path that was not significant was 
through collective shame, z = 1.61,/? = .11. Unfortunately, these results create some 
ambiguity concerning the causal direction of this model. For instance, although existing 
theory may support the former, in this sample it is unclear empirically whether 
affirmation reduces defensiveness which in turn increases guilt, or although theoretically 
less plausible if affirmation increases guilt which in turn decreases defensiveness. One 
potential reason for this ambiguity may be that some aspects of the defensiveness 
measure may conceptually overlap with some aspects of the collective guilt measure. For 
instance, some of the defensive items involve mental undoing of the appraisals required 
to elicit collective guilt. As such, meditation analysis may be unable to ascertain a 
86 
in Study 3, which was driven by collective guilt in both conditions). I interpret these 
results as evidence that, when people reflect on an ingroup transgression, social identity 
threat compels the image concerns associated with collective shame to override any 
empathic concern for the victims. Under such circumstances, reparation appears to 
function primarily to alleviate collective shame by restoring the ingroup's integrity. In 
contrast, when social identity threat is disarmed, although group members are more likely 
to acknowledge collective shame, it appears that this shame no longer possesses the same 
aversive quality that group members are motivated to alleviate. Instead, an empathic 
concern associated with collective guilt comes to the forefront to motivate reparation. 
Thus, the current research provides further support for Brown and Cehajic's (2008) 
contention that collective guilt and collective shame may both lead to the same 
behavioural outcome - compensation - albeit for very different reasons. 
Co-occurrence of Collective Guilt and Collective Shame 
Across Studies 3 to 5, participants' reports of collective guilt and collective shame 
were strongly correlated. Such results lend further credence to previous theorizing and 
research that guilt and shame can be felt at the same time (Brown & Cehajic, 2008; 
Brown et al., 2008; Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1991; Tangney et al., 1992b). The co-
occurrence of collective guilt and collective shame may seem somewhat counterintuitive 
as these two emotions seem to be quite at odds with one another. For example, shame is 
described as a "self-focused" concern over the identity or image of the ingroup, and has 
even been found to be inversely related to the "other-focused" empathic concern 
associated with guilt (Tangney, 1990). Given their seemingly incompatibility, how does a 
person actually feel when they acknowledge both guilt and shame? One answer to this 
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question is that, even though both emotions can co-occur in response to an ingroup 
transgression, only one or the other may be reflective of a person's driving or core 
emotional reaction at any one moment. In this manner, even though an individual may 
experience both collective guilt and collective shame regarding an ingroup transgression, 
how they feel at any one moment, and consequently how they react, should be driven 
either by guilt or by shame. Specifically, when collective guilt is prominent, the negative 
affect experienced in response to an ingroup transgression should arise mostly out of an 
empathic concern for the consequences of the transgression on others. In contrast, when 
collective shame is given prominence, the negative affect should be driven primarily by a 
preoccupation with the group's tarnished image. 
Brown et al. (2008) similarly argued that when collective shame is more 
prominent than collective guilt, the empathic concern associated with guilt will be 
inhibited as people will be more concerned with repairing any potential harm to their 
ingroup's image or identity. However, when collective shame is not prominent, it will no 
longer act to inhibit the underlying processes of collective guilt, such that collective guilt 
would then be free to motivate attempts to repair or undo the harm inflicted by the 
ingroup. In support of their reasoning, Brown et al. (2008) examined the interaction 
between collective guilt and collective shame in a longitudinal study. Their results 
revealed that Chileans' initial feelings of collective guilt (at Time 1) over their historic 
oppression of the Mapuch were associated with subsequent reparation attitudes six-
months later (at Time 2). However, the relation between initial guilt and subsequent 
reparation attitudes was moderated by initial feelings of collective shame. Specifically, 
the link between initial guilt and subsequent reparation only persisted for those who 
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reported low levels of collective shame. In contrast, for those with high initial collective 
shame, the positive long-term consequences of guilt appeared to have been suppressed. 
Unfortunately, Brown et al. (2008) did not include any measure of defensiveness or 
withdrawal, so they could not test the parallel model for collective shame - whether the 
relation between initial collective shame and subsequent withdrawal/defensiveness would 
be similarly moderated across different levels of collective guilt. Therefore, the bi-
directionality of the inhibiting influence of collective guilt and collective shame upon 
each other remains as of yet unclear. For instance, does it work in both directions, such 
that the egoistic concerns associated with collective shame are similarly inhibited at high 
levels of collective guilt? Although only speculated upon, the general consensus seems 
to be that this is not the case, that instead collective guilt only comes into play when the 
image concerns associated with shame have been alleviated (Brown et al., 2008; Harvey 
& Oswald, 2000). 
Predominance of Collective Shame over Collective Guilt 
If only one of collective guilt or collective shame can reflect how one truly feels 
in any given moment, then when exactly is one emotion granted prominence over the 
other emotion? The simple answer is that whenever a transgression impugns the character 
of the ingroup, perpetrator groups' affective responses should be driven mostly by 
collective shame. Therefore, any time that the ingroup is negatively evaluated for its 
transgression (either by oneself, by the victim group, or even by a neutral observer 
group), collective shame should be given prominence, thus undermining the empathic 
concern associated with collective guilt. Having said this, I suspect that, in most cases, 
when people reflect on an ingroup's transgression they will be primarily concerned about 
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the potential implications that the transgression has for their social identity. Specifically, 
as potential harm to oneself should be more salient and motivating than potential harm to 
others, the identity concerns associated with collective shame should take precedence for 
most people over any concerns for the victim group's suffering. In this manner, people 
must first rise above any self-centered concerns associated with collective shame before 
they can act on their guilt. In accordance with this reasoning, Harvey and Oswald (2000) 
speculated that mere exposure to an ingroup's culpability for harming another group is 
likely to result in antisocial, rather than pro-social, attitudes toward the victim group. As 
more concrete evidence that people are initially driven more by shame-related identity 
concerns than by collective guilt, Studies 3 and 4 demonstrated that, in the non-
affirmation condition, participants' reparatory attitudes were associated with collective 
shame and not collective guilt. In other words, in the condition that approximates the 
normal circumstances in which people are confronted with an ingroup transgression, 
endorsing compensation seemed to be more motivated by image-repair concerns than by 
any genuine concern for the victim group. 
Potential Confounding of Collective Guilt with Collective Shame 
Given the theoretical distinction between collective guilt and collective shame, it 
may have seemed reasonable in Studies 3 to 5 to expect that ingroup-affirmation would 
have very different effects on the two emotions - alleviating collective shame while 
simultaneously facilitating collective guilt. So how to explain the finding that ingroup-
affirmation appeared to have facilitated both collective guilt and collective shame? 
Perhaps the simplest answer is that ingroup-affirmation allowed people to openly 
acknowledge collective shame, but that the component of collective shame concerned 
with the ingroup's identity or image had been effectively assuaged. In this manner, 
having been deprived of its overriding concern, the functional utility of collective shame 
may have faded to the back. It turns out that participants were indeed quite willing to 
acknowledge the ingroup transgression as shameful in the ingroup-affirmation condition. 
Moreover, it appears that the collective shame reported in the ingroup-affirmation 
condition, although still acknowledged, had been rendered relatively inert. Specifically, 
in the ingroup-affirmation condition, compensation appears to have been driven primarily 
by collective guilt and not collective shame. 
Given the strong correlations that have been found between guilt and shame at 
both the individual and group levels (e.g., Brown et al., 2008; Harvey & Oswald, 2000; 
Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Lickel et al., 2005; Tangney et al., 1992a), and the fact that 
the terms are often used interchangeably, people may not always be able to distinguish 
between their feelings of collective guilt and collective shame. Consistent with this 
possibility, literatures on emotional intelligence (e.g., Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, 
& Palfai, 1995) and emotional differentiation (e.g., Barrett, Gross, Christensen, & 
Benvenuto, 2001) indicate that people vary in their ability to effectively discriminate 
between, and label, their emotions. Therefore, a second, more complicated, possibility for 
why participants' reports of collective guilt and collective shame were similarly affected 
by ingroup-affirmation is that participants did not sufficiently distinguish between the 
two emotions. How exactly could an inability to distinguish between the two emotions 
lead participants to report greater collective shame in the ingroup-affirmation condition? 
Given that the threat of the ingroup transgression should have been attenuated in the 
ingroup-affirmation condition, participants may not have been basing their responses to 
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the collective shame measure on any distress over the ingroup's image. Instead, due to an 
inability to distinguish between the two emotions, they may have based their responses 
on the greater empathy toward the victims that they experienced in that condition. Hence, 
the negative affect that participants reported in this condition may generally have 
reflected collective guilt, regardless of whether they labeled it as guilt or shame. 
One implication of this potential confound is that, in the non-affirmation 
condition - where social identity threat should outweigh a concern for others -
participants may have based their responses on the collective guilt measure off of their 
feelings of collective shame. Indeed, people are reluctant to acknowledge shame due to 
its negative evaluative implications for identity, so a potential confounding between the 
two emotions might explain why people are also reluctant to acknowledge guilt in that 
condition. This reasoning would also give us a different perspective with which to view 
the null effects for compensation obtained in Studies 1 and 2. In both studies, although 
collective guilt was boosted after ingroup-affirmation, compensatory attitudes were not, 
suggesting a possible disconnect between the two in one of the conditions. Arguing 
against any disconnect though, simple regressions revealed collective guilt to be a 
significant predictor of compensation in both conditions. However, if people were indeed 
confusing their feelings of collective shame as collective guilt in the non-affirmation 
conditions, then the compensation they reported in the non-affirmation condition may 
really have been driven by a superficial desire to appear compassionate and guilty rather 
than by any true concern for the victim's welfare. The potential confounding between 
collective guilt and collective shame may even have implications for the interpretation for 
previous research. For instance, arguing for collective guilt as a self-focused affect, 
Miron and colleagues (2006) found that, when controlling for one another, only self-
oriented distress, and not empathic concern, predicted men's "collective guilt" due to 
gender inequality. However, if participants were not able to clearly distinguish between 
their feelings of collective guilt and collective shame, then regardless of which emotion 
they had labeled it as, the negative affect that participants reported may generally have 
reflected collective shame, which would better account for why it was driven by a self-
oriented distress. Such reasoning is in accordance with the conceptualization of shame-
fused guilt, in which it is not guilt per se that is associated with self-protective concerns 
and psychological maladjustment, but it is the variance in guilt that can be accounted for 
by shame (Tangney, 1996). 
Note that in Studies 1 and 2,1 only measured collective guilt. The potential 
confounding between collective guilt and collective shame may particularly be a problem 
when using a measure of only guilt or only shame. Specifically, when not designed to 
take into account their theoretical difference, responses on such measures may reflect 
both emotions. The problem of such confounded measures is that they may obscure the 
different functions and consequences of guilt and shame (Tangney, 1996). To address this 
issue, I introduced collective shame measures in Studies 3 to 5 to examine the relations of 
each emotion with compensation while controlling for the other. In accord with the 
possibility that the two emotions were confounded, there appeared to be considerable 
shared variance between measures as they were strongly correlated across all three 
studies. However, arguing against the possibility that collective guilt and collective 
shame were fully confounded, the residual variance of each emotion - what is left after 
controlling for the other emotion - was found to differentially predict compensation 
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between conditions in a manner that was consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of 
guilt and shame. Specifically, shame-free collective guilt was linked to compensation in 
the ingroup-affirmation condition (where identity threat was buffered), whereas guilt-free 
collective shame was linked to compensation in the non-affirmation condition (where 
identity threat was left unchecked). Therefore, it appears that participants were not 
completely unable to distinguish between collective guilt and collective shame in each 
condition. Instead, although they may be somewhat conflated, there appears to be a 
glimmer of each pure emotion captured within its appropriate measure. Taken together 
then, these results stress the importance for future research to employ valid measures of 
both collective guilt and collective shame to better disentangle the unique roles each 
plays for various psychological and social processes. For instance, whereas the current 
research has focused on the unique roles of each emotion in predicting subsequent 
compensation, future research may want to examine their unique roles in predicting 
subsequent face-saving attempts or reappraisals of the ingroup transgression. Such 
research would be expected to find that subsequent defensiveness is predicted by guilt-
free collective shame rather than shame-free collective guilt (although presumably neither 
would be predictive in an ingroup-affirmation condition). 
Potential Limitations & Future Directions 
One of the premises in the current research is that collective guilt is a rare 
phenomenon. Specifically, members of perpetrator groups engage in various defensive 
strategies to protect their social identity, which also have the side effect of undermining 
collective guilt. To illustrate the role of defensiveness in inhibiting collective guilt, I 
demonstrated that members of perpetrator groups report less collective guilt when they 
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need to actively defend against such identity threat (non-affirmation condition) than when 
identity threat has been mitigated (ingroup-affirmation condition). However, a potential 
shortcoming of these studies is that there was no true baseline to support the notion of the 
rarity of collective guilt. For instance, I never included a condition in which members of 
a perpetrator group indicated how guilty they felt for a non-injustice event, or even for an 
outgroup injustice event. If I had run such a condition, it very well may have revealed 
that, although participants in the non-affirmation condition only reported modest levels of 
guilt, they are still reporting relatively more guilt than would be expected from a truly 
non-guilt eliciting situation. These baseline conditions were not included because it 
seemed odd to ask people how guilty they feel for a totally neutral event and then 
consider it news that they do not. Having said all this, in previous research that I have 
been involved with has revealed the collective guilt reported by Germans for the 
Holocaust to be just as low as the collective guilt reported by Canadians (a neutral third-
party sample) for the Holocaust (Peetz et al., 2009). Therefore, there is evidence for the 
rarity of collective guilt in the absence of ingroup-affirmation, as members of perpetrator 
groups do not always indicate greater collective guilt in response to an ingroup-
transgression than in response to an outgroup-transgression that should have little 
relevance for them. 
Within any perpetrator group, there are likely to be a whole assortment of 
individual differences which influence the extent to which its members acknowledge 
collective guilt and/or collective shame. Unfortunately, participants in the current 
research may only reflect a limited subset of the targeted perpetrator groups. Specifically, 
consisting almost exclusively of undergraduate students, the samples may have been 
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relatively limited in terms of age, demographic backgrounds, life experiences, or even 
political engagement. Using such limited samples can cast doubt on the generalizability 
of the current findings to perpetrator groups as a whole. For instance, if undergraduate 
students are generally not aware of their ingroup's transgression, their emotional 
reactions may not be as strong or as clear compared to other group members more 
familiar with the transgression. On the other hand though, individuals who are more 
familiar with an ingroup transgression may have already developed well-practiced 
defences against the immoral implications, such that their affective responses may be 
inhibited. Hoping to address these potential concerns, I attempted in Study 4 to recruit 
participants from online discussion forums and post ads, but met with little success as 
people were not interested in, or were skeptical of, disclosing their personal opinions 
online. Regardless, future attempts should be made to replicate the current findings in a 
more diverse and representational sample of a perpetrator group. More consideration 
should also be given to how individual differences within a perpetrator group on various 
personality and psychological factors (e.g., ingroup identification, left-wing liberalism 
versus right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, belief in a just world, 
etc.) may moderate the impact of ingroup-affirmation on collective guilt. For instance, 
some people may readily acknowledge collective guilt on their own, such that ingroup-
affirmation has no additional effect. Alternatively, ingroup affirmation may not be 
effective in facilitating collective guilt for individuals who engage in defensives 
strategies for reasons other than protecting identity. 
In the current research, I have generally accepted the criteria set forth by 
Branscombe and colleagues (2002) for collective guilt to be experienced. Specifically, 
collective guilt will occur when: a) one self-categorizes as a member of a group; b) one 
perceives that ingroup as responsible for harming another group; and c) one perceives the 
harm inflicted by the ingroup as illegitimate or immoral. However, in light of the 
theoretical distinction between collective guilt and collective shame, it may be 
worthwhile to disentangle which criteria are actually necessary for eliciting which 
emotion. For instance, as collective guilt is driven primarily by a concern for the harm 
that one's ingroup has inflicted on others, the first two criteria may be sufficient on their 
own for the experience of collective guilt. Specifically, individuals should experience 
collective guilt when they categorize themselves as part of a group, and when they 
perceive that ingroup as responsible for harming another group. However, when just 
these two criteria are met, there is not yet any judgement about the ingroup's behaviour, 
such that there may be no implications for the ingroup's perceived morality. In contrast, 
the third criterion seems to have some bearing for the ingroup's perceived morality, such 
that perceiving the harm as illegitimate or immoral might be an antecedent for collective 
shame more so than collective guilt. Unfortunately, disentangling which specific criteria 
are required to elicit collective guilt versus collective shame is beyond the scope of the 
current research. However, through manipulating the perceived illegitimacy of the harm 
inflicted by an ingroup (which corresponds to the third criteria), prior research has 
demonstrated that perceived illegitimacy evokes a self-oriented stress, but has little 
bearing on the empathic concern for the victim group (Miron et al., 2006). Although the 
authors interpreted the self-oriented stress as the underlying process of collective guilt, I 
interpret it to be more theoretically consistent with the underlying processes of collective 
shame. Not to discount the role of empathy in intergroup transgressions, the authors 
speculated that empathy toward the victim group is aroused not by the perceived 
illegitimacy of that harm, but by the perceived severity of the harm inflicted by the 
ingroup, which seems to correspond most closely with the second criteria. To follow up, 
future research should manipulate each of the criteria to examine their independent 
effects on valid measures of both collective guilt and collective shame. 
The current research illustrated the different roles that collective guilt and 
collective shame appeared to have played in facilitating reparation across the two 
conditions. Specifically, guilt-free collective shame appears to have been the driving 
force behind compensatory attitudes when the ingroup transgression posed a social 
identity threat, whereas shame-free collective guilt appears to have been the driving force 
when the social identity threat was buffered. However, one concern with this 
interpretation is that it is concluded from participants' self-reports of compensation. It is 
not certain that this pattern of relations would persist if I had measured actual 
compensation. Alleviating this concern to some extent, a case has been made that, 
relative to a more general self-reported support for compensation, self-reported 
willingness to engage in specific actions (as would be reflected in the checklists that I 
provided participants with) is a strong predictor of actual behaviour (Leach, Iyer, & 
Pedersen, 2007). Regardless, future studies may want to follow self-report measures with 
an actual opportunity to engage in reparative behaviour, particularly some form that 
involves a cost to oneself or an ingroup (e.g., donate money, commit personal time to a 
protest/rally, signing a petition in favour of granting greater rights or funds to the victim 
group over the ingroup, etc.). Indeed, it would be interesting to investigate which group 
members - those driven primarily by collective guilt or those by collective shame - are 
more willing to put their money where their mouth is (so to speak). In accordance with 
Brown et al.'s (2008) reasoning that members of perpetrator groups may seek out other 
means to restore their ingroup's integrity when reparation proves too costly or effortful, I 
would expect collective guilt to be a stronger predictor than collective shame of actually 
following through with a self-reported willingness to compensate. 
The current research has illustrated how members of a perpetrator group are more 
willing to acknowledge collective guilt after they have had a chance to affirm their 
ingroup. These findings raise the question of exactly what is ingroup-affirmation doing? 
In accord with previous research (Derks et al., 2006, 2007; Sherman et al., 2007), I argue 
that ingroup-affirmation functions in much the same way as self-affirmation does. 
Specifically, when threatened in one domain, group members can restore their ingroup's 
integrity by affirming that ingroup in another unrelated domain. In the context of 
intergroup injustices, an ingroup transgression should threaten group members' 
perceptions of their ingroup as being fair and moral. However, by reflecting on other 
positively valued aspects of the ingroup, group members can buffer the negative impact 
of this threat on their social identity. In turn, by allowing group members to feel secure 
about their ingroup's worth and integrity, ingroup-affirmation precludes the need to 
defensively re-appraise the injustice. As a result, group members are free to acknowledge 
the ingroup's transgression and confess guilt. One limitation of the affirmation task used 
in the current research is that some of the values that participants were presented with 
(i.e., concern for others, social issues, politics) may conceivably have been directly 
related to the source of their social identity threat (i.e., perceiving the ingroup as immoral 
or unjust toward other groups). One concern is that, although unaware that they would be 
reading about an ingroup injustice, group members may still have reflected on "justice-
related" values because ingroup morality is an important component of a positive social 
identity (Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007). If this were the case, then participants may 
have experienced a state of cognitive dissonance when afterwards presented with 
information about the ingroup's unjust or immoral actions. In other words, participants 
may have accepted greater collective guilt in the ingroup-affirmation condition not 
because the affirmation task buffered the impact of the social identity threat, but because 
the injustice was judged even harsher in light of the ingroup's justice or egalitarian ideals. 
Although this alternative explanation seems plausible, it is unlikely to fully account for 
the effect of ingroup-affirmation on collective guilt, as this effect persisted in Study 2 
where I removed any potentially justice-related values from the affirmation task. 
Regardless, one way for future research to disentangle the different routes by which 
ingroup-affirmation may increase collective guilt is to randomly assign participants to a 
condition where they are either able to re-establish their ingroup's worth and integrity by 
reflecting on a positive but unrelated value (e.g., hardworking, intelligence), or instead 
are made to experience a sense of hypocrisy by reflecting on a positive but related value 
(e.g., equality, concern for others). 
In the current research, participants were given an opportunity to affirm their 
ingroups. Specifically, they buffered the threat to their social identity by reflecting on 
other positively valued aspects of the ingroup. However, considerable research has shown 
that affirmations of the personal self can also be effective at attenuating social identity 
threats (see Sherman & Cohen, 2006, for a review). For instance, after having an 
opportunity to affirm their personal sense of self, members of sports teams were less 
likely to attribute a victory to their team's performance and conversely more likely to 
attribute a loss to their team's performance (Sherman & Kim, 2005); members of 
advantaged groups are less likely to deny the role that racism plays in maintaining the 
current status quo (Adams, Tormala, & O'Brien, 2006; Unzueta & Lowery, 2008); 
patriotic Americans were less likely to invalidate an article critical of the United States 
(Cohen, Sherman, Bastardi, Hsu, McGoey, & Ross, 2004); and Whites who had just 
watched a civil-rights protest were more supportive of Black programs (Harvey & 
Oswald, 2000). Within the context of the current research then, one might expect self-
affirmation to have the same effect on collective guilt as ingroup-affirmation - that 
people would accept greater collective guilt after having an opportunity to affirm their 
personal self than when given no such opportunity. There is reason to suspect however 
that self-affirmation may not necessarily facilitate collective guilt. Through an implicit 
measurement of self versus group focus, ingroup-affirmation has been found to increase 
the cognitive salience of one's social self, whereas self-affirmation increases the 
cognitive salience of one's individual self (Derks, Van Laar, & Ellemers, 2009). 
Therefore, after engaging in self-affirmation, people may tend to define themselves in 
terms of their unique qualities that set them apart from others, which would preclude 
defining themselves in terms of the groups to which they belong. Thus, self-affirmation 
may attenuate social identity threat and decrease defensiveness by decoupling the self 
from the group. However, recall that in order for people to experience collective guilt, 
they must first categorize themselves as a member of the perpetrator group. If people no 
longer categorize themselves as a member of an ingroup after self-affirmation though, 
then they may no longer experience collective guilt for that ingroup's transgressions. In 
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light of these considerations, one interesting avenue for future research would be to 
disentangle the effects of self- versus ingroup-affirmation on collective guilt and 
collective shame. 
Finally, note that the ingroup-transgressions that I have targeted in the current 
research are historical rather than current and ongoing ones. One benefit of using historic 
injustices is that there is often greater awareness or acknowledgment of them, particularly 
relative to many forms of current inequality which are often subtle, hidden, or denied 
(Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995). Moreover, despite having occurred in the past, 
many historic injustices still represent an ongoing concern that continues to define the 
intergroup relations between current members of the perpetrator and victim groups. For 
instance, the issue of whether collective guilt and reparations is an appropriate response 
to long past sins is currently debated in the political arenas of many nations today. 
Indeed, people continue to be bitterly divided on these issues. For example, as a 
descendant of those affected by Canada's anti-Chinese policies between 1885 and 1947, 
Yew Lee asserts, "When you speak about the Head Tax, people often see it as in the 
distant past. But for me and many others, it is a family legacy that still needs to be 
resolved" (If 4). A potential concern of using historic injustices though is how much one 
can be expected to feel guilty for something that happened so long ago. Indeed, that there 
appear to be quite a few 'outs' for historic injustices that are not applicable for ongoing 
injustices (i.e., happened in the past, things are better now, I was not even alive, etc.). So 
maybe historic injustices are just not perceived as relevant enough to evoke very strong 
feelings of guilt in the first place? However, it does not seem to be the case that collective 
guilt simply does not exist for historical injustices, as the current research demonstrates 
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that people do acknowledge collective guilt for historic injustices once social identity 
threat has been attenuated. Having said all this, by focusing on historic injustices, I do not 
mean to imply that the processes I am proposing in the current research are unique to 
only past harms. On the contrary, the same processes should apply for perpetrators of 
more recent injustices. With this in mind, future studies should seek to establish that 
ingroup-affirmation can reduce defensiveness, and thus increase collective guilt, for more 
recent injustices and societal issues. For instance, many current injustices occur within 
the context of ongoing conflict, where intergroup hostility and animosity can stack the 
odds against the emergence of collective guilt (Wohl et al., 2006). However, ingroup 
affirmation may allow members of both sides of the conflict to rise above their hatred and 
acknowledge guilt for the pain and suffering they have inflicted upon each other, which 
may go a long way in de-escalating any further conflict. 
Conclusion 
The current research increases our understanding of how social identity threat 
contributes to the rarity of collective guilt. Many of the defensive strategies employed by 
members of perpetrator groups to protect their social identity from threat have the side 
effect of undermining collective guilt and its pro-social consequences. In some cases, 
where the perpetrator group has adequately atoned for its wrongdoings and the victim 
group has forgiven and moved on, it seemingly would be quite adaptive for members of 
the perpetrator group to put to rest any feelings of collective guilt. On the other hand, in 
the many other cases where the harms have not been redressed, denial of collective guilt 
may only exacerbate the tensions that exist between groups and pose a major hurdle 
toward reconciliation. However, the current research indicates that all hope is not lost. 
For starters, the link between collective shame and reparation reveals that collective guilt 
is not always necessary for members of perpetrator groups to engage in reparative 
behaviours, although reparation in these cases may not be as genuine in nature as when 
elicited by collective guilt. On top of that, the current research illustrates one way in 
which perpetrator groups can alleviate threat without undermining collective guilt. 
Specifically, affirming other aspects of the ingroup allows perpetrator groups to 
acknowledge greater collective guilt. Such findings could have important implications for 
the reconciliation between perpetrator and victim groups. When seeking an apology or 
reparation, simply confronting the perpetrator group about their unjust actions may 
backfire, as the perpetrator group may turn to various defensive strategies to protect their 
social identity. Indeed, such a straightforward approach may actually exacerbate the 
conflict, as the perceived minimization or legitimization of the transgression that often 
results from defensiveness may lead to further disagreements between groups that can be 
very difficult to reconcile. However, combining appeals for atonement with reaffirming 
messages may provide the perpetrator group a means to salvage their social identity such 
that they can consequently be more open minded about working together with the victim 
group to resolve the injustice in a way that is fair to all parties involved. Thus, once 
coupled with group-affirmation, collective guilt may prove to be a motivating force for 
improving the relations between groups with a history of conflict. 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for Study 1 
Importance of value to men 
Appraisal of ingroup accountability 
Appraisal of unjustness 
Collective guilt 
General support for compensation 
Personal willingness to compensate 
Affirmation 
8.60 a 
(1.07) 
5.00a 
(1.59) 
5.84 a 
(1.19) 
4.70 a 
(1.35) 
-.02a 
(.91) 
•05
 a 
(1.01) 
Control 
3.52b 
(1.78) 
4.81
 a 
(1.54) 
5.62 a 
(97) 
3.76
 b 
(1.29) 
•04a 
(87) 
-.09a 
(.82) 
Note: Different subscripts indicate significant differences between conditions 
Table 2 
Bivariate Correlations for Study 1 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 Importance of value to men 
- Appraisal of ingroup ,-, 
accountability 
3 Appraisal of unjustness .09 .24f 
4 Collective guilt .31* .28* .07 
r General support for 
compensation 
, Personal willingness to 
compensate 
t / ? < . 1 0 ; * » < . 0 5 ; * * p < . 0 1 
-.05 .12 .19 .47** 
.02 .10 .10 .37** .65** 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Study 2 
Importance of value to Canadians 
Appraisal of ingroup accountability 
Appraisal of unjustness 
Collective guilt 
General support for compensation 
Personal willingness to compensate 
Affirmation 
8.35 a 
(.98) 
4.78 a 
(1.35) 
6.43
 a 
(1.12) 
5.72 a 
(1.02) 
• 10a 
(88) 
.05
 a 
(98) 
Control 
4.83
 b 
(1.63) 
4.21a 
(1.59) 
6.17a 
(1.34) 
4.91
 b 
(1.37) 
-•10a 
(92) 
-.05a 
(88) 
Note: Different subscripts indicate significant differences between conditions 
Table 4 
Bivariate Correlations for Study 2 
, Importance of value to 
Canadians 
~ Appraisal of ingroup ~~ 
accountability 
3 Appraisal of unjustness .22 .36* 
4 Collective guilt .41** .43** .49** 
5 General support for 1 9 ^ ^ M^ ^ ^ 
compensation 
6 Personal willingness to 2^ ^* ^ 5^* 6 5** 
compensate 
t / ? < . 1 0 ; * » < . 0 5 ; * * p < . 0 1 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Statistics for Study 3 
Importance of value to Canadians 
Appraisal of negative impact 
Appraisal of ingroup accountability 
Appraisal of unjustness 
Collective guilt 
Collective shame 
General support for compensation 
Personal willingness to compensate 
Affirmation 
8.32 a 
(1.38) 
5.97
 a 
(1.35) 
4.70
 a 
(1.88) 
6.48 a 
(1.18) 
5.82 a 
(1.21) 
5.66 a 
(1.32) 
•22
 a 
(1.03) 
•20
 a 
(99) 
Control 
3.50b 
(1.82) 
6.00 a 
(1.19) 
4.29
 a 
(1.80) 
6.2U 
(1.18) 
4.86
 b 
(1.50) 
4.86
 b 
(1.74) 
-.23b 
C7o; 
-.20
 b 
(85) 
Note: Different subscripts indicate significant differences between conditions with one 
exception: the difference for personal willingness to compensate is marginal (p = .10) 
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Table 6 
Bivariate Correlations for Study 3 
. Importance of value to 
Canadians 
2 Appraisal of negative impact .01 
3 Appraisal of ingroup Q 4 4 3 + % 
accountability 
4 Appraisal of unjustness .02 .67** .42** 
5 Collective guilt .27* .26* .44* .35** 
6 Collective Shame .21f .54** .37** .58** .60 
j General support tor 29* 29* 42** 48** .46** .48* 
compensation 
o rersonal willingness to 2fi* 15 11* 17** 'SR** 4<** 63** 
compensate 
He He 
f / ?< .10 ; * / ?< .05 ;** ; ?< .01 
Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics for Study 4 
Importance of value to Canadians 
Appraisal of negative impact 
Appraisal of ingroup accountability 
Appraisal of unjustness 
Collective guilt 
Collective shame 
General support for compensation 
Personal willingness to compensate 
Affirmation 
8.12a 
(1.19) 
6.24
 a 
(.97) 
4.33 a 
(1.73) 
6.55
 a 
(62) 
5.17a 
(1.14) 
5.49 a 
(1.04) 
•08
 a 
(81) 
•10a 
(83) 
Control 
4.38
 b 
(1.72) 
5.85 a 
(1.26) 
4A4a 
(1.56) 
6.62 a 
(70) 
4.49
 b 
(1.47) 
4.82 b 
(1.25) 
-.10a 
(93) 
-•12a 
(.93) 
Note: Different subscripts indicate significant differences between conditions 
Table 8 
Bivariate Correlations for Study 4 
, Importance of value to 
Canadians 
2 Appraisal of negative impact 
-, Appraisal of ingroup 
accountability 
4 Appraisal of unjustness 
5 Collective guilt 
6 Collective shame 
7 General support for 
compensation 
„ Personal willingness to 
compensate 
f p < . 1 0 ; * /?< .05; **/?< .01 
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Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics for Study 5 
Affirmation Control 
Importance of value to Canadians 
Defensiveness 
Collective guilt 
Collective shame 
General Support for Compensation 
Personal Willingness to Compensate 
Note: Different subscripts indicate significant differences between conditions with one 
exception: the difference for collective shame is marginal (p = .07) 
7.70
 a 
(1.08) 
-.72
 a 
(1.24) 
4.42
 a 
(1.60) 
5.32
 a 
(1.02) 
•30
 a 
(.87) 
.34
 a 
(.99) 
3.14b 
(2.20) 
.02
 b 
(.96) 
3.38
 b 
(1.47) 
4.61b 
(1.38) 
-.27b 
(.84) 
- .31b 
(77) 
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Table 10 
Bivariate Correlations for Study 5 
* Importance of value to 
Canadians 
2 Defensiveness -.16 
3 Collective guilt .26 -.65** 
4 Collective shame .20 -.48** .77** 
^ General Support for
 2Q _ ^^^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Compensation 
6 Personal Willingness to 2 g _6g+Hc 7()!|t+ 56!M! 66!Mc 
Compensate 
f / ?< .10; * p < .05; * * p < .01 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. Affirmation moderating the relation between collective guilt (controlling for 
collective shame) and support for compensation in Study 3. 
Figure 2. Affirmation moderating the relation between collective shame (controlling for 
collective guilt) and support for compensation in Study 3. 
Figure 3. Affirmation moderating the relation between collective guilt (controlling for 
collective shame) and support for compensation in Study 4. 
Figure 4. Affirmation moderating the relation between collective shame (controlling for 
collective guilt) and support for compensation in Study 4. 
Figure 5. Affirmation moderating the relation between collective guilt (controlling for 
collective shame) and personal willingness to compensate in Study 4. 
Figure 6. Affirmation moderating the relation between collective shame (controlling for 
collective guilt) and personal willingness to compensate in Study 4. 
Figure 7. Defensiveness as a mediator for the effect of affirmation (0 = non-affirmation; 
1 = ingroup-affirmation) on collective guilt in Study 5. 
Figure 8. Defensiveness as a mediator for the effect of affirmation (0 = non-affirmation; 
1 = ingroup-affirmation) on collective shame in Study 5. 
Figure 9. Defensiveness as a mediator for the effect of affirmation (0 = non-affirmation; 
1 = ingroup-affirmation) on support for compensation in Study 5. 
Figure 10. Defensiveness as a mediator for the effect of affirmation (0 = non-affirmation; 
1 = ingroup-affirmation) on personal willingness to compensate in Study 5. 
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Footnotes 
1
 Due to the limits to sample size, the power of the study was quite low. A review 
of past studies which were successfully able to move collective guilt around via 
manipulated independent variables, and in which either the effect sizes themselves or the 
information needed to calculate the effect sizes were actually provided (Doosje et al., 
1998; Miron et al., 2006; Powell et al., 2005; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008), revealed effect 
sizes that when converted to eta squares (n ) ranged from .044 to .085. Note that the 
center of these n2 falls approximately at .06, which is a medium effect size according to 
Cohen's (1988) conventions. To have been able to detect an effect size of .06 with 80% 
power (using a one-way analysis of variance with two levels at a .05 significance level), I 
would have needed 64 participants within each condition. In reality, my sample sizes 
were much lower (n = 31 for the ingroup-affirmation condition and n = 22 for the non-
affirmation condition). Calculating the harmonic mean revealed that I had the equivalent 
of two equal samples each with n = 25.1 A. With such a small sample size, the power of 
my study to detect a medium effect size of .06 was only 42%. Fortunately though, due to 
•y
 # 
the observed effect size (n
 partiai ~ -11) being much larger than the expected effect size, 
Study 1 was still able to detect a significant effect of affirmation on collective guilt, albeit 
with an observed power of only 71%. 
All regression analyses were conducted according to the guidelines provided by 
Aiken and West (1991). For instance, when regressing either of the compensation 
variables onto the affirmation manipulation and collective guilt, the affirmation 
manipulation was dummy coded (0 = non-affirmation; 1 = ingroup-affirmation) and the 
collective guilt variable was centered on its mean. The affirmation manipulation and 
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collective guilt were then entered into the regression as predictor variables in step 1, and 
their corresponding interaction term was entered in step 2. 
As in Study 1, due to the limits to sample size (n = 23 for the ingroup-
affirmation condition and n = 24 for the non-affirmation condition), the power of Study 2 
was quite low. Calculating the harmonic mean revealed that I had the equivalent of two 
equal samples each with n = 23.48. With such a small sample size, the power of my study 
to detect a medium effect size of .06 is only 40%. However, again the observed effect 
size (n
 partiai = .10) was much larger than the expected effect size, such that Study 2 was 
still able to detect a significant effect of affirmation on collective guilt, albeit with an 
observed power of only 61%. 
4
 As in the previous studies, due to the limits to sample size (n = 31 for the 
ingroup-affirmation condition and n = 28 for the non-affirmation condition), the power of 
Study 3 was low. Calculating the harmonic mean revealed that I had the equivalent of 
two equal samples each with n = 29.42. With such a small sample size, the power of my 
study to detect a medium effect size of .06 is only 46%. However, again the observed 
effect size (n
 partjai = .12) was much larger than the expected effect size, such that Study 3 
was still able to detect a significant effect of affirmation on collective guilt with an 
observed power of 77%. Although the small sample size may not have hindered the 
studies ability to detect a significant effect for collective guilt, it may have accounted for 
why the effect on affirmation was only found to be marginally significant despite being 
medium in size (r)2Partiai = -07). Indeed, the observed power for the effect of affirmation 
on collective shame was only 51%. Low power may also have accounted for why both 
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the collective guilt and collective shame interactions with ingroup-affirmation on general 
support for compensation were only found to be marginal. 
To test the fit of the model suggested by the principle-axis factor analysis, 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using maximum-likelihood estimation were also 
performed via AMOS 7. Specifically, I specified a two factor model with the 3 collective 
guilt items loading only onto one factor and the three collective shame items loading only 
onto the other factor. All indicators loaded strongly and significantly on their respective 
factors. Specifically, the standardized loadings ranged from .76 to .94 for the collective 
guilt items; ranged from .81 to .96 for the collective shame items; and allps < .01. 
Unfortunately, this model generally did not provide a good fit to the data, •£ (8) = 19.232, 
p = .01, Comparative Fit Index (CFI) = .953, Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA) = .156. However, keep in mind that relative to the other fit indices, the CFI is 
recommended for smaller sample like those within this study (Pugesek, Tomer, von Eye, 
2003), and by exceeding the cutoff of .95 does suggest reasonable fit to the data. For 
comparison, I also specified a single factor model with the collective guilt and collective 
shame items all loading onto one factor. All indicators loaded significantly onto the 
single factor, albeit not as strongly as they had loaded onto their corresponding factor in 
the two factor model. Specifically, the standardized loadings ranged from .63 to .76 for 
the collective guilt items; ranged from .76 to .90 for the collective shame items; and all ps 
< .001. Moreover, this model seemingly provided even worse fit to the data, ft2 (9) = 
61.387, p < .01, CFI = .782, RMSEA = .317. Indeed, the comparison between the two 
factor model and the one factor model was significant, % difference (1) = 42.155, p < .01, 
indicating that the two-factor model fit the data better than the one-factor model. 
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6
 The affirmation manipulation was dummy coded (0 = non-affirmation; 1 = 
ingroup-affirmatiori) and both the collective guilt and collective shame variables were 
centered on their own means. The affirmation manipulation, collective guilt, and 
collective shame were entered into the regression as predictor variables in step 1. The 
corresponding two-way interaction terms (i.e., affirmation X collective guilt; affirmation 
X collective shame; and collective guilt X collective shame) were entered in step 2. 
Finally, the three-way interaction term (i.e., affirmation X collective guilt X collective 
shame) was entered in step 3. 
7
 As in the previous studies, due to the limits to sample size (n = 33 for the 
ingroup-affirmation condition and n = 26 for the non-affirmation condition), the power of 
Study 4 was quite low. Calculating the harmonic mean revealed that I had the equivalent 
of two equal samples each with n = 29.08. With such a small sample size, the power of 
my study to detect a medium effect size of .06 is only 46%. However, again the observed 
effect size on collective guilt (r|
 partiai = .07) was larger than the expected effect size, such 
that Study 4 was still able to detect a significant effect of affirmation, although just barely 
in this case with an observed power of 51%. Similarly, the observed effect size on 
collective shame (r^ panjai = .08) was also larger than the expected effect size, such that 
Study 4 was also able to detect a significant effect of affirmation on collective shame, 
albeit with an observed power of only 61%. 
Q 
As in Study 3, CFA using maximum-likelihood estimation was performed via 
AMOS 7 to test how well the two factor model fit the data. All indicators loaded strongly 
and significantly on their respective factors. Specifically, the standardized loadings 
ranged from .91 to .97 for the collective guilt items; ranged from .80 to .88 for the 
collective shame items; and all/?s < .01. This model did provide a reasonable fit to the 
data, x2 (8) = 11.751,/? = .16, CFI = .987, RMSEA = .090. For comparison, a single 
factor model with the collective guilt and collective shame items all loading onto one 
factor was also tested. All indicators loaded significantly onto the single factor, albeit not 
as strongly as they had loaded onto their corresponding factor in the two factor model. 
Specifically, the standardized loadings ranged from .63 to .76 for the collective guilt 
items; ranged from .76 to .90 for the collective shame items; and all/?s < .001. However, 
this model did not provide good fit to the data, x2 (9) = 64.232,/? < .01, CFI = .802, 
RMSEA = .325. Moreover, the comparison between the two factor model and the one 
factor model was significant, x2 difference (1) = 52.479, p < .01, indicating that the two-
factor model is preferred over the one-factor model. 
9
 As in the previous studies, due to the limits to sample size (n = 20 for the 
ingroup-affirmation condition and n = 21 for the non-affirmation condition), the power of 
Study 5 was quite low. Calculating the harmonic mean revealed that I had the equivalent 
of two equal samples each with n = 20.49. With such a small sample size, the power of 
my study to detect a medium effect size of .06 is only 35%. However, again the observed 
effect size (r|2partiai = • 11) was much larger than the expected effect size, such that Study 5 
was still able to detect a significant effect of affirmation on collective guilt, albeit only 
with an observed power of 56%. In contrast, the low power may have accounted for why 
the effect on affirmation on collective shame was found only to be marginally significant 
despite being medium in size (ri2Partiai = -08). Indeed, the observed power for the effect of 
affirmation on collective shame was only 44%. 
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10An exploratory PA factor analysis with a direct oblimin rotation was conducted 
to examine for underlying factors. The scree plot leveled off after the second factor and 
the eigenvalues of the remaining factors were all at or below 1. Thus, the defensiveness 
items generally loaded onto two separate underlying factors, which accounted for 56.71% 
of their variance. After rotation, the structure matrix showed that: items 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 
11, and 12 loaded most strongly onto a first factor (ranging from .428 to .834); and items 
4, 7, and 10 loaded most strongly onto a second factor (ranging from .517 to .658). 
However, a simple inspection of the items in each grouping does not reveal any clear and 
straightforward theoretical distinction between them. As such, I opted to aggregate them 
all into one general measure, such that higher positive scores reflect greater 
defensiveness. 
1
 To minimize any potential confounding between collective guilt and collective 
shame, participants in the current study completed the three items for one emotion before 
receiving the three items for the other emotion on a new webpage (as opposed to 
receiving them all at once and interspersed amongst each other as in Studies 3 and 4). 
Note that participants were randomly assigned to complete either the collective guilt 
items or the collective shame items first. However, the predicted effect of affirmation on 
collective guilt and collective shame was only obtained for participants who completed 
the collective guilt items before the collective shame items. Specifically, participants who 
completed the collective shame items first did not report significantly greater collective 
guilt in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= 4.03, SD = 1.23) than in the non-
affirmation condition (M= 3.81, SD = 1.60), F(l, 42) = .27,p = .61, n2partiai = .01. 
Moreover, they actually reported less rather than greater collective shame in the ingroup-
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affirmation condition (M= 4.37, SD = 1.42) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= 
4.76, SD = 1.42), albeit non-significantly, F(l, 42) = .75,p = .39, n2partiai = -02. It is 
difficult to speculate why completing the collective shame items first may have affected 
participants' responses. One potential reason though is that, unlike for participants who 
indicated their collective guilt first, the ingroup-affirmation did not effectively buffer the 
social identity threat for participants who indicated their collective shame first, which 
would then account for the null effects observed on the collective guilt and collective 
shame measures. In support of this explanation, for some reason, participants did not rate 
the defensive statements as being less valid in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= -
.67, SD = 1.11) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= -.42, SD = 1.07), F(l, 43) = 
.60, p = .44, r^ partjai = .01. This particular result is unlikely to have been due to completing 
the shame measure before the guilt measure, as participants completed the defensive 
measure before either of the emotion measures. Therefore, for the sake of clarity, I limit 
my analyses only to those participants who completed the collective guilt items before 
the collective shame items. It should be noted though that the predicted pattern of results 
does generally persist when both participants who completed the collective guilt items 
first and those who completed the collective shame items first are included. For instance, 
overall, participants rated the defensive statements as being less valid in the ingroup-
affirmation condition (M= -.72, SD = 1.24) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= 
.02, SD = .96), F(l, 82) = 4.31, p = .04, n2partiai = .05. The order that they completed the 
collective emotion items did not have a significant effect, nor did it interact with the 
affirmation manipulation, Fs < 1.08?jps > .42. Moreover, participants also reported 
significantly greater collective guilt in the ingroup-affirmation condition (M= 4.23, SD = 
132 
1.42) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= 3.61, SD = 1.53), F(l, 81) = 3.82,p = 
.05, impartial = .05. The order that they completed the collective emotion items did not have 
a significant effect, nor did it interact with the affirmation manipulation, Fs < 1.57,/?s > 
.21. However, participants did not report greater collective shame in the ingroup-
affirmation condition (M= 4.84, SD = 1.39) than in the non-affirmation condition (M= 
4.69, SD = 1.39), F(l, 81) = 1.89, p = . 18, r|2partiai = -02. The order that they completed the 
collective emotion items did not have a significant effect, F(\, 81) = .28,/? = .60, 
T| partial < .01; but it did marginally interact with the affirmation manipulation, F{\, 81) = 
3.40, p = .07, T| partial < -04. Tests of simple effects confirmed that participants reported 
marginally greater collective shame in the ingroup-affirmation condition than in the non-
affirmation condition when they completed the collective guilt items first, /(39) = 1.85,/? 
= .07, Cohen's d = .57; but not at all when they completed the collective shame items 
first, t(42) = .86,p = .39, Cohen's d = .25. Further tests revealed that the order in which 
participants completed the collective emotion items seems to only have had an effect in 
the ingroup-affirmation condition. Specifically, collective shame did not differ between 
those who completed the collective guilt items first and those who completed the 
collective shame items first in the non-affirmation condition, /(43) = .35,p = .73, Cohen's 
d = . 10. However, in the ingroup-affirmation condition, participants who completed the 
shame items first reported significantly less shame than those who reported the guilt 
items first, r(38) = -2.26,p = .03, Cohen's d = .70, again suggesting that for some reason 
the ingroup affirmation was not effective for participants who completed the shame items 
first. Finally, a series of Sobel tests confirmed that the effect of ingroup-affirmation on 
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specific causal ordering because, to some extent, the defensiveness and collective guilt 
measures tap into the same underlying construct. As such, future research should attempt 
to refine the defensiveness measure to distinguish it from the specific appraisals involved 
in collective guilt. 
Appendices 
Appendix A: Background Survey in Study 1 
1) What is your age? 
2) What gender do you identify yourself as? 
Male Female Other (e.g., asexual, transsexual, etc.) 
Please specify 
3) What is your ethnicity? Please check one 
Aboriginal/Native Asian Black 
East Indian Hispanic Middle Eastern 
White Other 
5) Which specific ethnic group do you most identify with? (e.g., Chinese, Irish, 
Jewish, etc.) 
6) In which country were you born? 
7) If not Canada, how long have you lived in Canada? 
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Appendix B: Ingroup Affirmation in Study 1 
Thinking about Group Values 
We are interested in the collective attitudes and values shared by members of various social 
groups. We are all members of different social groups or social categories. One such social group 
pertains to gender, whether one identifies oneself as male or female. We would like you to 
consider your particular gender group (i.e., females/males), and from the list of values printed 
below, please circle the value that is the most important to men, generally. If the value that you 
feel is most important to women/men is not on the list, then you may add it in and use it to answer 
the questions on this page. 
self-discipline 
loyalty 
appearance/fashion 
patience 
self-respect 
athletics 
other value: 
family 
creativity 
concern for others 
religion/spirituality 
friendships 
business/money 
politics 
originality 
honesty 
social issues 
independence 
social skills 
How important is this value for men in general? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
not at all 
important 
10 
extremely 
important 
Please write a paragraph describing the reasons why this value generally tends to be important 
to men. 
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Appendix C: Non-Affirmation in Study 1 
Thinking About Group Values 
We are interested in the collective attitudes and values shared by members of various social 
groups. We are all members of different social groups or social categories. One such social group 
pertains to gender, whether one identifies oneself as male or female. We would like you to 
consider your particular gender group (i.e., females/males), and from the list of values printed 
below, please circle the value that is the least important to men, generally. If the value that you 
feel is least important to women/men is not on the list, then you may add it in and use it to answer 
the questions on this page. 
self-discipline 
loyalty 
appearance/fashion 
patience 
self-respect 
athletics 
other value: 
family 
creativity 
concern for others 
religion/spirituality 
friendships 
business/money 
politics 
originality 
honesty 
social issues 
independence 
social skills 
How important is this value for men in general? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 
not at all 
important 
10 
extremely 
important 
Please write a paragraph describing the reasons why this value might be important to other social 
groups (i.e., age, race, socio-economic status, etc.). Do not describe why it is unimportant to 
men - focus only on its importance for other social groups. 
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Appendix D: Collective Guilt in Study 1 
We would like you to consider the past treatment of women, and respond to the following 
statements on the basis of how you currently feel about each statement. There are no right 
or wrong answers; we are interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read 
each statement carefully and respond by using the following scale: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly slightly slightly strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
I feel guilty about the negative things that men have done to women 
I feel regret about things that men have done to women in the past 
I feel regret for the harmful past actions of men toward women 
4. I can easily feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by women in the 
past 
Appendix E: Compensation in Study 1 
1. Should women be compensated because of the past injustices committed by men 
against women? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Should not be Should be 
compensated compensated 
2. Which forms of compensation would you like to see offered to women in response to 
the treatment of women in 1900? (check all that apply)? 
Nothing 
Formal apology 
Community support for women's groups 
Programs to educate about gender issues 
Greater protection for victims of domestic violence 
Stricter laws against gender inequality 
Greater support for affirmative action policies in the workplace 
Monetary compensation 
3. To what degree are you personally willing to take action to ensure that women are 
compensated for the past injustices committed by men against women? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not willing to Willing to 
compensate compensate 
4. What kind of activities would you personally be willing to do to promote gender 
equality? (check all that apply) 
Nothing 
Keep informed on gender issues 
Take a class on gender issues 
Discuss gender issues amongst friends and family 
Sign a petition 
Write a letter to a politician 
Take part in a protest/march/rally 
Volunteer for groups aimed at reducing gender inequality 
Donate money to an organization aimed at reducing gender inequality 
Appendix F: Injustice Appraisals in Study 1 
Please respond to the following questions by indicating your personal opinion or belief: 
1 How unjust was the treatment of women in 1900? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Extremely 
unjust unjust 
2. To what degree were men initially accountable for the treatment of women in 1900? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Fully 
accountable accountable 
3. To what degree do women today still experience negative consequences resulting 
from the treatment of women in 1900? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No current Severe current 
consequences consequences 
4. To what degree can men still be held accountable for the past treatment of women? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Fully 
accountable accountable 
5. How much have women's rights improved from 1900 to the present in Canada? 
1 2 3 4 - 5 6 7 
No Dramatic 
improvement improvement 
Appendix G: Statistics for the non-criterion Injustice Appraisals from Study 1 
Mean and Standard . , „ „ . 
with Collective Deviation 
3.23 
Guilt 
To what degree do women today still - „ _ 
experience negative consequences resulting a in\ •^* 
from the treatment of women in 1900? ' 
To what degree can men still be held 
accountable for the past treatment of (f/i6\ .54** 
women? 
.03 How much have women's rights improved 5.89
 + 
from 1900 to the present in Canada? (1.12) 
Note: For the descriptive statistics column,'+' indicates a mean to be significantly 
above the midpoint, whereas ' - ' indicates a mean to be significantly below the 
midpoint. For the correlation columns, f p < • 10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
Appendix H: Background Survey in Studies 2, 3, 4, & 5 
1) What is your age? 
2) 
3) 
What gender do you identify yourself as? 
Male / Female 
What is your racial background? Please check one 
Aboriginal/Native Asian 
East Indian Hispanic 
White Other 
Black 
Middle Eastern 
5) Which specific ethnic/cultural group do you most identify with (e.g., Chinese, 
Irish, Jewish, etc.)? 
6) How much do you identify with your ethnic/cultural group? 
1 . — 2 - — 3 - — 4 - — 5 -— 6 - — 7 - — 8 -—9 - — 10 
Not at all Very much 
7) In which country were you born? 
8) If not Canada, how long have you lived in Canada? 
9) Do you identify yourself as being Canadian? 
Yes / No 
10) How much do you identify yourself as being Canadian? 
1 . — 2 - — 3 - — 4 - — 5 - — 6 -— 7 - — 8 -—9 - — 10 
Not at all Very much 
11) How important is being Canadian to your sense of self? 
1 . — 2 - — 3 - — 4 - — 5 -— 6 - — 7 - — 8 -—9 - — 10 
Not at all Very much 
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Appendix I: Injustice Information in Studies 2, 3, 4, & 5 
Canada's Mistreatment of Aboriginal Children in Residential Schools 
By the early twentieth century, Canada had come to view Aboriginals' "savage" way of life as a 
threat to "civilized" society. Hoping to eliminate this problem, Canada passed the Indian Act in 1920 
to make attendance at federally-funded residential schools mandatory for all Aboriginal children 
between the ages of 7 and 18. At their peak in the 1930's, there were 82 residential schools scattered 
across the country. As a consequence, thousands of Aboriginal children were removed, often 
forcibly, from their families and communities and shipped hundreds of miles to these residential 
schools. Those parents who refused to send their children were threatened with prison sentences. 
Although the Aboriginal communities had been promised that their youth would be educated at these 
schools, the children were typically not allowed to progress past a grade three education. Moreover, 
attempts at literary education were almost non-existent, as most students came away without 
knowing how to read. Instead of preparing Aboriginal children to be productive members of society, 
Canada's real aim was to "kill the Indian in the child" by destroying their sense of Aboriginal culture 
and identity. To this end, Aboriginal children were purposely isolated from parental and cultural 
influences. For example, Aboriginal parents had been required by law to sign over legal custody of 
their children to the schools' principals, thereby losing their visitation rights. As a result, often for 
years at a time, students had little to no contact with their families. Moreover, they were prohibited 
from speaking Aboriginal languages or practicing Aboriginal rituals. Those caught doing so, even if 
only amongst themselves, were more often than not severely beaten. Violence became commonplace 
in these residential schools, as most Aboriginal students experienced some form of physical, 
emotional, or even sexual abuse at the hands of their teachers and principals. On top of such abuse, 
these children were subjected to exceptionally harsh conditions. Due to poor funding, nearly all 
students were forced into either manual labour or farming to help sustain the schools. On top of that, 
they were often poorly fed and housed in crowded quarters. Such squalid living conditions led to 
rampant disease and death. Although ignored by government officials and public alike, mortality 
rates in these schools ranged from 35% to 60%. The most frequent cause of death was the disease 
tuberculosis, of which over 50% of the students were diagnosed with. In many residential schools, 
healthy Aboriginal children were purposely exposed to those with tuberculosis and then left 
untreated. Resident schools began to decline during the 1940's, although the last residential school 
was not closed until 1996. In that time, a total of 160,000 Aboriginal children had been forced 
through the system. Of those, there were over 50,000 deaths and another 91,000 reports of physical, 
emotional, and sexual abuse. 
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Appendix J: Ingroup Affirmation in Study 2 
Thinking about Group Values 
We are interested in the collective attitudes and values shared by members of various social 
groups. We are all members of different social groups or social categories. One such social group 
pertains to nationality (i.e., the country with which you identify yourself with). From the list of 
values printed below, please circle the value that is the most important to Canadians, 
generally. 
family 
integrity 
art & creativity 
business/money 
hard working 
friendships 
independence 
knowledge 
self-respect 
1) How important is this value for Canadians in general? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all 
important 
10 
extremely 
important 
2) Please provide two reasons why this value generally tends to be important to Canadians. 
3) Please provide one example of something that Canadians have done to demonstrate this 
value 
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Appendix K: Non-Affirmation in Study 2 
Thinking about Group Values 
We are interested in the collective attitudes and values shared by members of various social 
groups. We are all members of different social groups or social categories. One such social group 
pertains to nationality (i.e., the country with which you identify yourself with). From the list of 
values printed below, please circle the value that is the least important to Canadians, 
generally. 
family 
integrity 
art & creativity 
business/money 
hard working 
friendships 
independence 
knowledge 
self-respect 
1) How important is this value for Canadians in general? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
not at all 
important 
10 
extremely 
important 
2) Please provide two reasons why this value might be important to another nationality (e.g., 
Americans, Chinese, Iranians, etc.). 
3) Please provide one example of something that this other nationality has done to demonstrate 
this value. 
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Appendix L: Collective Guilt in Study 2 
We would like you to consider the mistreatment of Aboriginal children in residential 
schools, and respond to each of the following statements on the basis of how you 
personally feel right at this moment. There are no right or wrong answers; we are 
interested in your honest reactions and opinions. Please read each statement carefully and 
respond by using the following scale: 
1 
strongly 
disagree 
— 2 - - 3 
slightly 
disagree 
.... 4 .... 5 
slightly 
agree 
.... 6 — 7 
strongly 
agree 
1. I feel guilty about the negative things that Canada has done to Aboriginal 
children 
2. I feel regret about the things that Canada has done to Aboriginal children 
in the past 
3 I feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by Aboriginal children in the 
past 
4. I feel regret for the harmful past actions of Canada toward Aboriginal 
children 
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Appendix M: Compensation in Studies 2, 3, 4, & 5 
1. Should Aboriginals be compensated by Canada for the harms they endured in 
residential schools? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Should not be Should be 
compensated compensated 
2. Which specific forms of compensation would you like to see Canada offer 
Aboriginals (check beside all that apply)? 
Nothing 
Formal apology 
Memorial dedicated to the Aboriginals forced to attend residential schools 
Programs to educate Canadians about the mistreatment of Aboriginals 
Community support for Aboriginal communities 
Monetary compensation to remaining survivors of the residential schools 
Other: Please specify 
3. How willing are you personally to take action to ensure that the harms committed 
against Aboriginals in residential schools are redressed? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not willing to Willing to 
compensate compensate 
Which activities are you personally willing to partake in to ensure that the harms 
committed against Aboriginals in residential schools are redressed (check beside all 
that apply)? 
Nothing 
Discuss the mistreatment of Aboriginals amongst friends and family 
Sign a petition 
Write a letter to a politician 
Take part in a protest/march/rally 
Volunteer for groups aimed at educating about the mistreatment of Aboriginals 
Donate money 
Other: Please specify 
Appendix N: Injustice Appraisals in Study 2 
Please respond to the following questions by indicating your personal opinion or belief: 
1 How unjust was the treatment of Aboriginal children at these residential schools? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Extremely 
unjust unjust 
2. Can Canada be held accountable for the past treatment of Aboriginal children in 
residential schools? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Fully 
accountable accountable 
3. Do Aboriginals today still experience negative consequences as a result of their 
treatment in these residential schools? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No current Severe current 
consequences consequences 
4. To what extent do Aboriginals continue to face discrimination today? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Not at all Fully 
accountable accountable 
5. Has Canada done enough to make amends to the Aboriginal communities? 
1 2 3 4 - 5 6 7 
Not More than 
enough enough 
1 
Appendix O: Statistics for the non-criterion Injustice Appraisals from Study 2 
Mean and Standard .„, _ „
 A. 
with Collective Deviation Guilt 
Do Aboriginals today still experience . _„ 
negative consequences as a result of their n s-n -22 
treatment in these residential schools? {1.57) 
To what extent do Aboriginals continue to 3.85 
face discrimination today? (7.19) 
Has Canada done enough to make amends 4.63 + 
to the Aboriginal communities? (1-22) 
Note: For the descriptive statistics column,'+' indicates a mean to be significantly 
above the midpoint, whereas ' - ' indicates a mean to be significantly below the 
midpoint. For the correlation columns, f p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
.08 
-.24 
151 
Appendix P: Ingroup-Affirmation in Studies 3, 4 & 5 
Thinking about Group Values 
We are interested in the collective attitudes and values shared by members of various social 
groups. We are all members of different social groups or social categories. One such social group 
pertains to nationality (i.e., the country with which you identify yourself with). From the list of 
values printed below, please circle the value that is the most important to Canadians, generally. 
If the value that you feel is most important to Canadians is not on the list, then you may add it in 
and use it to answer the questions on this page. 
family 
integrity 
honesty 
knowledge 
other value: 
hard-working 
originality 
independence 
self-respect 
1) How important is this value for Canadians in general? 
0 1 2 3 
not at all 
important 
4 5 6 7 
politics 
concern for others 
art & fashion 
religion/spirituality 
8 9 10 
extremely 
important 
2) Please explain why this value generally tends to be important to Canadians. 
3) Please provide one example of what Canadians have done to demonstrate this value 
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Appendix Q: Non-Affirmation in Studies 3, 4 & 5 
Thinking about Group Values 
We are interested in the collective attitudes and values shared by members of various social 
groups. We are all members of different social groups or social categories. One such social group 
pertains to nationality (i.e., the country with which you identify yourself with). From the list of 
values printed below, please circle the value that is the least important to Canadians, generally. 
If the value that you feel is least important to Canadians is not on the list, then you may add it in 
and use it to answer the questions on this page. 
family 
integrity 
honesty 
knowledge 
other value: 
hard-working 
originality 
independence 
self-respect 
politics 
concern for others 
art & fashion 
religion/spirituality 
1) How important is this value for Canadians in general? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 
not at all 
important 
extremely 
important 
2) Please explain why this value generally tends to be important to some other nationality (i.e., 
Americans, Germans, Chinese, etc.). Do not describe why it is unimportant to Canadians -
focus only on its importance for some other nationality. 
3) Please provide one example of what this other nationality has demonstrated this value 
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Appendix R: Collective Guilt & Collective Shame in Study 3 
We would like you to consider the Aboriginal children in residential schools, and respond 
to the following statements. Please base your responses on how you feel right at this 
moment as a Canadian. Please read each statement carefully and respond by using the 
following scale: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly slightly slightly strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
I feel guilty for the harm that Canada has caused to Aboriginals because of the 
residential schools 
2. I feel ashamed of how others might look at or think about Canada because of the 
harm inflicted against Aboriginals in residential schools 
I feel embarrassed because the mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential 
schools reflects poorly upon Canada 
I feel guilty for the negative things that Canada has done to Aboriginals in 
residential schools 
I feel regret about the harmful actions of Canada toward Aboriginals in 
residential schools 
6. I feel embarrassed because the mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential 
schools has created a negative image of Canada in the eyes of the world 
Note: Items 1, 4, and 5 measure collective guilt, whereas items 2, 3, and 6 measure 
collective shame 
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Appendix S: Injustice Appraisals in Studies 3 & 4 
Please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements using the following 
scale: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly slightly slightly strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
1. The treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools was unjust and unfair 
2. Aboriginals at the time experienced negative consequences as a result of their 
treatment in residential schools 
3. Aboriginals today still experience negative consequences as a result of their past 
treatment in residential schools 
4. Canada can be held accountable for the past treatment of Aboriginal children in 
residential schools 
5. Canada has already done enough to make amends to the Aboriginal communities 
6. Aboriginal rights have dramatically improved in Canada since the Indian Act was 
passed in 1920 
7. Discrimination against Aboriginals no longer exists in Canada today 
8. People should focus on today and not what happened in the past 
9. The treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools was fair according to 
the standards of the time 
10. The facts presented in the study about the treatment of Aboriginal children in 
residential schools are probably inaccurate or biased 
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Appendix T: Statistics for the non-criterion Injustice Appraisals from Study 3 
Mean and 
Standard 
Deviation 
with 
Collective 
Guilt 
with 
Collective 
Shame 
Aboriginals today still experience negative 
consequences as a result of their past 
treatment in residential schools 
4.60 + 
(1.75) .46 * * .38 * * 
Canada has already done enough to make 
amends to the Aboriginal communities 
Aboriginal rights have dramatically 
improved in Canada since the Indian Act 
was passed in 1920 
Discrimination against Aboriginals no 
longer exists in Canada today 
People should focus on today and not what 
happened in the past 
The treatment of Aboriginal children in 
residential schools was fair according to the 
standards of the time 
The facts presented in the study about the 
treatment of Aboriginal children in 
residential schools are probably inaccurate 
or biased 
3.95 
(1.62) 
4.49 + 
(1.47) 
2.61" 
{1.47) 
4.17 
(1.80) 
2.44" 
(1.55) 
2.84" 
(1.44) 
-.21* 
-.19 
.01 
-.28s1 
.14 
.38 * * 
.19 
.19 
-.06 
- .35** 
.17 
.48** 
Note: For the descriptive statistics column,'+' indicates a mean to be significantly 
above the midpoint, whereas ' - ' indicates a mean to be significantly below the 
midpoint. For the correlation columns, f p < .10; * p < . 05 ;**p<. 01 
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Appendix U: Collective Guilt & Collective Shame in Study 4 
We would like you to consider the Aboriginal children in residential schools, and respond 
to the following statements base on how you feel right at this moment as a Canadian. 
Please read each statement carefully and respond by using the following scale: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly slightly slightly strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
1. I feel ashamed because the mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential schools 
creates a negative image of Canada 
2. I feel guilty because of the harmful actions of Canada toward Aboriginals in 
residential schools 
3. How Canadians may be viewed by the rest of the world due to the way they 
treated Aboriginals in residential schools makes me feel ashamed 
4. Canada's mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential schools makes me feel 
guilty 
5. I feel ashamed because of how others might look at or think about Canada in 
response to the mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential schools 
6. The way Canadians treated Aboriginals in residential schools makes me feel 
guilty 
Note: Items 2, 4, and 6 measure collective guilt, whereas items 1,3, and 5 measure 
collective shame 
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Appendix V: Infrahumanization in Study 4 
Below is a list of various feelings and emotions. Please use the following scale to indicate 
the extent to which you think that Aboriginals in general are likely to feel each emotion. 
1 
Not at all Very much 
Pain 
Admiration 
Panic 
Love 
Pleasure 
Pride 
Attraction 
Embarrassment 
Irritation 
Sympathy 
Fear 
Resentment 
Surprise 
Shame 
Anger 
Remorse 
Excitement 
Guilt 
Hope Sadness 
Appendix W: Statistics for the non-criterion Injustice Appraisals from Study 4 
Mean and 
Standard 
Deviation 
r 
with 
Collective 
Guilt 
r 
with 
Collective 
Shame 
Aboriginals today still experience negative 
consequences as a result of their past 
treatment in residential schools 
Canada has already done enough to make 
amends to the Aboriginal communities 
Aboriginal rights have dramatically 
improved in Canada since the Indian Act 
was passed in 1920 
Discrimination against Aboriginals no 
longer exists in Canada today 
People should focus on today and not what 
happened in the past 
The treatment of Aboriginal children in 
residential schools was fair according to the 
standards of the time 
The facts presented in the study about the 
treatment of Aboriginal children in 
residential schools are probably inaccurate 
or biased 
4.88 + 
(1.51) 
3.58" 
(1.38) 
4.98 + 
(1.46) 
2.58" 
(1.18) 
3.91 
(1.68) 
2.29" 
(1.40) 
2.32" 
(1.29) 
.12 
.21 
.17 
.11 
-.11 
.06 
-.23f 
.29* 
-.29* 
-.17 
-.23f 
-.06 
-.11 
-.01 
Note: For the descriptive statistics column,'+' indicates a mean to be significantly 
above the midpoint, whereas ' - ' indicates a mean to be significantly below the 
midpoint. For the correlation columns, f p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
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Appendix X: Defensiveness in Study 5 
The treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools is a controversial issue as different 
people have different opinions. Below are listed some of the more common opinions that have 
been expressed in previous research. Please rate how valid or invalid you perceive each opinion 
to be. Even if they are not your personal opinions, rate each opinion according to how valid of an 
argument you think can be made to support it. 
-3 2 1 0 1 2 3 
very slightly slightly very 
invalid invalid valid valid 
"As a Canadian, I feel partially accountable for Canada's mistreatment of 
Aboriginals in residential schools and thus am obligated to ensure that everything 
has been done to atone for this wrong" 
2. "The way Aboriginals were treated in residential schools was unwarranted, but it 
happened so long ago and nothing can be done about it now. As such, it is not 
really an issue today, and we should be focusing on the present rather than what 
happened in the past" 
3. "You cannot blame Canadians in general for what happened as most Canadians 
probably didn't even know what was going on at the time. Only those 
government officials and school employees who were directly involved with the 
residential schools can be held accountable" 
4. "Canada had no right whatsoever to treat Aboriginal children in such an 
inhumane way. Despite what it claimed at the time, Canada was never under any 
threat of losing its identity to Aboriginal culture" 
5. "The treatment of Aboriginal children in residential schools reflected the norms 
of the time and should not be judged by today's standards of fairness" 
6. "What happened in those residential schools is regrettable, but I feel that 
Aboriginals are currently demanding too much in restitution. Aboriginals still 
bring up the residential schools in order to get things for free from Canada" 
7. "The impact of residential schools on Aboriginals continues to be felt today as 
many of the problems that Aboriginals face today (e.g., unemployment, crime, 
alcoholism, mood-disorders, etc.) can be attributed to the way their ancestors 
were treated in residential schools" 
8. "What happened in the residential schools was unfortunate, but I do not have 
much to say about it because I personally had nothing to do with it" 
"Canadians today should not be held accountable for what happened m the past. 
Most Canadians today were not even born when the residential schools were 
operating, and those individuals who were responsible are likely dead by now" 
"Canada should feel hypocritical for claiming to be a diverse and open-minded 
country despite the past measures it took in residential schools to wipe out 
Aboriginal culture" 
"I just do not want to talk about it anymore. This subject has come up far too 
often and I feel that the Aboriginal Peoples and everyone else should just move 
on" 
"I doubt the treatment of Aboriginal children was as bad as it is being made out 
to be. A lot of the "facts" seem to be biased so as to either emphasize how 
harshly they were treated or to discount the benefits of the residential schools 
(e.g., education, socialization, etc.)" 
, 4, 7, and 10 were reversed scored 
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Appendix Y: Collective Guilt in Study 5 
We would like you to consider Canada's treatment of Aboriginal children in residential 
schools, and respond to the following statements. Please base your responses on how you 
feel right at this moment. Please read each statement carefully and respond using the 
given scale: 
1 
strongly 
disagree 
.... 2 . . . 3 
slightly 
disagree 
— 4 — 5 
slightly 
agree 
.... 6 —• 7 
strongly 
agree 
1. I feel guilty because of the unjust actions of Canada toward Aboriginals in 
residential schools 
2. I do not feel any guilt over Canada's mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential 
schools 
The harm that we Canadians inflicted on Aboriginals in residential schools 
makes me feel guilty 
Note: Item 2 was reversed scored 
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Appendix Z: Collective Shame in Study 5 
We would like you to consider Canada's treatment of Aboriginal children in residential 
schools, and respond to the following statements. Please base your responses on how you 
feel right at this moment. Please read each statement carefully and respond using the 
given scale: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
strongly slightly slightly strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree 
I feel ashamed because the mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential schools 
creates a negative image of Canada 
How others might look at or think about Canada in response to the 
mistreatment of Aboriginals in residential schools makes me feel ashamed 
3. I do not feel any shame over how negatively Canadians may be viewed by the 
rest of the world in light of the way we treated Aboriginals in residential schools 
Note: Item 3 was reversed scored 
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